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U.S. v. HRISTOVSKI, 2:14-CR-226 JAM. (2015)

Court: District Court, E.D. California Number: infdco20150106832 Visitors: 32
Filed: Jan. 02, 2015
Latest Update: Jan. 02, 2015
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER DATE JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge. STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on January 6, 2015. 2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until March 10, 2015, and to exclude time
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER DATE

JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on January 6, 2015.

2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until March 10, 2015, and to exclude time between January 6, 2015, and March 10, 2015, under Local Code T4.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes investigative reports and other documents, comprising over 1000 pages of discovery. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying. b) Counsel for defendant was just assigned to this case on December 4, 2014. He desires additional time to consult with his client, to review the current charges, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, and to review discovery. He needs additional time as he is currently scheduled to be in trial for most of February 2015. c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. d) The government does not object to the continuance. e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of January 6, 2015 to March 10, 2015, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

FINDINGS AND ORDER

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.

Source:  Leagle

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