BARBARA A. McAULIFFE, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Reginald Ray York is a state prisoner appearing pro se in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Currently before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that both Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment be denied.
This action is proceeding on Plaintiff's complaint, filed on December 7, 2015, against Defendant Garcia for excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, against Defendant Neighbors for failure to protect Plaintiff from the excessive use of force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and against Defendants Garcia and Neighbors for failure to decontaminate Plaintiff's cell in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (ECF Nos. 1, 17.)
On March 10, 2017, Defendants Garcia and Neighbors filed answer to Plaintiff's complaint. (ECF No. 20.) On March 16, 2017, the Court issued the discovery and scheduling order. (ECF No. 21.)
On July 17, 2018, the Court granted Defendants' motion to modify the discovery and scheduling order and extended the deadline for filing a dispositive motion until October 22, 2018. (ECF No. 60.)
As previously stated, on December 3, 2018, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 64.)
On December 18, 2018, the District Judge issued an order granting in part Defendants' motion for sanctions and denying Plaintiff's motion for sanctions. (ECF No. 66.) The District Judge imposed an evidentiary sanction on Plaintiff and ordered that Plaintiff is prohibited from supporting his case or opposing Defendants' defenses with any evidence that Plaintiff had not already disclosed to Defendants. (
On December 20, 2018, the Court issued another order amending the discovery and scheduling order. (ECF No. 67.) In that order, the Court extended the dispositive motion deadline until February 4, 2019, and deemed Plaintiff's motion timely filed. (
On February 4, 2019, Defendants filed an opposition to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, as well as their own motion for partial summary judgment.
On February 21, 2019, Plaintiff filed a reply to his motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 70.) On February 28, 2019, Defendants filed a reply to their motion for partial summary judgment. (ECF No. 71.) Also, on February 28, 2019, Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment. (ECF No. 72.)
On March 7, 2019, Defendants filed a motion to strike Plaintiff's opposition to Defendant's motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 73.) On March 18, 2019, the Court denied Defendants' motion to strike Plaintiff's February 28, 2019 opposition, but granted Defendants leave to file a supplemental reply within seven days. (ECF No. 74.) On March 22, 2019, Defendants filed their supplemental reply. (ECF No. 74.)
Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment are deemed submitted for review, without oral argument. Local Rule 230(1).
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, disclosure materials, discovery, and any affidavits provided establish that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A material fact is one that may affect the outcome of the case under the applicable law.
The party seeking summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact."
If the movant satisfies its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the allegations in its pleadings to "show a genuine issue of material fact by presenting affirmative evidence from which a jury could find in [its] favor."
Each party's position, whether it be that a fact is disputed or undisputed, must be supported by (1) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including but not limited to depositions, documents, declarations, or discovery; or (2) showing that the materials cited do not establish the presence or absence of a genuine dispute or that the opposing party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (quotation marks omitted). The Court may consider other materials in the record not cited to by the parties, but it is not required to do so. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3);
In resolving a summary judgment motion, "the court does not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence."
In arriving at these findings and recommendations, the Court carefully reviewed and considered all arguments, points and authorities, declarations, exhibits, statements of undisputed facts and responses thereto, if any, objections, and other papers filed by the parties. Omission of reference to an argument, document, paper, or objection is not to be construed to the effect that this Court did not consider the argument, document, paper, or objection. This Court thoroughly reviewed and considered the evidence it deemed admissible, material, and appropriate.
Defendants object to Exhibit D of Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, (ECF No. 64, at 46-50)
Defendants' objections to Exhibit D are overruled. Initially, with regards to hearsay, at summary judgment, the focus is not on the "admissibility of the evidence's form," but rather on the "admissibility of its contents."
With regards to relevancy, given the Court's duty to determine whether there exists a genuine dispute as to any material fact, objections to evidence as irrelevant are both unnecessary and unhelpful.
Defendants object to Exhibit E of Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the evidentiary sanction imposed against Plaintiff in this case prohibits Plaintiff from using these documents in support of his motion for summary judgment or in opposition to Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, and the documents are irrelevant, not properly authenticated, and hearsay. However, the Court declines to rule on Defendants' objections to Plaintiff's Exhibit E because Exhibit E is not material to Plaintiff's excessive force, failure to protect, or conditions of confinement claims.
Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on his claim for excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment against Defendant Garcia. (ECF No. 64, at 1, 5.) Defendant Garcia does not move for summary judgment on Plaintiff's excessive force claim. (ECF No. 69.)
"[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is. . . whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm."
In his verified complaint, Plaintiff alleges that, on January 18, 2014, while he was waiting for Defendant Garcia to return and tell his cellmate and him whether the lieutenant in charge of the search would return to the building in order to document the condition of Plaintiff's cell, he sat on the floor at the edge of his bed with his back against the wall and the right side of his body facing the cell door, while he was wearing waist-chain handcuffs. (Complaint, ECF No. 1, at 4, 8.) When Plaintiff's cell door opened, Defendant Garcia walked into the cell, grabbed Plaintiff's right arm with his right hand, put Plaintiff in a choke hold with his left arm, and began to choke Plaintiff as Defendant Garcia dragged Plaintiff's partially nude body out of the cell. (
On the other hand, Defendant Garcia disputes the application of force as alleged by Plaintiff. Defendant Garcia states that, on January 18, 2014, after he determined that the lieutenant had left the building, he returned to Plaintiff's cell, along with another officer, to inform Plaintiff of that fact. (Declaration of Defendant G. Garcia, ECF No. 68-4, ¶¶ 6-7.) Defendant Garcia informed Plaintiff that he was going to escort Plaintiff and his cellmate to the program office in a different building to discuss the condition of their cell. (
Based on the conflicting version of events, as described by Plaintiff in his verified complaint and as described by Defendant Garcia in his verified declaration, the Court determines that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether there was a need for Defendant Garcia to use force on Plaintiff, the relationship between that need for the application of force and the amount of force actually used on Plaintiff, and the threat reasonably perceived by Defendant Garcia. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on his excessive force claim should be denied.
Both Plaintiff and Defendant Neighbors move for summary judgment regarding Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Neighbors for failure to intervene/protect Plaintiff from the excessive use of force in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
A prison official may be liable under § 1983 if he is aware that a fellow official is violating a prisoner's constitutional rights, but fails to intervene.
In his verified complaint, Plaintiff alleges that, on January 18, 2014, Defendant Neighbors returned to Plaintiff's cell with Defendant Garcia and stood at the door while Defendant Garcia walked into the cell, grabbed Plaintiff by his right arm, put Plaintiff in a choke hold, and dragged Plaintiff from the cell in waist-chain restraints. (Complaint, ECF No. 1, at 10.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Neighbors watched Defendant Garcia place Plaintiff on his back, remove his MK9X oleoresin capsicum pepper spray from his holster, bend down on one knee, put the spray 6 to 8 inches from Plaintiff's face, and spray Plaintiff for 3 to 4 seconds. (
Additionally, Plaintiff has provided the Court with the verified declaration of Wallace W. Vaughn, who stated that, on January 18, 2014, he witnessed Defendants Garcia and Neighbors enter Facility B, Building 8 and go to the cell at the far end of section B. (ECF No. 64, at 106.) Mr. Vaughn further states that, shortly thereafter, he smelled a strong odor of pepper spray and heard someone "screaming/crying" and an alarm. (
On the other hand, Defendant Neighbors disputes that he was present during the incident. Defendant Neighbors asserts he was at a different location within the facility during the events at issue. Defendant Neighbors asserts in his declaration, submitted in support of his opposition to Plaintiff's summary judgment motion and in support of his own motion for summary judgment, that, on January 18, 2014, he reported to work at approximately 1400 hours to the Facility B Program Sergeant's office to sign in on the Fair Labor and Standards Act sign in sheet. (Declaration of Defendant J. Neighbors, ECF Nos. 68-3 & 69-4, ¶ 3.) Defendant Neighbors further asserts that, due to staff shortages, he was redirected from his regular post as a Facility B Program Sergeant to a post as the Facility B, Building 1, Administrative Segregation Unit ("ASU") Sergeant. (
Based on the evidence described above, the Court determines that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Defendant Neighbors was present and had a realistic opportunity to intervene in the use of force incident between Plaintiff and Defendant Garcia, but failed to do so. Therefore, the Court finds that neither Plaintiff nor Defendant Neighbors are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, both Plaintiff's and Defendant Neighbors' summary judgment motions on Plaintiff's claim for failure to protect/intervene against Defendant Neighbors should be denied.
Both Plaintiff and Defendants Garcia and Neighbors move for summary judgment regarding Plaintiff's claim against both Defendants for failure to decontaminate Plaintiff's cell in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and from inhumane conditions of confinement.
"A prisoner claiming an Eighth Amendment violation must show (1) that the deprivation he suffered was `objectively, sufficiently serious'; and (2) that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his [health or] safety in allowing the deprivation to take place."
In his verified complaint, Plaintiff alleges that, on January 18, 2014, after both he and his cellmate were sprayed with pepper spray by Defendant Garcia, he was taken to the Facility B program office to be decontaminated, have a CDCR 7219 medical evaluation performed, and to have a use of force interview. (Complaint, ECF No. 1, at 12.) Plaintiff asserts that he was then returned back to his cell, which had not been decontaminated or cleaned. (
On the other hand, in his verified declaration, Defendant Garcia asserts that he did not know whether Plaintiff's cell required decontamination, that he was never informed that Plaintiff was complaining that his cell required decontamination by wiping down the pepper spray residue, and there is no documentation that Plaintiff's cell was required to be wiped down and cleaned. (Declaration of Defendant G. Garcia, ECF No. 69-3, ¶ 12.) In his verified declaration, Defendant Neighbors asserts that he was not present for the altercation between Defendant Garcia and Plaintiff on January 18, 2014, he did not have a role in determining whether Plaintiff's cell required additional decontamination, and he would not have participated in any decontamination that may have been required. (Declaration of Defendant J. Neighbors, ECF No. 69-4, ¶¶ 5-7.)
In order to hold a prison official liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement, a plaintiff must establish that the official knew that the plaintiff faced a substantial risk of harm and disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.
In this case, Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that either Defendant Garcia or Neighbors knew the cell was still contaminated. Plaintiff argues that Defendants Garcia and Neighbors were deliberately indifferent because they were aware that Defendant Garcia had sprayed pepper spray inside of Plaintiff's cell and inside of Building 8 and another inmate in Building 8 smelled a strong odor of pepper spray around the time of the incident. However, Plaintiff's evidence also establishes that he had been removed from his cell for a time in order for his person to be decontaminated from the pepper spray. (Complaint, ECF No. 1, at 10.) Plaintiff has not provided the Court with any evidence that Defendants Garcia and/or Neighbors knew that the pepper spray in Plaintiff's cell had not dissipated by the time that Plaintiff was returned to his cell. Indeed, Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that either Garcia or Neighbors escorted him back to his cell, as opposed to other officers, after going to the program office. Plaintiff has also not presented any evidence that Defendants Garcia and/or Neighbors knew that, after Plaintiff had wiped down his cell with his state-issued towels, Plaintiff was unable to remove the towels from his cell. Finally, Plaintiff has not offered any evidence that Defendants Garcia and/or Neighbors knew that Plaintiff was having difficulty breathing and seeing and was experiencing a burning sensation throughout his head and body because the ventilation system in the building blew hot air into Plaintiff's cell, which made the vapors of the pepper spray residue in the cell very strong. Therefore, Plaintiff's evidence is insufficient to raise a material fact that Defendants Garcia and/or Neighbors knew about and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff from the failure to decontaminate Plaintiff's cell.
Based on the foregoing, having carefully reviewed the evidence and after resolving all factual disputes in favor of the plaintiff, the Court concludes that no reasonable trier of fact could find in Plaintiff's favor with respect to Plaintiff's claim that Defendants Garcia and Neighbors violated his Eighth Amendment protection against inhumane conditions of confinement by failing to decontaminate Plaintiff's cell.
Defendant Garcia contends that the Court should grant him summary judgment on Plaintiff's conditions of confinement claim pursuant to the qualified immunity doctrine. However, since the Court has found that the undisputed facts establish that Defendant Garcia did not violate Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment protection against inhumane conditions of confinement, the Court finds that there is no need to decide the issue of whether Defendant Garcia is entitled to qualified immunity.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within
Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations." The parties are advised that the failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of the "right to challenge the magistrate's factual findings" on appeal.
Further, Plaintiff also did not comply with Local Rule 260(b), which requires any party opposing a motion for summary judgment to reproduce the facts in the moving party's statement of undisputed facts and admit those facts that are undisputed, deny those that are disputed, and provide a citation to the evidence relied upon in support of the dispute. As a result, Defendants' statement of undisputed facts in support of their motion is accepted except where brought into dispute by Plaintiff's verified complaint.
Unless otherwise indicated, disputed and immaterial facts are omitted from this statement and relevant objections are overruled.
