STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge.

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for a status conference on August 29, 2013 at 9:00 a.m.

2. By this stipulation, the parties move to continue the status conference until October 3, 2013, at 9:00 a.m. and to exclude time between August 29, 2013 and October 3, 2013 under Local Code T4.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. The government has provided defense counsel with discovery associated with this case, which includes several law enforcement reports and audio recordings. The government recently produced additional discovery to defendants, which includes several hundreds of pages of documents and additional audio recordings.

b. On July 10, 2013, defendant Malo-Vergera retained private counsel, who has a notice of substitution of counsel pending before the court. On July 18, 2013, defendant Junez-Ramirez appeared in magistrate court pursuant to a writ, and attorney Kyle Knapp was appointed to represent him. The government has produced discovery to these attorneys, and they need additional time to review it.

c. Based on the foregoing, defense counsel needs additional time, taking into account the exercise of due diligence, to review the materials described above and to discuss them with their clients, and otherwise effectively prepare for the disposition of this case. Based on the Court's available calendars and the availability of the parties, the parties ask that the Court set this matter for a status conference on October 3, 2013, at 9:00 a.m. and that it find excludable time from August 29, 2013 through and including the October 3, 2013 status conference. Because of the need for additional preparation outlined above, a denial of a continuance to October 3, 2013 would deny the parties the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case and excluding time as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of August 29, 2013 to October 3, 2013 inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED. The status conference currently scheduled for August 29, 2013, is hereby vacated and continued to October 3, 2013, at 9:00 a.m. in Courtroom 7. The time period between August 29, 2013 and October 3, 2013 is excluded under Local Code T4 for the reasons stated in the parties' stipulation. The Court finds that the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

IT IS SO ORDERED.