JANIS L. SAMMARTINO, District Judge.
Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Adnan Rahman's Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis ("IFP"). (IFP Mot., ECF No. 2.) Plaintiff has filed an action alleging that Defendants San Diego Accounts Service d/b/a California Accounts Service ("CAS") and Does 1-10 ("Does") violated the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the California Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and the California Credit Reporting Agencies Act. (Compl. at 1, ECF No. 1.)
All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff's failure to prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). A federal court may authorize the commencement of an action without the prepayment of fees if the party submits an affidavit, including a statement of assets, showing that he is unable to pay the required filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
Here, Plaintiff filed an affidavit stating that he is currently employed by the Nitto Denko Technical Corporation, his monthly gross pay is $3,800, and his monthly take-home pay is $3150. (IFP Mot. at 1.) Plaintiff further indicates that he has not received any other income in the past twelve months,
The Court must screen every civil action brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and dismiss any case that is "frivolous or malicious," "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners."); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) "not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim"). Additionally, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) mandates that the court reviewing an action filed pursuant to the IFP provisions of § 1915 make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before directing the Marshal to effect service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c)(3). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3); Navarette v. Pioneer Med. Ctr., No. 12-cv-0629-WQH (DHB), 2013 WL 139925, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2013).
All complaints must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007)). "[D]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim is context-specific, requiring the reviewing court to draw on its experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663-64 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
"When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. "[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Andrews v. King, 393 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) ("The language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).").
In the present case, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's complaint survives the sua sponte screening procedure. Plaintiff pleads adequate facts concerning the propriety of the relevant debt, Plaintiff's communication to relevant parties that he was disputing the debt, and the debt-collection practices used by the relevant Defendants, that, if true, would entitle him to relief under relevant federal and California law. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 15-16, 22-25, 29, 36, 42, 47, 49-50, 52-53.) Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to U.S. Marshal service on his behalf.
Good cause appearing,
1. Plaintiff's IFP Motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 2) is
2. The Clerk is
3. Upon receipt, the U.S. Marshal is
4. Defendant CAS is thereafter
5. Plaintiff