Filed: Aug. 24, 2018
Latest Update: Aug. 24, 2018
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER JOHN A. MENDEZ , District Judge . IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED by and between the parties hereto through their respective counsel, Cameron Desmond, Assistant United States Attorney, attorney for Plaintiff, and Steven B. Plesser, attorney for Defendant, that the status conference currently set for August 28, 2018 should be continued until October 2, 2018, and to exclude time between August 28, 2018 and Octobe
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER JOHN A. MENDEZ , District Judge . IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED by and between the parties hereto through their respective counsel, Cameron Desmond, Assistant United States Attorney, attorney for Plaintiff, and Steven B. Plesser, attorney for Defendant, that the status conference currently set for August 28, 2018 should be continued until October 2, 2018, and to exclude time between August 28, 2018 and October..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.
IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED by and between the parties hereto through their respective counsel, Cameron Desmond, Assistant United States Attorney, attorney for Plaintiff, and Steven B. Plesser, attorney for Defendant, that the status conference currently set for August 28, 2018 should be continued until October 2, 2018, and to exclude time between August 28, 2018 and October 2, 2018, under Local Code T4.
The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
1. Counsel for defendant was only recently appointed as counsel, substituting in for the Office of the Federal Defender. Counsel requires additional time to review the discovery in this matter, to consult with client and conduct any necessary investigation and research related to the charges, and to otherwise prepare for trial.
2. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
3. The government is unopposed to the request for the continuance.
4. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
5. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of August 28, 2018 to October 2, 2018, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv)[Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at counsel's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
6. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
7.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
FINDINGS And ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
