Filed: Nov. 19, 2013
Latest Update: Nov. 19, 2013
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge. STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on November 21, 2013. 2. By this stipulation, the government now moves to continue the status conference to December 12, 2013, and to exclude time between November 21, 2013, and December 12, 2013, under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: a) The
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge. STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on November 21, 2013. 2. By this stipulation, the government now moves to continue the status conference to December 12, 2013, and to exclude time between November 21, 2013, and December 12, 2013, under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: a) The g..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.
STIPULATION
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on November 21, 2013.
2. By this stipulation, the government now moves to continue the status conference to December 12, 2013, and to exclude time between November 21, 2013, and December 12, 2013, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government is conducting additional investigation, the outcome of which may result in a more favorable outcome for the defendants in this matter. The government needs additional time to conduct this follow-up investigation and review and consider its results.
b) The defense counsel will also need additional time to review the information acquired through this follow-up investigation with their clients, examine possible defenses in light of this information, discuss potential resolutions, and/or otherwise prepare for trial.
c) Counsel for defendants agree that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) Counsel for defendants do not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of November 21, 2013 to December 12, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at the parties' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
FINDINGS AND ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
