ORDER SETTING NEW STATUS CONFERENCE DATE FOR DEFENDANT ARMANDO VASQUEZ-BARRAGAN AND EXCLUDING TIME UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

LAWRENCE K. KARLTON, District Judge.

On April 9, 2013, the Court held a regularly scheduled status conference for defendant Armando Vasquez-Barragan only. Assistant United States Attorney Samuel Wong appeared on behalf of plaintiff United States of America. Defense attorney Danny Brace, Esq., appeared with defendant Armando Vasquez-Barragan, who was present in custody.

The parties advised the Court that Mr. Brace needed additional time to further investigate the case, attempt to settle this case, and advise the defendant of the ramifications of any settlement offer made to defendant. Defense counsel's task of conferring with defendant is made more difficult and requires more time because defendant is a Spanish language speaker and an English/Spanish interpreter must be used to facilitate communications between attorney and client.

The parties requested and agreed that: (1) the Court hold a status conference on May 21, 2013 at 9:15 a.m.; and (2) the time period from the April 9, 2013, hearing to, and including, the new status conference hearing on May 21, 2013, shall be excluded from computation of time within which the trial of this case must be commenced under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv), and Local Code T4 (both pertaining to additional time necessary for defense counsel to prepare).

Based on the representations and stipulations of the parties, and good cause appearing therefrom, the Court sets a new status conference hearing for defendant Vasquez-Barragan only on May 21, 2013, at 9:15 a.m. The Court orders that time from April 9, 2013, to, and including, May 21, 2013, shall be excluded from computation of time within which the trial of this case must be commenced under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv), and Local Code T4 pertaining to additional time necessary for defense preparation.

The Court finds that the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. The Court finds that the ends of justice to be served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and defendant in a speedy trial.

It is so ordered.