ORDER DENYING MOTION OF DEFENDANTS CFMG AND FITHIAN TO JOIN PATRICIO CLAYPOLE AS A PARTY

[Re: ECF 112]

BETH LABSON FREEMAN, District Judge.

This tragic case comes after the deaths of two people, one of whom was Plaintiff Silvia Guersenzvaig's son, Joshua Claypole. Guersenzvaig brought this action individually and in her capacity as administrator of Claypole's estate. She asserts that jail personnel and others who had custody of Claypole in the days before his death were deliberately indifferent to Claypole's serious mental health needs in violation of his federal constitutional rights and breached various duties owed to Claypole under state law. Two defendants — the doctor and the medical group who oversaw Claypole's medical and mental health care at the jail — move to join Claypole's father as a party in this action. The motion is DENIED for the reasons discussed below.

I. BACKGROUND

On May 1, 2013, Claypole was arrested for fatally stabbing a taxi driver. After he was held for several hours by the City of Monterey Police Department, he was transported to the Monterey County Jail, where he was held alternately on and off suicide watch until he was found hanging in his cell on May 4, 2013. Claypole was revived and kept alive on a respirator for several days. However, once it was determined that he was brain dead, the respirator was removed and he passed away.

Guersenzvaig filed this lawsuit on her own behalf and on behalf of Claypole's estate. At her deposition, she disclosed that prior to his death Claypole had enjoyed an ongoing relationship with his father, Patricio Claypole. She testified that Patricio, a resident of Argentina, had flown to the United States immediately upon hearing about Claypole's condition and had participated in the decision to take Claypole off the respirator. Based upon that testimony and other statements made in the deposition, moving parties assert that Patricio is a required party to this litigation.

II. DISCUSSION

The motion is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, which provides in relevant part as follows:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1).

Moving parties argue that Patricio is a required party under Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(ii) because he claims an interest relating to Claypole's death and later could assert his own constitutional or wrongful death claims, thus subjecting moving parties to a risk of incurring double obligations.1 Moving parties also argue that Patricio must be joined in the current wrongful death claim under California law.

Moving parties' argument that failure to join Patricio in this lawsuit will subject them to a risk of incurring double obligations is not enough to satisfy Rule 19. In order to establish that Patricio is a required party, moving parties also must demonstrate that "the absent party claim[s] a legally protected interest relating to the subject matter of the action." Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1043 (9th Cir. 1983). Moving parties have not met this standard.

Although Northrop is factually distinct from the present case, as it involved military contracts rather than an alleged wrongful death, the Ninth Circuit did not limit the above statement of the law to the facts before it in Northrop. To the contrary, it appears that the Ninth Circuit expressly applied Rule 19's language requiring joinder of a person when the person "claims an interest relating to the subject of the action" and other specified conditions are met. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(B) (formerly Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2)). Applying Rule 19, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court had erred in finding the Government to be a required party in the Northrop action, noting that the Government was not a party to the contracts at issue and had "never asserted a formal interest in either the subject matter of [the] action or the action itself." Northrop, 705 F.2d at 1043-44. Other courts in this district have relied upon Northrop and its progeny in holding that when an individual has not come forward to claim an interest in the action, that individual is not a required party under Rule 19. See, e.g., Zacharias v. U.S. Bank, N.A., No. 14-02186 S.C. 2014 WL 4100705, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2014).

In the present case, Guersenzvaig's testimony initially suggested that Patricio wished to become a party to the litigation but was under the mistaken impression that he could not do so because he resides in Argentina. See Guersenzvaig Dep. 135:21-137:22, Exh. A to Bertling Decl., ECF 112-3. However, Guersenzvaig's subsequent corrections to her deposition clarified that Patricio wished to "be part of" the litigation only by supporting Guersenzvaig's efforts. Guersenzvaig Dep. Corrections, Exh. 1 to Tajsar Decl., ECF 116-1. Guersenzvaig testified that she informed Patricio about this lawsuit. Guersenzvaig Dep. 139:14-17, Exh. A to Bertling Decl., ECF 112-3. Patricio has not joined the lawsuit in the year and a half that it has been pending. Nor does the record contain any evidence suggesting that Patricio intends to bring his own lawsuit at some later date. Moving parties thus have failed to establish a "substantial risk" of incurring double obligations under Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(ii).

Moving parties further argue that California law requires that Patricio be joined in the wrongful death claim. They rely on Harden v. United States, 485 F.Supp. 380, 395 (S.D. Ga. 1980), aff'd in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 688 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1982), in which the district court found that a minor decedent's father had to be joined in a wrongful death claim brought by the decedent's mother because Georgia state law vested the right of action in both parents. Even if this Court were to accept Harden as authority that state law informs a district court's Rule 19 analysis with respect to state law claims2, California law does not mandate Patricio's joinder in this case and in fact precludes it. Under California law, "[e]ither the decedent's personal representative on behalf of the heirs or the specified heirs (either as plaintiffs or joined defendants) may assert the wrongful death claim — but not both." Adams v. Sup. Ct., 196 Cal.App.4th 71, 77 (2011). When the personal representative of the estate brings a wrongful death claim, he or she acts as a trustee for all the heirs. Id. As noted above, Guersenzvaig has brought suit as the administrator of Claypole's estate. Thus under California law Patricio could not be joined in the wrongful death claim and any interest he might assert would be properly addressed to the state probate court.

The party bringing a Rule 19 motion has the burden of persuasion. See Brum v. Cnty. of Merced, No. 1:12-cv-01636-AWI-KSO, 2013 WL 2404844, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 31, 2013) (collecting cases). Moving parties have not met that burden here.3

III. ORDER

Accordingly, the motion to join Patricio Claypole in this action is DENIED.