EDWARD J. DAVILA, District Judge.
Plaintiffs Aurora Vasquez and Hector Lozano, Jr. bring claims arising from the death of pretrial detainee Hector Lozano. Defendant County of Santa Clara (and numerous individual defendants) now move for summary judgment on all claims. Defendants' motion will be granted.
On September 18, 2014, Hector Lozano was booked into the County of Santa Clara jail on attempted murder charges. First Am. Compl. ("FAC") ¶ 39, Dkt. No. 1-1; Pls.' Am. Responsive Separate Statement ("Separate Statement") ¶ 1, Dkt. No. 45-1 Ex. A. Over the next six months, Lozano—who had an extensive history of diagnosed mental illness—suffered several acute psychotic episodes and received treatment from mental health staff. FAC ¶¶ 40-75; Separate Statement ¶¶ 2-45.
On May 15, 2015, Lozano committed suicide in his jail cell. FAC ¶¶ 76; Separate Statement ¶ 46.
Plaintiffs are Lozano's mother and minor son. FAC ¶¶ 1-2. Defendants are the County of Santa Clara and several individual defendants who were involved with Lozano's medical care and housing.
"Summary judgment is proper where no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Plaintiffs bring three sets of claims: (1) the first, second, third, and fourth claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference (FAC ¶¶ 77-101); (2) the sixth claim for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") (FAC ¶¶ 106-12); and (3) the fifth and seventh claims for wrongful death and neglect of a dependent adult under California law (FAC ¶¶ 102-05, 113-120).
Plaintiffs bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of Lozano's First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights against the County and the individual defendants. FAC ¶¶ 77-101. Each claim asserts that the Defendants were "deliberately indifferent to Hector's serious medical needs and safety."
Correctional facility officers violate pretrial detainees' constitutional rights by acting with "deliberate indifference" to detainees' medical needs (including their need for care to prevent suicide).
The Ninth Circuit recently held that pretrial detainees' failure-to-protect claims under the Fourteenth Amendment (in contrast to claims under the Eighth Amendment) do not require a showing of the officer's subjective intent.
Jay Choi was a mental health therapist employed by the County. FAC ¶ 15; Defs.' Reply in Support of Mot. for Summ. J. ("Reply") 4, Dkt. No. 42. On May 13, 2015—two days before Lozano's suicide—Choi saw Lozano for a 15-minute welfare check, during which Lozano denied suicidal thoughts and reported that he was "doing pretty good." Opp'n 7, 14; MSJ 19. Choi determined that Lozano did not exhibit suicidal risk factors or self-harm behavior, and he decided to discontinue the 15-minute welfare checks. Opp'n 7, 14; MSJ 19. Choi recommended that Lozano be housed in "special management units," which house "inmates who are not under protective custody status and are seriously mentally ill or developmentally limited, but do not meet the criteria of an involuntary legal hold under section 5150." MSJ 3; Opp'n 7-8.
Plaintiffs do not disagree with Choi's professional determination that Lozano did not exhibit suicidal risk factors during his examination on May 13, 2015. Opp'n 14. Nor do Plaintiffs disagree with Choi's decision to discontinue 15-minute welfare checks.
These allegations do not establish that Choi subjected Lozano to a substantial risk of serious harm. Based on the undisputed facts, Choi reasonably determined that, during the May 13 examination, Lozano was not a suicide risk and was not experiencing an acute psychotic episode. It was appropriate for Choi to discontinue the 15-minute welfare checks. Even if Choi had a duty to challenge the prison's housing policies, there was no reason for him to do so under these circumstances, since the undisputed facts show that Lozano did not exhibit suicidal risk factors when Choi examined him—and Plaintiffs do not dispute that Choi properly determined that Lozano was not a suicide risk at the time Choi examined him. As such, Choi did not act with deliberate indifference and he is entitled to summary judgment.
Mark Navarette "was responsible for determining the proper classification and housing for inmates." FAC ¶ 16. As discussed above, on May 13 (two days before Lozano's suicide), Jay Choi recommended that Lozano be housed in "special management units" for inmates who "are seriously mentally ill or developmentally limited, but do not meet the criteria of an involuntary legal hold under section 5150." MSJ 3. However, despite Choi's recommendation, Navarette decided to house Lozano in "E-Dorm"—which Plaintiffs describe as "a solitary confinement/administrative segregation cell with numerous hanging points" (Opp'n 1-2) and which Defendants describe as "a maximum security unit" (MSJ 9).
Plaintiffs argue that Navarette's decision regarding Lozano's housing amounted to deliberate indifference because, at the time Navarette assigned him to E-Dorm, Lozano was at risk of committing suicide. Opp'n 14-15. However, when Navarette made his housing decision, there was no indication that Lozano was actively suicidal. Rather, as discussed above, Choi had examined Lozano immediately before Navarette's decision, and he determined that Lozano did not exhibit suicidal risk factors. As a result, Choi recommended ending the 15-minute welfare checks, and did not recommend that Lozano be housed in the specialized 8A units. Since Lozano was not suicidal at the time, Navarette's housing decision was reasonable and did not put Lozano at substantial risk of suffering serious harm.
Moreover, Navarette based his decision on the fact that Lozano had recently been criminally charged for "gassing" a correctional officer (i.e., filling a container with urine and feces and throwing it at the officer).
John Hirokawa was "the Santa Clara County Undersheriff and the Chief of Correction, the highest position in the Department of Correction." FAC ¶ 4. Plaintiffs allege that Hirokawa was deliberately indifferent to Lozano's medical needs because he knew that cells in the prison had not been retrofitted to make them suicide resistant. Opp'n 14. Plaintiffs further allege that Hirokawa knew that the prison's mental health services were "understaffed, overworked, and inadequate."
Defendants respond that Hirokawa was never personally involved with Lozano's medical treatment or decisions about his housing. MSJ 20-21. In addition, they argue that Hirokawa was never aware of Lozano's active and imminent risk of suicide.
At the time of his suicide, Lozano was housed in a cell that had not been retrofitted to be suicide resistant. However, at the time of his suicide, medical staff had determined that Lozano did not exhibit suicidal risk factors. Opp'n 7; MSJ 19. In addition, during the times when medical staff determined that Lozano was suicidal, he was housed in specialized units (including on 8A) where he could be closely monitored to prevent a suicide attempt. The evidence shows that, when Lozano exhibited suicidal risk factors, he was housed in areas designed to prevent suicide attempts. However, at the time of his suicide, there was no indication (in the medical staff's professional judgment) that Lozano was at risk for committing suicide—and as a result, there was no need for Lozano to be housed in a specially retrofitted cell. The lack of retrofitting does not establish that Hirokawa acted with deliberate indifference.
In addition, the evidence does not support Plaintiffs' claim that the prison's mental health services were "understaffed, overworked, and inadequate." Opp'n 14-15. Rather, the evidence suggests that the health staff regularly examined Lozano and took appropriate protective measures when they determined that Lozano's safety was at risk. For instance, on April 11-14, 2015, Lozano was placed on an involuntary 5150 psychiatric hold and specially housed in the 8A housing units. Reply 7; MSJ 17. On November 23-26, 2014, Lozano was placed on 15-minute welfare checks. MSJ 17. Lozano was again placed on 15-minute checks on May 10-13, 2015— until, as discussed above, Choi determined that 15-minute checks were no longer necessary because Lozano no longer exhibited suicidal risk factors.
Finally, there is no evidence that Hirokawa was personally involved with Lozano's medical treatment or that he was aware of any imminent risk of suicide. Plaintiffs have not produced evidence showing a causal connection between Hirokawa's conduct and Lozano's suicide.
As such, Hirokawa is entitled to summary judgment.
Mannstock was a "social services staff member" who worked with Lozano. FAC ¶ 13. Mannstock was the last person to evaluate Lozano on May 15, 2015—the day of his suicide. Opp'n 8. After examining Lozano on that day, Mannstock reported that Lozano's "mood was withdrawn," he appeared preoccupied, his behavior was composed, and he spoke slowly, appropriately, and in a subdued tone.
Plaintiffs argue that Mannstock acted improperly by relying on Lozano's self-reporting of his mental condition.
The Court finds that a reasonable trier of fact could not conclude that, when Mannstock examined him, Lozano's condition presented a suicide risk that required immediate intervention. The evidence suggests that, on several other occasions, Lozano did exhibit suicidal risk factors that prompted medical staff to take immediate measures to prevent his suicide, including placing him in special observation housing units and conducting regular welfare checks. Mannstock exercised his professional judgment to conclude that those risk factors were no longer present. As similar cases have concluded, the fact that Lozano had previously been placed on a suicide watch does not mean that Mannstock acted with deliberate indifference by examining him and determining that he was no longer actively suicidal.
Here, Mannstock's medical judgment may have been mistaken under the circumstances—and, in hindsight, it likely was. Such an error might give rise to a negligence claim. Deliberate indifference, however, requires more than negligence; as discussed above, to prevail on a deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff must show the existence of "conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm."
The circumstances here are disturbing and disappointing. The prison staff made a determination that an inmate under their care and supervision, who had a lengthy history of serious mental illness, including being frequently diagnosed as actively suicidal, should be housed in solitary confinement shortly after a routine examination where a prison staff member came to the conclusion that Lozano was no longer at risk of harming himself. Tragically, despite that decision—or because of it—he committed suicide in the solitary cell where he was placed.
Although the conduct of the individual prison officials may not have risen to the level of deliberate indifference, this case sadly brings attention to the level of care and treatment of those in our prisons and jails who wait for adjudication while under the presumption of innocence or are serving a sentence following conviction. The prison, perhaps at a systemic level, wholly failed to protect the welfare of one of its most vulnerable inmates. Because Mannstock's personal conduct did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference he is entitled to summary judgment. But the circumstances of this case remain troubling and raise serious concerns about a prison system that houses inmates with severe mental illness and suicidal tendencies in solitary confinement.
Nancy Mager was a "social services staff member" who personally evaluated Lozano's mental health on at least one occasion. FAC ¶ 12; Opp'n 6. She was involved in Lozano's treatment "from the latter half of 2014 through April 2015," although the precise nature of her involvement is unclear. MSJ 17. On April 16, 2015 (approximately a month before Lozano's suicide), Lozano reported to Mager: "I feel improved. I was suicidal, and hearing voices, which I still do, but I am not suicidal now." Opp'n 6. On May 11, 2015 (four days before Lozano's suicide), Mager noted in an email that Lozano was housed in E-Dorm rather than in 8A.
Plaintiffs argue that Mager acted with deliberate indifference because she knew that Lozano had previously been placed under a Murphy conservatorship in other proceedings. Opp'n 15. In addition, on May 11, 2015, Mager was aware that Lozano was not housed in special observation units on 8A.
Plaintiffs' arguments fail for two reasons. First, on May 11, 2015, Lozano was already housed in an observation cell with 15-minute welfare checks. Opp'n 15; Reply 6. At that time, there was no reason for Mager to recommend that Lozano be housed in 8A (which provided specialized housing for prisoners experiencing acute psychiatric episodes). Second, there is no causal connection between Mager's action (or inaction) and Lozano's suicide. As discussed above, in the four days between Mager's email (on May 11) and Lozano's suicide (on May 15), Lozano was independently examined by Choi and Mannstock, each of whom determined that Lozano was not actively suicidal. Even if Mager had acted unreasonably (which the record does not support), the intervening examinations break the chain of causation between her conduct and Lozano's death. Similarly, there is no causal connection between Lozano's suicide and her treatment of him from 2014 to April 2015. As such, Mager did not act with deliberate indifference and she is entitled to summary judgment.
A governmental entity can be held liable under § 1983 if "a policy, practice, or custom of the entity can be shown to be a moving force behind a violation of constitutional rights."
Here, Plaintiffs have not established an underlying constitutional violation.
Under Title II of the ADA, "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132. "A public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity." 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)(i). "Unjustified isolation . . . is properly regarded as discrimination based on disability."
To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must allege that "(1) he is an individual with a disability; (2) he is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of some public entity's services, programs, or activities; (3) he was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the public entity's services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (4) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of [his] disability."
Here, Plaintiffs argue that "Lozano was classified by the jail to be housed in isolation/administrative segregation, the most restrict [sic] area of the Jail, based on conduct that was specifically linked to his mental illness." Opp'n 24. Plaintiffs do not identify the "conduct" that was "linked to his mental illness." Nor do they explain how Defendants' housing decisions constituted discrimination on the basis of disability. Nonetheless, the Court infers that the conduct at issue was the incident where Lozano "gassed" a correctional officer (i.e., where he filled a container with urine and feces and threw it at the officer). MSJ 8. As discussed above, on May 12, 2015, Officer Mark Navarette decided to house Lozano in E-Dorm "[b]ecause Lozano gassed a correctional officer" (Opp'n 14), and because "Lozano no longer satisfied the threshold for an involuntary 5150 hold and on the multitude of factors considered by the Classification Department, including Lozano's protective custody status" (MSJ 18-19).
Even with this inference, however, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not established that Defendants violated the ADA. There is no evidence showing that Defendants decided to house Lozano in E-Dorm because of his disability. Rather, the evidence suggests that the housing decision was based on Lozano's behavior, including gassing a correctional officer, and from his protective custody status (which resulted from his status as a former gang member). MSJ 2-4. The fact that Lozano was mentally disabled does not mean that the housing decision was discriminatory.
Plaintiffs discuss their wrongful death claim in a single paragraph in their opposition brief:
Opp'n 24. Plaintiffs do not identify any evidence showing how Defendants "failed to take appropriate actions to address the substantial risk of death" or how Defendants "failed to summon immediate medical care." The evidence on the record shows that the opposite is true: Defendants routinely provided medical care to Lozano, and on multiple occasions they determined that his suicide risk was high and took appropriate measures to mitigate that risk. Summary judgment is warranted in Defendants' favor.
Plaintiffs' complaint contains a claim for neglect of a dependent adult in violation of the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act, Cal. Welfare & Institutions Code § 15610.57. FAC ¶¶ 113-20. In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants argued that this Act's remedies are not available to inmates of county jails—and, even if they were, Plaintiffs have not presented evidence of "malicious, oppressive, and abusive conduct" as the Act requires. In their opposition brief, Plaintiffs do not respond to Defendants' argument or provide any other discussion of their claim for neglect of a dependent adult. As such, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
Defendants Doe 4 and Doe 6 have not been identified.
In addition to the individual Defendants discussed above, six other individual Defendants have been named in this case: Maryann Barry, Mark Bruguera, Laura Ferguson, Blanca Hoyt, Beverly Purdy, and Erica Rivera. Plaintiffs did not mention these Defendants in their opposition brief. Summary judgment is therefore warranted in favor of these six Defendants.
Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. The Clerk shall close this file.
