STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., District Judge.

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for a status conference on April 11, 2013 at 9:00 a.m.

2. By this stipulation, defendant Valentina Beknazarov now moves to continue the status conference until May 16, 2013, at 9:00 a.m. and to exclude time between April 11, 2013 and May 16, 2013 under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request, nor do unsevered co-defendants Anatoliy Beknazarov and Valeri Mysin.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. The government has provided defense counsel with the discovery associated with this case, which includes voluminous records, including mortgage and bank records involving multiple transactions. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying, and/or will be made available.

b. Counsel for defendants have been reviewing these materials, discussing them with their clients, and assessing potential trial and sentencing issues.

c. Additionally, the government has provided proposed plea agreements to Valentina and Anatoliy Beknazarov, which defense counsel have been discussing with their clients and the government.

d. Defense counsel needs additional time, taking into account the exercise of due diligence, to review the materials described above and to discuss them with his client, and otherwise effectively prepare for the disposition of this case. Based on the Court's available calendars and the availability of defense counsel, the parties ask that the Court set this matter for a status conference on May 16, 2013, at 9:00 a.m. and that it find excludable time from April 11, 2013 through and including the May 16, 2013 status conference. Because of the need for additional preparation outlined above, a denial of a continuance to May 16, 2013 would deny the parties the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case and excluding time as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of April 11, 2013 to May 16, 2013 inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED.