William H. Orrick, United States District Judge.
Plaintiff Theresa Hunter brings this class case against defendants Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. ("Kaiser") and its debt collector USCB, Inc. ("USCB") under California and federal law based on defendants' debt collection and credit reporting practices. Complaint, Dkt. No. 1. Hunter alleges that defendants regularly seek to unlawfully collect alleged balances from Medi-Cal beneficiaries for Medi-Cal covered services and furnish information about those alleged debts to consumer credit reporting agencies. The question here on defendants' motions to compel arbitration is whether the arbitration provisions in Hunter's contracts with Kaiser (that are identical in all respects) are valid. Federal law preempts California Health and Safety Code section 1363.1, so the arbitration provision applies, and it is neither procedurally or substantively unconscionable. It does not clearly contemplate class arbitration and does not prohibit the arbitrator from issuing public injunctive relief. For the reasons discussed below, the motions to compel arbitration by Kaiser and USCB are GRANTED.
Medi-Cal, California's medical assistance program, pays medical costs for eligible people of limited financial means. Compl. ¶ 12. A medical service provider that accepts Medi-Cal payments (a "Medi-Cal provider") may not directly seek from the beneficiary any balance in excess of the amount approved by Medi-Cal; payment by Medi-Cal to the provider constitutes payment in full. Id. ¶¶ 12-13. Therefore,
In 2012, Hunter was a Medi-Cal beneficiary. She received medical services from Kaiser. Id. at ¶ 22. Despite that, Kaiser sought to collect from Hunter charges related to her Medi-Cal covered services. Id. at ¶ 25. It engaged third-party debt collector USCB to assist it. Id. at ¶ 26. In early 2018, Hunter reviewed copies of her credit files from three national consumer credit reporting agencies, Experian, Equifax, and Trans Union, because she was attempting to obtain a mortgage to assist with the financing of a home purchase. Id. at ¶ 28. At that time, she discovered USCB collection entries showing that she had an unpaid balance to Kaiser in excess of $9,000 for the Medi-Cal covered services from 2012. Id. at ¶ 29.
Hunter disputed the appearance of the USCB entries with the credit reporting agencies and made several unsuccessful attempts to have the entries removed. Id. at ¶¶ 33-34. Experian contacted USCB about Hunter's dispute and USCB contacted Kaiser, who confirmed to USCB and Experian that Hunter was responsible for the charges. Id. at ¶¶ 36-39. Hunter alleges that Kaiser also verified the debt to Trans Union and Equifax. Id. at ¶ 40.
Hunter then filed a complaint with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB") which contacted the three credit reporting agencies, USCB, and the Office of the California Attorney General (the "AG"). Id. at ¶¶ 42-43. USCB responded to the CFPB that it would verify the debt again with Kaiser, that it had not bought Hunter's debt, and that it was acting only as a third-party debt collector contracted by Kaiser. Id. at ¶¶ 44-47. The Public Inquiry Unit of the AG also notified Kaiser of Hunter's charges. Id. at ¶ 48. On May 30, 2018, Kaiser admitted to the AG that Hunter had active Medi-Cal coverage when she received Kaiser's services in 2012, that it had assigned the charges to collection, that Kaiser (not Hunter) was responsible for the bill, and that it had the power to "recall" the charges. Id. at ¶¶ 49-53.
Hunter states that she has been injured because she had lost the opportunity to secure financing for a home purchase and suffered harm to her credit score, harm to her reputation, emotional distress, and time lost disputing Kaiser's charges with USCB and the reporting agencies. Id. at ¶¶ 55-56. Hunter claims that Kaiser regularly attempts to collect money from Medi-Cal beneficiaries for covered services. Id. at ¶¶ 57-59, 63. She brings claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p, the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act ("CCRAA"), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1785.1-1787.3, the California Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200-17210, the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("RFDCPA"), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1788-1788.33, and California common law, and seeks relief on a class-wide basis. Id. at ¶¶ 5, 74-164.
Hunter has been a member of Kaiser since 2012. Between 2012 and 2017, she was enrolled in Kaiser's Medi-Cal Managed Care in Contra Costa County. Declaration of Christine Nelson in Support of Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.'s Motion to Compel Arbitration ("Nelson Decl.") ¶ 10 [Dkt. No. 27-4]. In order to
Medi-Cal Choice Form attached as Ex. A to Nelson Decl. [Dkt. No. 27-5]. This form has been used since at least 2012. Nelson Decl. ¶ 5. Hunter does not dispute that she signed this Medi-Cal Choice Form.
In 2018, Hunter enrolled in Kaiser through Covered California. Declaration of Vonya E. Taylor in Support of Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.'s Motion to Compel Arbitration ("Taylor Decl.") ¶¶ 8-10 [Dkt. No. 27-6]. According to Kaiser, individuals may enroll in health benefit plans by accessing Covered California's online enrollment system ("CalHEERS") and may do so directly or utilize the assistance of a certified agent in person or by telephone. Id. ¶ 5.
If an enrollee utilizes the assistance of a certified agent, the agent will walk through the online enrollment forms and disclosures with the enrollee. Id. As part of Covered California's online enrollment process, the enrollee receives a separate screen regarding binding arbitration that read in 2018 as follows:
Covered California E-Signature Report from Enrollment attached as Ex. A to Nelson Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. A ["Covered California Form," Dkt. No. 27-7]. Immediately after the enrollee is presented with the above text, the enrollee must provide an "eSignature" upon enrollment that states: "□ I Have Read And Agree To The Binding Arbitration Agreement." Taylor Decl. at ¶ 6; Covered California Form. The enrollee cannot proceed further with enrollment if the enrollee does not attest to having read and agreed to the Binding Arbitration Agreement. Taylor Decl. ¶ 6.
The Covered California enrollment system records and stores the electronic eSignature of the enrollee and the date on which the disclosure was signed. Id. The system also provides a record of that enrollment information to Kaiser. Id. Kaiser asserts, and Hunter does not dispute, that
Kaiser claims that every Membership Agreement that is provided to or made available to participants following their enrollment includes a binding arbitration provision. Nelson Decl. ¶ 8. The Arbitration Agreement in the 2018 Membership Agreement provides:
2108 Individual Plan Combined Membership Agreement, Disclosure Form, and Evidence of Coverage for Kaiser Permanente for Individuals and Families ("Membership Agreement") attached as Ex. C to Taylor Decl. [Dkt. No. 27-9].
The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") governs motions to compel arbitration. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. Under the FAA, a district court determines: (i) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and, if it does, (ii) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue. Lifescan, Inc. v. Premier Diabetic Servs., Inc., 363 F.3d 1010, 1012 (9th Cir. 2004). "To evaluate the validity of an arbitration agreement, federal courts should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts." Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1170 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If the court is satisfied "that the making of the arbitration agreement or the failure to comply with the agreement is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement." 9 U.S.C. § 4. "[A]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration." Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983).
Kaiser and USCB move to compel Hunter to arbitrate her claims individually pursuant to an arbitration provision contained in Kaiser's Membership Agreements to which Hunter agreed every year since 2012. Kaiser's Motion to Compel Arbitration ("Kaiser MTC") [Dkt. No. 27-1]; USCB, Inc. Motion to Compel Individual Arbitration ("USCB MTC") [Dkt. No. 28].
Hunter counters, first, that no agreement to arbitrate was formed because Kaiser did not comply with Section 1363.1 of the California Health & Safety Code. Plaintiff's Opposition ("Oppo.") at 2-7 [Dkt. No. 33]. Section 1363.1 reads:
Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1363.1.
Hunter argues that Kaiser fails to show that either of its enrollment processes — the Medi-Cal Choice Form used from 2012-2017, ("Medi-Cal period") or the CalHEERS online enrollment portal (used in 2018, "ACA period") — met the requirements of Section 1363.1. Oppo. at 4.
Courts have consistently held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not preempt Section 1363.1 because the McCarran-Ferguson Act (15 U.S.C. § 1011 et. seq.) preserves the ability of states like California to regulate the insurance industry. See Brown v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., No. E069356, 2019 WL 2539179, *4 (Cal. Ct. App. June 20, 2019); Imbler v. PacifiCare of Cal., Inc., 103 Cal.App.4th 567, 571-573, 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 715 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (purpose of the McCarran-Ferguson Act was to insure that states would continue to enjoy broad authority over regulating dealings between insurers and their policyholders); Smith v. PacifiCare Behavioral Health of Cal., Inc., 93 Cal.App.4th 139, 152-162, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 140 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (same). Nonetheless, Kaiser argues that Section 1363.1 is preempted because the insurance contracts at issue here are governed by federal law—namely, ACA during the ACA period and the federal Medicaid Act and its regulations during the Medi-Cal period —and not state law. Kaiser Reply at 5-8.
In order to receive federal insurance premium assistance in 2018, Hunter selected and secured coverage — required under the ACA — through the CalHEERS portal. The ACA provides that "[n]othing in this title shall be construed to preempt any State law that does not prevent the application of the provisions of this title." 42 U.S.C. § 18041(d). But Kaiser argues that the requirements of Section 1363.1 actually conflict with and prevent the application of numerous mandates of the ACA, particularly the provisions requiring state exchanges like CalHEERS to allow enrollment online and with the use of call center agents.
A recent unpublished California Court of Appeal decision is consistent with Kaiser's
I agree with this reasoning. Given the extensive regulation under both the ACA itself and its implementation by the State of California that govern how applicants can enroll and the mandated methods of disclosing the existence of arbitration required by the underlying health care plans, I hold that the requirements of Section 1363.1 do not apply to Hunter's enrollment and her agreement to the arbitration provisions of the Kaiser health plan during the ACA period.
Kaiser also argues that the Federal Medicaid Act preempts Section 1363.1 with respect to the Medi-Cal Choice Forms executed by Hunter between 2012 and 2017. Kaiser Reply at 7-8. In support, Kaiser relies on decisions from this District that conclude in light of extensive implementing regulations adopted under the Medicare Act that the requirements of Section 1363.1 were preempted for Medicare Advantage enrollees in Kaiser plans. In Clay v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 540 F.Supp.2d 1101, 1106-11 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (Conti, J.) the court noted that the Medicare Act preempts all state regulations of Medicare Advantage plans not relating to licensing or plan solvency, including marketing materials, election forms, and disclosure requirements.
Kaiser argues that based on the reasoning in Clay, the Medicaid Act should have a similar preemptive effect because it has similar standards and disclosure requirements. Hunter counters that Clay (and Drissi) are inapposite because those decisions rely on the exhaustive regulations and CMS review and approval of materials for plans under the Medicare Act, which were not similarly adopted or utilized for plans funded through Medi-Cal. I need not resolve this dispute. Assuming that the Medicaid Act and its regulations do not have the same preemptive effect as the Medicare Act and its implementing regulations, as discussed below I conclude that the Medi-Cal Choice Form satisfies Section 1363.1.
Kaiser argues that if Section 1363.1 applies to the Medi-Cal period, the Medi-Cal Choice Form satisfies those requirements. The Medi-Cal Choice Form Hunter signed (or does not dispute she signed) provides the following "notice" almost immediately above the signature line:
Medi-Cal Choice Form, Dkt. No. 27-5.
Hunter argues that the arbitration agreement does not satisfy Section 1363.1 because it is not "prominently displayed" as required by 1363.1(b); does not include wording required by 1363.1(c); and is not "immediately" above the signature line as required by 1363.1(d). I disagree. The NOTICE is prominently displayed as it is set off from prior section on the page, the word "
Moreover, it is questionable whether the language required by 1363.1(c) applies at all because Kaiser is a licensed health care service plan under the Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan Act and Section 1295(a) applies to disputes "as to professional negligence of a health care provider." See Code Civ. Proc. § 1295(a). Because this is not a medical malpractice claim asserted against a provider, the fact that the Medi-Cal Choice Form does not include the language mandated by Section 1295(a) is not relevant. In any event, the language actually used in the Medi-Cal Choice Form substantially complies with (c), which is all that is required because it clearly informs
If not preempted, I conclude that the requirements of Section 1363.1 were satisfied in the Medi-Cal Choice Form.
Hunter also argues that the Arbitration Agreement should not be enforced because it is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Whether a contract is unconscionable is a question of law. Patterson v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 14 Cal.App.4th 1659, 1663, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 563 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). In California, unconscionability includes an "absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party." Lhotka v. Geographic Expeditions, Inc., 181 Cal.App.4th 816, 821, 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 844 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (citation omitted). Accordingly, unconscionability has both a "procedural" and a "substantive" element. Id.
Procedural unconscionability occurs where a contract or clause involves oppression, consisting of a lack of negotiation and meaningful choice, or surprise, such as where the term at issue is hidden within a wordy document. Id. "California law treats contracts of adhesion, or at least terms over which a party of lesser bargaining power had no opportunity to negotiate, as procedurally unconscionable to at least some degree." Bridge Fund Capital Corp. v. Fastbucks Franchise Corp., 622 F.3d 996, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010). Substantive unconscionability occurs where the provision at issue "reallocates risks in an objectively unreasonable or unexpected manner." Lhotka, 181 Cal. App. 4th at 821, 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 844 (citation omitted). "Substantive unconscionability focuses on the one-sidedness or overly harsh effect of the contract term or clause." Id. at 824-25, 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 844 (citation omitted). Both procedural and substantive unconscionability must be found before a term will be deemed unenforceable, but both need not be present to the same degree. Rather, "the more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa." Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24 Cal.4th 83, 114, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745, 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000).
Hunter contends that the Agreement is procedurally unconscionable because it was a contract of adhesion that she was forced to enter (as she had only limited choice, and under the ACA had to select at least one plan) and because the actual terms of the Agreement were not provided until after she agreed to arbitration through the one page form or online enrollment portal. The Agreement is substantively unconscionable, she argues, because: (1) it prevents her from recovering attorney fees if successful, which would be available to her under the consumer protection statutes she invokes; (2) it forces her to share costs of arbitration with Kaiser, which she would not normally bear in litigation; and (3) its rules of arbitration are skewed in favor of Kaiser, which helped develop the rules.
Hunter asserts that the Agreement is procedurally unconscionable because it resulted from a contract of adhesion forced upon her by a substantially more powerful party. Oppo. at 9-10. She claims that as a person of limited means who was required to maintain minimum effective coverage under the ACA, she only had three health plans from which to select coverage. Id. The absence of meaningful choice, she argues, supports a finding of procedural unconscionability. Id. She also asserts that the arbitration provision's terms were disclosed in a confusing
Kaiser counters that Hunter had a meaningful choice between three plans. She chose Kaiser each year since at least 2012, showing that she preferred Kaiser over other health plan options. Kaiser Reply at 9-10. She also had the opportunity to review her Medi-Cal Choice Form and Membership Agreement each year since 2012; each Membership Agreement contained the same binding arbitration clause. Nelson Decl., ¶¶ 8, 10. The Membership Agreement clearly labels the "Binding Arbitration" clause, describes the terms in plain language, and lists the clause in the table of contents. Membership Agreement [Dkt. No. 27-9] at TOC, 65. Additionally, the Medi-Cal Choice Form that Hunter filled out each year from 2012 to 2017 provided "NOTICE ... that Kaiser requires the use of binding arbitration to resolve certain disputes. ..." And when she enrolled through Covered California in 2018, she was prompted to review and check a box acknowledging that "the full arbitration provision for each participating health plan ... is in the health plan's coverage document, which is available online at CoveredCA.com for [her] review, or [she] can call Covered California for more information." Id. (citing Medi-Cal Choice Form; Covered California E-Signature Report from Enrollment, attached as Ex. A to Taylor Decl. [Dkt. No. 27-7]).
Because the Membership Agreement agreed to through Medi-Cal Choice Forms and CalHEERS e-signature page was a contract of adhesion, it is "procedurally unconscionable to at least some degree." Bridge Fund Capital Corp. v. Fastbucks Fran. Corp., 622 F.3d 996, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (in California, "contracts of adhesion, or at least terms over which a party of lesser bargaining power had no opportunity to negotiate, [are] procedurally unconscionable to at least some degree."). But that limited degree of unconscionability is as far as it goes.
Hunter cites to Stiener v. Apple Computer, Inc., 556 F.Supp.2d 1016, 1026 (N.D. Cal. 2008) for the proposition that a lack of market alternatives demonstrates procedural unconscionability. In Stiener, the court held that, at the time, the iPhone was the only "breakthrough" device and was unique among wireless products because it combined "into one small, lightweight, handheld device ... desktop-class email, web browsing, searching and Google Maps." Id. There were no alternative smartphones (unlike today) and the court held that this added an additional amount of procedural unconscionability. But that is not the case here. At least for the ACA period, Hunter had two other alternatives and she does not argue that something about these alternatives (or those available to her during the Medi-Cal period) rendered them illusory. Moreover, by the time Hunter signed up through CalHEERS in 2018, she had been provided an opportunity to review the Membership Agreement containing the same Arbitration Agreement for six years.
Accordingly, the amount of procedural unconscionability is low. Hunter needs to demonstrate a high degree of substantive unconscionability in order to prevent enforcement of the arbitration provision against her. Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 114, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745, 6 P.3d 669.
Hunter contends that the agreement is substantively unconscionable because it
Regarding attorney fees, Hunter argues that without the fee-shifting incentives present in consumer protection statutes she invokes in this case (CCRAA, Cal. Civ. Code § 1785.31(a) and FCRA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 1681o), consumers are left to fend for themselves without competent representation, undermining the intent of the California legislature and the United States Congress to incentivize private enforcement. Oppo. at 11. She asserts that by limiting the remedies provided to plaintiffs, the arbitration provision has a chilling effect on consumers' pursuit of statutory consumer-protection claims while insulating Kaiser from liability. Id. She relies on Ridgeway v. Nabors Completion & Prod. Servs. Co., where the court held that arbitration provisions that "flatly prohibit the arbitrator from shifting discovery costs and expert fees to the losing party, no matter the circumstances and even when California law dictates a different result," were substantively unconscionable, but severable. Ridgeway v. Nabors Completion & Prod. Services Co., 725 Fed. Appx. 472, 474 (9th Cir. 2018). She contends that because the Agreement here prohibits fee shifting for various costs as well as attorney fees, the Agreement "effectively blocks every forum for the redress of disputes, including arbitration itself." Oppo. at 10-11 (citing Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 57 Cal.4th 1109, 1148 (Cal. 2013)).
Kaiser does not respond to this point other than to argue that Hunter has not shown that she will incur more attorneys' fees in arbitration than in Court. Id. That is not the point. It does not matter what fees Hunter incurs during the litigation itself. It matters that if she is successful, under California law she could recover her attorney fees. That law incentivizes attorneys and plaintiffs to bring the consumer protection claims Hunter asserts in this case. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1785.31(a); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n(a)(3), 1681o(b). If those incentives are removed, the vindication of California's consumer protection statutes suffers. Serpa v. California Surety Investigations, Inc., 215 Cal.App.4th 695, 709-710, 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 506 (2013) (finding arbitration agreement unconscionable because it deprived employee of a favorable fee-shifting rule under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA)). To the extent this provision precludes Hunter from recovering attorney fees if she is successful, which is what is appears
Concerning Hunter's challenge to the provision of the Arbitration Agreement imposing costs of arbitration upon her (that she would not have to bear in traditional litigation), she points to language that: "the fees and expenses of the neutral arbitrator shall be paid one-half by the Claimants and one-half by the Respondents." Membership Agreement at 67.
Kaiser counters that Hunter has failed to meet her burden to show that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92, 121 S.Ct. 513, 148 L.Ed.2d 373 (2000) ("[A] party seeking to invalidate an arbitration agreement because arbitration would be prohibitively expensive bears the burden of showing this likelihood."). It notes that under the Rules of the Office of the Independent Administrator ("OIA"), which govern Kaiser arbitrations, a claimant may shift the obligation of paying fees and expenses, the filing fees and the fees for the arbitrator, to Kaiser. Id. (citing OIA Rules 12, 13).
Kaiser's arguments have some persuasive authority. But as the California Supreme Court has explained, "imposing arbitral forum fees that are prohibitively high" is unconscionable. Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc., 57 Cal. 4th at 1144-45, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 269, 311 P.3d 184. That plaintiffs apparently need to proceed to arbitration
Hunter also argues that Kaiser's use of its "own" OIA rules, as opposed to the commonly used rules of either the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") or Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services ("JAMS"), is unconscionable. Oppo. at 12-13. She alleges that Kaiser has designed the rules and governing body to favor itself because the OIA exists only to "administer [] arbitrations between Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. and its California health plan members." Id. Even if a non-OIA arbitrator were selected, she would have been vetted and selected by the OIA and required to apply the OIA Rules. Id.
Hunter says that this raises concerns of arbitral bias. See Pokorny v. Quixtar, Inc., 601 F.3d 987, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010). In Pokorny, the Ninth Circuit considered the mandated use of the defendant-trained arbitrators, concluding that use of those arbitrators was to defendant's advantage, a fact about which claimants were not informed. Id. at 1003. The Pokorny court concluded that the mandated use of those arbitrators was a contributing factor to the substantive unconscionability of the arbitration agreement.
Kaiser counters that Hunter's suggestions of bias are unfounded. In 2018, 48% of arbitration claimants received compensation from Kaiser, either as a result of settlement or hearing. OIA Report, p. xi. It also notes that the arbitrators on the OIA panel are neutral and have plaintiff, defendant, and judicial backgrounds. Id. at xii. It points out that all OIA arbitrators are required to follow the Ethics Standards set forth in the California Rules of Court and AAA Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes. OIA Rule 4. It concludes that there is nothing substantively unconscionable about requiring arbitration before an OIA arbitrator.
I find that on the limited record before me, the use of OIA rules raises the slight specter of arbitral bias. But Hunter has failed to point out any particular OIA rule that would, as she says, "place a finger on the scale" in Kaiser's favor. In addition, she does not identify any particular selection criteria or training mandated by Kaiser for OIA arbitrators that was undisclosed or would lead to Kaiser's advantage. Absent additional evidence, I cannot conclude that use of OIA arbitrators creates a substantively unconscionable advantage for Kaiser.
Kaiser does not directly address severability of any substantively unconscionable provision, but its co-defendant USCB suggests that I sever the unconscionable substantive provisions rather than refuse to enforce the Agreement in its entirety. USCB, Inc.'s Reply at 8-9 [Dkt. No. 40]. Hunter opposes severance, arguing that because the Agreement is "permeated" with unconscionability, the whole agreement is "tainted with illegality" and severance is not appropriate. However, as noted above, it is only the attorney fees and cost-splitting provisions that I have determined are substantively unconscionable. Those discrete provisions can be severed without rewriting or defeating the purpose of the mutually agreed-to arbitration provision. See, e.g., Baker v. Acad. of Art Univ. Found., No. 17-CV-03444-JSC, 2017 WL 4418973, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2017) (severing was warranted because "California courts prefer to sever provisions rather than hold an entire agreement unenforceable[,]" the provision at issue was not integral to the remaining terms and was easily severable, and in light of the strong public policy favoring arbitration).
Hunter argues that if arbitration of any of her claims is required, the arbitration should be on a class-wide basis in light of the clear terms of the applicable Arbitration Agreements. I disagree.
The Supreme Court has held that "a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so." Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684, 130 S.Ct. 1758, 176 L.Ed.2d 605 (2010). This is because "the differences between bilateral and class-action arbitration are too great for arbitrators to presume, consistent with their limited powers under the FAA, that the parties' mere silence on the issue of class-action arbitration constitutes consent to resolve their disputes in class proceedings." Id. at 687, 130 S.Ct. 1758. The Court recently reaffirmed Stolt in Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S.Ct. 1407, 203 L.Ed.2d 636 (2019), holding that under the FAA an ambiguous agreement cannot provide the necessary contractual basis for concluding that the parties agreed to submit to class arbitration. "Like silence, ambiguity does not provide a sufficient basis to conclude that parties to an arbitration agreement agreed to `sacrifice[] the principal advantage of arbitration." Id. at 1416.
Hunter contends that the arbitration provision expressly contemplates plural and therefore class-wide dispute resolution because included within the "Scope of Arbitration" in the Agreement are claims where, "[t]he claim is asserted by one or more Member Parties against one or more Kaiser Permanente Parties or by one or more Kaiser Permanente Parties against one or more Member Parties." Membership Agreement at 67 (emphasis added). She points out that in nine of the eleven times the Agreement uses the word "Claimant," it is the plural "Claimants."
The references to plural parties or claimants, at best, only create the kind of ambiguity that the Supreme Court addressed in Lamps Plus. Reading the relevant provisions of the Agreement in full, in particular the "Binding Arbitration" section at pages 65-67, there is no clear provision for class-wide or group arbitration. The plural references relied on by Hunter are mostly general references to how arbitration of individual claims proceed, not commitments to allowing multiple claims to be grouped in one proceeding. Hunter must arbitrate her claims individually.
Hunter also asks that if she is compelled to arbitrate her claims, I should retain jurisdiction over and proceed to litigate her claims in Counts 1, 2, 3, and 8 because they seek "public injunctive relief" and are not arbitrable under McGill v. Citibank, N.A., 2 Cal. 5th 945, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 627, 393 P.3d 85 (Cal. 2017).
Kaiser argues that because the Agreement at issue here does not preclude public injunctive relief, the McGill rule is inapposite. It relies on Lee v. Postmates Inc., where a judge in this District addressed a similar arbitration agreement. In Lee, the court concluded that because the arbitration agreement (which included a class action waiver) did not prevent the arbitrator from awarding public injunctive relief, the McGill rule did not apply and the claims were subject to arbitration. Lee v. Postmates Inc., 18-CV-03421-JCS, 2018 WL 4961802, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2018), motion to certify appeal granted, 18-CV-03421-JCS, 2019 WL 1864442 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2019); see also Ionescu v. Extra Space Storage Inc., 19-CV-02226-YGR, 2019 WL 3997480, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2019) ("That the Arbitration Provision prohibits plaintiffs from proceeding `on a representative basis' ... does not mean that an arbitrator cannot award injunctive relief benefiting the public at large. As McGill itself makes clear, an action seeking public injunctive relief is not a "representative action."); Garcia v. Kakish, 1:17-CV-00374-JLT, 2017 WL 2773667, at *7 (E.D. Cal. June 27, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, 1:17-CV-00374-JLT, 2017 WL 4325777 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2017) (declining to invalidate arbitration agreement under McGill where there were was no "explicit provision waiving a buyer's right to seek public injunctive relief, and no agreement between the parties regarding whether the effect of the provision constitutes such a waiver.").
Hunter points to nothing in the Agreement here that would preclude the arbitrator from awarding public injunctive relief. The McGill rule does not apply. All of Hunter's claims will be sent to arbitration.
Kaiser's and USBC's motions to compel arbitration are GRANTED in full, except that the substantively unconscionable provisions concerning fee shifting and the costs of arbitration as identified above are severed and unenforceable. This case will be administratively closed pending completion of the arbitration. Every 180 days from the date below, counsel shall file a joint Status Update informing me about the status of the arbitration.
