JANIS L. SAMMARTINO, District Judge.
Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Gavin B. Davis's Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunction. ("PI Mot.," ECF No. 9.) Also before the Court are Defendant San Diego District Attorney Leonard Trinh's and Defendant San Diego Police Department's responses in opposition to Plaintiff's motion, (ECF Nos. 11, 12, respectively), and Plaintiff's reply in support of his motion, ("PI Mot. Reply," ECF No. 16). After considering the parties' arguments and the law, the Court
The same standard governs TROs and preliminary injunctions. Stuhlbard Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush and Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). "A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest." Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (citing Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689-90 (2008)); see also Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. City of L.A., 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009); Sierra Forest Legacy v. Rey, 691 F.Supp.2d 1204, 1207 (E.D. Cal. 2010). In the Ninth Circuit, "serious questions going to the merits and a balance of hardships that tips sharply towards the plaintiff can support issuance of a preliminary injunction, so long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public interest." All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (concluding that this "sliding scale" approach survives after the Supreme Court's decision in Winter). This is an "extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief." Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. To warrant injunctive relief, irreparable injury must be more than merely possible. See Midgett v. Tri-Cty. Metro. Transp. Dist. of Or., 254 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2001). Rather, the plaintiff must show "that he faces a real or immediate threat" that he will suffer irreparable harm. Id. Plaintiffs seeking a preliminary injunction carry a particularly "heavy burden" of proving their entitlement to it. Earth Island Inst. v. Carlton, 626 F.3d 462, 469 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Munaf, 553 U.S. at 689 ("A preliminary injunction is an `extraordinary and drastic remedy.'").
Plaintiff filed his emergency motion for preliminary injunction on April 25, 2017. (ECF No. 9.) In the Requested Relief section, Plaintiff requests:
(PI Mot. 9-10
Plaintiff's motion fails. As an initial matter, Plaintiff's motion is difficult to understand. He appears to generally discuss events occurring in two of his state law cases. (Id. at 5-8.) Apparently Judge Jeffrey Fraser issued a bench warrant for Plaintiff's arrest on April 17, 2017, and Plaintiff has filed, in his state court cases, motions to remove Judge Fraser from presiding over his cases and a motion to quash the bench warrant. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff alleges that on April 24, 2017, officers attempted to execute the arrest warrant, which Plaintiff argues caused him reputational harm. (Id. at 7.) Because Plaintiff argues he is contesting the validity of the warrant, he further argues that the officers do not have the authority to arrest him based on the same, and thus he apparently seeks an order from this Court barring officers from taking him into custody. (Id. at 7-8.)
Although Plaintiff engages with the relevant Winter factors in support of his motion for a preliminary injunction, he fails to persuade the Court to grant him this "extraordinary" remedy. First, Plaintiff argues that "[t]here is a substantial likelihood that Plaintiff will prevail on the merits because the right to each of Due Process and counsel are some of the most basic and fundamental rights afforded to criminal defendants, which the Plaintiff is awaiting federal rulings on, while clearly not evading the law, and not a threat to anyone."
Furthermore, Plaintiff, in a conclusory manner, states he "will suffer irreparable, and separately imminent harm, prima facie, if the preliminary injunction is not granted," and that "[t]here is no adequate remedy of law other than seeking this relief herein." (PI Mot. 8.) This is plainly insufficient to establish "a clear showing that [he] is entitled to such relief." Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. Finally, Plaintiff argues that an injunction is in the public interest because "the right to due process and/or the assistance of counsel are some of the most fundamental rights to be afforded to a criminal defendant . . . ." (Id. at 9; see also PI Mot. Reply 17.) While the Court agrees with this statement in the abstract, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a likelihood that these rights have been violated in this case. Additionally, Defendants argue that "Plaintiff does not seek to protect any public interests, and a superior court judge seems to have determined the opposite—that Plaintiff presents enough of a risk to others that he must be taken into custody." (E.g., ECF No. 11, at 4.) On balance, the Court finds that the Winter factors do not favor a grant of injunctive relief, and that Plaintiff has failed to at least demonstrate serious questions going to the merits of his claims and that the balance of hardships tips sharply in his favor. Accordingly, the Court
For the reasons stated above, the Court