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U.S. v. LE, CR-S-10-443 JAM. (2012)

Court: District Court, E.D. California Number: infdco20121026a81 Visitors: 27
Filed: Oct. 25, 2012
Latest Update: Oct. 25, 2012
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge. The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Todd D. Leras, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Vi A. Le, John R. Manning, Esq., and counsel for defendant Dong Ping Huang, Olaf W. Hedberg, Esq., hereby stipulate the following: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference on October 30, 2012. 2. By this stipulation
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS

JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.

The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Todd D. Leras, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Vi A. Le, John R. Manning, Esq., and counsel for defendant Dong Ping Huang, Olaf W. Hedberg, Esq., hereby stipulate the following:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference on October 30, 2012.

2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until December 11, 2012 at 9:45 a.m., and to exclude time between October 30, 2012 and December 11, 2012 under the Local Code T-4 (to allow defense counsel time to prepare).

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request the Court find the following:

a. Counsel for the defendants need additional time to meet with the defendants (with interpreter) in order to complete their review of the discovery; investigation reports, discussion and analysis of relevant USSG calculations; and, review the plea agreements. b. This case includes 526 pages of discovery as well as one disc of video. c. The defendants require the services of a Cantonese interpreter in order to communicate effectively with counsel. d. Counsel for defendants believe the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. e. The Government does not object to the continuance. f. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. g. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv) within which trial must commence, the time period of October 30, 2012 to December 11, 2012, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv) corresponding to Local Code T-4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. 4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.

Source:  Leagle

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