Filed: Feb. 10, 2015
Latest Update: Feb. 10, 2015
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge. 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on February 12, 2015. 2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until March 26, 2015, and to exclude time between February 12, 2015, and March 26, 2015, under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: a) The government has repres
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge. 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on February 12, 2015. 2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until March 26, 2015, and to exclude time between February 12, 2015, and March 26, 2015, under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: a) The government has represe..
More
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on February 12, 2015.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until March 26, 2015, and to exclude time between February 12, 2015, and March 26, 2015, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes several hundred pages of financial records and witness statements. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to review the material provided and to discuss proposed plea terms, which have been provided from the government to the defense.
c) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The government does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of February 12, 2015 to March 26, 2015, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
FINDINGS AND ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
