Filed: Jul. 17, 2015
Latest Update: Jul. 17, 2015
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr. , Chief District Judge . STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on July 16, 2015. 2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until August 20, 2015, and to exclude tim
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr. , Chief District Judge . STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on July 16, 2015. 2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until August 20, 2015, and to exclude time..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on July 16, 2015.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until August 20, 2015, and to exclude time between July 16, 2015, and August 20, 2015, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes both paper discovery and electronic evidence. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying other than materials that the government contends contain child pornography. See 18 U.S.C. § 3509(m).
b) Counsel for defendant is in trial and has retained the services of a computer forensic analyst, whose opinions have been sent to the government. The government is considering the defense computer report, and when defense counsel is out of trial, the parties hope to be able to meet on confer on the case.
c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The government does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of July 16, 2015 to August 20, 2015, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO ORDERED.
