NITA L. STORMES, District Judge.
Before the court is the Joint Motion for Determination of Discovery Dispute No. 2 between plaintiff in the consolidated action, Bryan Pease ("Plaintiff"), and defendants City of San Diego and San Diego Police Chief Shelly Zimmerman, Christopher Bernard, Brett Crawford, Curtis Doll, Christopher Lingenhol, Arturo Morales, Jr., Nathan Parga, Ricky M. Radasa, Michael Rojas, Jonathan Wells, Franklin White, Kyle Williams, and Jeff Willkomm (collectively "City" or "Defendants"). ECF No. 100. Plaintiff Pease moves to compel documents responsive to 49 requests. ECF No. 100-2. As explained below, the court will
This case arises from arrests made near the San Diego Convention Center following a rally for and protest against then presidential candidate Trump. Plaintiff alleges a Monell claim and that his arrest was unlawful, violating his First and Fourth Amendment rights. See ECF No. 89. Plaintiff's case was consolidated with the case he brought as counsel for four other attendees at the rally (now Ramirez; formerly Cervantes), alleging the same claims.
Plaintiff propounded interrogatories, requests for admissions, and requests for production to the City Defendants. See ECF No. 87. The City served unverified responses on February 11, 2019. Id. The parties began the meet and confer process, but due to a previously scheduled trial, requested and were granted an extension of time to file this discovery dispute. ECF No. 88.
The dispute now before the Court presents 49 individual requests and two over-arching arguments regarding (1) Plaintiff Pease's propounded discovery regarding acts or threats of violence leading up to the declaration of unlawful assembly in body worn camera ("body cam") footage, and (2) the City's redacted after-action report. See ECF Nos. 100, 100-1. Plaintiff also seeks attorney fees incurred in compelling City Defendants' responses. ECF No. 100-1 at 4.
Rule 26 permits discovery of "any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Information need not be admissible to be discoverable. Id. Once the propounding party establishes that the request seeks relevant information, "[t]he party who resists discovery has the burden to show discovery should not be allowed, and has the burden of clarifying, explaining, and supporting its objections." Superior Commc'ns v. Earhugger, Inc., 257 F.R.D. 215, 217 (C.D. Cal. 2009); see Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975) (requiring defendants "to carry heavy burden of showing why discovery was denied").
"The 2015 amendments to Rule 26(b)(1) emphasize the need to impose `reasonable limits on discovery through increased reliance on the common-sense concept of proportionality.'" Roberts v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 312 F.R.D. 594, 603 (D. Nev. 2016). The fundamental principle of amended Rule 26(b)(1) is "that lawyers must size and shape their discovery requests to the requisites of a case." Id. Discovery and Rule 26 is intended to provide parties with "efficient access to what is needed to prove a claim or defense, but eliminate unnecessary or wasteful discovery." Id. This requires active involvement of federal judges to make decisions regarding the scope of discovery. Id.
To the extent that the discovery sought is "unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive," the court is directed to limit the scope of the request. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2). Limits should also be imposed where the burden or expense outweighs the likely benefits. Id. How and when to so limit discovery, or to "issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense," remains in the court's discretion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1).
The discovery propounded by Plaintiff to the City appears to mirror the discovery propounded to the County and previously addressed in Discovery Dispute No. 1.
ECF No. 103 at 4-6.
As with the discovery propounded to the County, Plaintiff issues broad requests to the City that attempt to deduce information for all plaintiffs in the consolidated case, which is beyond the bounds of presently available discovery.
As before, Plaintiff had "ample opportunity" to gather information in discovery and fails to show any special circumstances that render additional discovery necessary or show the information was previously unavailable or specific to Plaintiff's arrest apart from the Ramirez plaintiffs. Pursuant to Rule 26, the Court may properly limit discovery. On this basis, the Plaintiff's motion to compel further responses is
The motion to compel further responses to these interrogatories boils down to a premature request for an exhibit list and witness list. Plaintiff is not entitled to these documents at this stage of the litigation. See CivLR 16.1(f); ECF No. 74. Further, Plaintiff's argument that further response is necessary to identify documents intended to be used as "pure impeachment" evidence contravenes the plain language of Rule 26. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A), (3)(A) ("In addition to the disclosures required by Rule 26(a)(1) and (2), a party must provide to the other parties and promptly file the following information about the evidence that it may present at trial other than solely for impeachment[.]").
The Court does not find these requests seek relevant information to the claims and defenses and are therefore beyond the bounds of Rule 26. Plaintiff was arrested for failure to disperse after an unlawful assembly had been declared. See ECF No. 100 at 6. The Fourth Amended Complaint makes clear that Plaintiff was arrested after the declaration of unlawful assembly. ECF No. 89 at ¶¶ 2, 11, 12. Acts of violence or the imminent threat thereof in the time leading up to the declaration of unlawful assembly may be relevant to the declaration of unlawful assembly. But this request seeks evidence of violence occurring after the declaration at the time of Plaintiff's arrest. Whether or not there were still acts of violence occurring after the declaration of unlawful assembly, or within two blocks of Plaintiff's arrest, is not relevant to the claims alleged and so, the motion to compel is denied.
Similarly, the related discovery requests,
Many of the requests at issue relate to the production of body cam footage, specifically: Requests for Production Nos. 4-10, Requests for Admission Nos. 1-3, and Interrogatory No. 5. ECF No. 100-1 at 2. City Defendants contend that such footage ("to locate acts of violence, or the lack thereof") is not relevant because Plaintiff Pease's complaint does not claim that violence was a reason for his allegedly unlawful arrest. ECF No. 100-1 at 6. Further, City Defendants argue that being required to review hundreds of hours of video footage is not proportional to the needs of this case and would impose undue burden and expense. ECF No. 100-1 at 6.
While not raised by either party, the Court notes that during discovery in the Ramirez matter, the parties filed a request for "an extension of time within which to file a motion to compel regarding production of certain body camera footage that the parties are in the process of reviewing." ECF No. 45. The parties presented no good cause for the extension and failed to provide the information required by the Chambers' Rules. See ECF No. 45; Hon. Nita L. Stormes, Civil Case Procedures §§ III(C) and VI(C)(2)(d)). The Court denied the motion without prejudice to refiling the extension request in compliance with the Chambers' Rules. ECF No. 47. The parties again filed a request for extension, and presented as good cause the same arguments the parties assert in the present dispute:
ECF No. 48 at 2. Unfortunately, while the parties' second request for an extension included good cause, it did not include any information regarding the timeliness of the dispute. Accordingly, the Court ordered the Ramirez plaintiffs—through their counsel, Plaintiff, Mr. Pease—to supplement the request with information necessary to establish the dispute was timely. ECF No. 49 ("The amended joint motion presents good cause for the requested extension but continues to fail to satisfy the Chambers Rules, specifically, the parties fail to provide the Court with the original date or deadline that the motion to compel was due. . . . [Ramirez] Plaintiffs, as the party who would be filing a motion to compel, must file a declaration providing the missing information at their earliest opportunity."). The Ramirez plaintiffs never filed the requested supplemental information, and so the Court denied the request for an extension. ECF No. 50 ("Plaintiffs were directed on August 9, 2018 to supplement the joint motion with the missing information at their "earliest convenience." [] No supplement has been filed, and sufficient time has now passed that the court concludes the motion is properly DENIED. [Dated August 22, 2018]).
Under Rule 26(b)(2)(C) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court must limit discovery that is "unreasonably cumulative or duplicative." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). Moreover, courts in this district, including this one, routinely reject attempts to circumvent discovery deadlines via duplicative discovery requests. See, e.g., Cruz v. United States, No. 14CV2956-LAB (DHB), 2016 WL 727066, at *2-3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2016) (finding subsequent RFP to be "substantially similar" to earlier RFP and rejecting as untimely joint discovery motion based on response deadline for subsequent RFP); see also Bird v. PSC Holdings I, LLC, No. 12-CV-1528 W NLS, 2013 WL 1120659, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2013) (finding joint motion untimely where submitted by separate defendant represented by the same counsel, advising the parties that "any discovery demands which are substantially similar to previous demands will not re-start the clock for filing a discovery motion, and may be grounds for a protective order").
Requests regarding body cam are plainly duplicative of prior requests and the subject of a prior dispute. Thus, any discovery dispute regarding the production of the body cam footage is now untimely.
ECF No. 74 at 3 (emphasis in original); ECF No. 18 at 2. The discovery dispute regarding body cam footage is untimely.
In addition to reasons stated above regarding ample opportunity, Plaintiff's motion to compel further responses regarding body cam footage is also DENIED as untimely as to Requests for Production Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 10; Requests for Admission Nos. 1, 2, 3; and Interrogatory No. 5.
The after-action report at issue is a report prepared after the event to `examine the pre-planning, execution, and demobilization by the San Diego Police Department and allied agencies as it relates to the Trump Rally on May 27, 2016.' It is dated June 21, 2016." ECF No. 100-3 at 2-3. It was produced by City Defendants "on April 11, 2018 in redacted form." ECF No. 100-3 at 2.
Plaintiff argues the un-redacted after-action report is responsive to RFP Nos. 3 and 4, and thus should be produced. ECF No. 100-1 at 2-3. City Defendants counter that the after-action report is not responsive to RFP Nos. 3 or 4. ECF No. 100-1 at 7. The City further contends that because the redacted version of the after-action report was produced in April 2018, Plaintiff's current request is an attempt to "take a second bite of the apple." ECF No. 100-1 at 7. In response, Plaintiff acknowledges the redacted report was produced, but argues this does not preclude him from obtaining an un-redacted version in his consolidated case. ECF No. 100-1 at 2-3.
Plaintiff's motion to compel is untimely. The City's "initial response" to Plaintiff Pease's after-action report requests was in April of 2018. ECF No. 100-1 at 7. Pursuant to this Court's Chambers' Rules, counsel were required to file their joint motion for determination of their discovery dispute within forty-five days of the initial response. Hon. Nita L. Stormes, Civil Case Procedures § VI(C)(2)(b). This discovery dispute is being filed approximately one year later. See ECF No. 100 (filed April 19, 2019). "A failure to comply [with the timing requirements] will result in a waiver of a party's discovery issue." ECF No. 74 at 3; ECF No. 18 at 2. Plaintiff's re-issuance of a discovery request does not re-start the clock. See, e.g., Cruz v. United States, 2016 WL 727066, at *2-3; Bird v. PSC Holdings I, LLC, 2013 WL 1120659, at *1). Likewise, Plaintiff's argument that consolidated cases retain their independent character as the basis to permit duplicative discovery is belied by Plaintiff's own actions and treatment of this case: Plaintiff's own representations to the Court indicate understanding that the consolidation was for all purposes other than trial.
The only remaining requests that are not addressed by the above analysis are Requests for Admission Nos. 20-23, and Requests for Production 15 and 16.
ECF No. 100-2 at 18. In its original response, the City objected, and provided no response. ECF No. 100-2 at 18. In response to Plaintiff's motion to compel, the City indicates it has since supplemented its response. Id.
Without knowing what the supplemental response is, and whether Plaintiff was satisfied with it, there is nothing for the Court to compel. To the extent the City may have supplemented its response on the eve of the deadline of filing this motion, the Court does not condone such a practice. The parties are expected to meet and confer regarding discovery responses and the joint motion so that only disputed requests are presented for adjudication. Nonetheless, based on the City's representation that a supplemental response was provided an no other argument from Plaintiff, the motion to compel is
ECF No. 100-2 at 19. City Defendants objected, claiming the information sought is "not relevant to the claims or defenses of any party." Id.
The Court disagrees. Plaintiff's case is, at its core, challenging his arrest. This request seeks information directly related to the circumstances of his arrest. This information is within the bounds of permissible Rule 26 discovery. The Court
ECF No. 100-2 at 19. City Defendants objected, claiming that it seeks information with is not relevant to Plaintiff Pease's claims. Id.
For the same reason as RFA No. 21, the Court overrules Defendants' objection. Plaintiff is plainly asking about the circumstances of his arrest, which is the issue of the case. City Defendants claim that the request is "overly broad as to time" and "vague and ambiguous." Id. at 19-20 (noting that it is "unclear at what point in time the request is referring to, what `line' he is referring"). These objections are not persuasive; the request is understandable, and Defendants' answer may, consistent with Rule 33, only admit or deny parts of the request. Plaintiff's motion to compel is
ECF No. 100-2 at 20. Defendants object, again stating that the information sought is irrelevant. Id. However, as with the previous requests in this category, Plaintiff Pease is requesting an admission directly related to the circumstances of his arrest. Plaintiff's motion to compel is
ECF No. 100-2 at 51. Defendants' response indicates that the unredacted report was produced. Id. at 52. Plaintiff's motion to compel is therefore
ECF No. 100-2 at 52. Plaintiff's motion to compel is
The Court declines to grant attorneys' fees to either party. M.B.L., Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. CV 13-03951 BRO (AGRx), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197240, at *6 (C.D. Cal. June 16, 2014) ("District courts have discretion to award attorney's fees and costs for discovery misconduct either under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 or under their inherent authority to manage the proceedings before them.") (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 and Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 33 (1991)).
Plaintiff's motion to compel is