STIPULATION AND ORDER TO CONTINUE STATUS CONFERENCE

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge.

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant John Dial, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on June 19, 2014.

2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until July 10, 2014, and to exclude time between June 19, 2014 and July 10, 2014, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. The government has provided initial discovery. However, Mr. Dial has matters in other jurisdictions that the government and counsel for Mr. Dial are trying to resolve globally. In addition, counsel for defendant has been in trial for the past six weeks, and has not had an opportunity to travel to Nevada City, where Mr. Dial is not located, to discuss new developments with the client.

b. Counsel for defendant also expects that there will be new discovery coming from the government regarding the other charges in other jurisdictions. Counsel for defendant desires additional time to complete the review of discovery with Mr. Dial, to conduct defense investigation, and to discuss potential resolutions with her client. Counsel is continuing to engage in negotiations with the government.

c. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

d. The government does not object to the continuance.

e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of June 19, 2014 to July 10, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED.