ORDER

TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court pursuant to Defendant City of Chico's ("Defendant"), Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 6.) Plaintiff Daniel Fonseca ("Plaintiff") opposes Defendant's motion. (ECF No. 8.) Defendant filed a reply in response to Plaintiff's opposition. (ECF No. 9.) The Court has carefully considered the arguments made by both parties. For the reasons stated below, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 6.)

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a peace officer pursuant to Penal Code section 830.1 from 1985 until his termination on November 15, 2012. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 12.) Plaintiff suffers from alcoholism, which he contends limits his major life activities.1 (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 3-4.) Plaintiff alleges that he is capable of performing the essential functions of the job. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 2.)

On or about May 14, 2012, Plaintiff disclosed to Defendant that he suffered from alcoholism and requested help. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 14.) Despite Plaintiff's request for help, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant did not offer any accommodations or engage in an interactive process with Plaintiff. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 15.)

Plaintiff further asserts that because of Plaintiff's disability and his request for help, Defendant treated Plaintiff adversely, subjecting him to the Internal Affairs process. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 16.) Specifically, Defendant dispatched superior officers to Plaintiff's home and required him to take an off-duty breathalyzer test after a traffic accident, even though the responding officer had told Defendant's managers the accident did not involve alcohol. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 16.) The breathalyzer test revealed Plaintiff was below the legal limit for driving. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 16.) Despite this fact, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant subjected him to adverse action by terminating him for this alleged misconduct on or about November 15, 2012. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 16-17.) Plaintiff timely appealed his termination. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 18.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a pleading contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). Under notice pleading in federal court, the complaint must "give the defendant fair notice of what the claim . . . is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). "This simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims." Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002).

On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). A court is bound to give plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn from the "well-pleaded" allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). A plaintiff need not allege "`specific facts' beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing entitlement to relief." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).

Nevertheless, a court "need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations." United States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, "it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading is insufficient if it offers mere "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 ("Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice."). Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume that the plaintiff "can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged[.]" Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

Ultimately, a court may not dismiss a complaint in which the plaintiff has alleged "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 697 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Only where a plaintiff has failed to "nudge[] [his or her] claims . . . across the line from conceivable to plausible[,]" is the complaint properly dismissed. Id. at 680. While the plausibility requirement is not akin to a probability requirement, it demands more than "a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. at 678. This plausibility inquiry is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679.

In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the court may consider only the complaint, any exhibits thereto, and matters which may be judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. See Mir v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1988); Isuzu Motors Ltd. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 12 F.Supp.2d 1035, 1042 (C.D. Cal. 1998).

If a complaint fails to state a plausible claim, "`[a] district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.'" Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 484, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also Gardner v. Marino, 563 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding no abuse of discretion in denying leave to amend when amendment would be futile). Although a district court should freely give leave to amend when justice so requires under Rule 15(a)(2), "the court's discretion to deny such leave is `particularly broad' where the plaintiff has previously amended its complaint[.]" Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 713 F.3d 502, 520 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Miller v. Yokohama Tire Corp., 358 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 2004)).

III. ANALYSIS

All of Plaintiff's claims rely on Plaintiff establishing that his alcoholism constitutes a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"). As explained below, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish that he in fact suffered from a disability. Accordingly, the Court need not address Defendant's other arguments.

A. Disability Discrimination

Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot state a claim for disability discrimination because Plaintiff failed to adequately allege the major life activities which his alcoholism limits, as required. In opposition, Plaintiff asserts he was not required to specify in his complaint which major life activities his alcoholism limits. Plaintiff contends that merely stating that major life activities are limited is enough to meet the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) standard for adequately pleading a claim. Accordingly, Plaintiff argues he has met this standard and adequately pleaded his disability under the ADA because he states his alcoholism limits his major life activities.

1. Major Life Activities

The crux of the matter before the Court is whether Plaintiff's alcoholism is a disability as defined under the ADA and FEHA. Alcoholism is a disability under the ADA if it limits major life activities. In Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 896 (9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs who alleged that their previous drug use resulted in limitations on their ability to work and learn had successfully pled that their drug addiction was a disability under the ADA. Id.; accord Currier v. Whim Co., C 04-01366 SI, 2004 WL 1212058, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 25, 2004) ("The term `disability' under the ADA means `a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities' of an individual."); Bailey v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 306 F.3d 1162, 1167-68 (1st Cir. 2002) ("An ADA plaintiff must offer evidence demonstrating that the limitation caused by the impairment is substantial in terms of his or her own experience. Alcoholism is no exception; courts have generally refused to recognize alcoholism as a per se disability under the ADA."); Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 315 (5th Cir. 1997) (establishing that alcoholism is not a per se disability); Lottinger v. Shell Oil Co., 143 F.Supp.2d 743, 761 (S.D. Tex. 2001) ("Thus, to proceed, Lottinger must show that his alcoholism or depression substantially limited a major life activity.").

In his complaint, Plaintiff contends that "Alcoholism is a disability under ADA if it limits major life activities." ECF No. 1 at ¶ 3.) This statement is inadequate to meet the Rule 8(a) standard because it merely states a necessary element of the claim. Although alcoholism may be a disability under the ADA where it has been shown to limit a major life activity, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to support that his alcoholism has in fact limited his major life activities. Instead, Plaintiff merely states legal conclusions and recites necessary elements in an attempt to satisfy this prerequisite. Under Twombly, a plaintiff cannot rely on a threadbare recitation of the elements to adequately plead his claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Thus, Plaintiff is required to provide factual information in support of his assertion that his alcoholism caused a physical or mental impairment. Currier v. Whim Co., C 04-01366 SI, 2004 WL 1212058, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 25, 2004) (explaining that if "plaintiff did not allege that his alcoholism caused any physical or mental impairments that could render him disabled," then his conclusory statements and recitation of the elements is not enough to sufficiently plead the claim). As such, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of specifying what major life activities his alcoholism limits and thus has failed to state a claim under the ADA.

Consequently, because FEHA's interpretation of disability parallels the ADA's interpretation, Plaintiff's FEHA claims for disability discrimination also fail. Gelfo v. Lockheed martin Corp., 140 Cal.App.4th 34, 56-57 (2006) ("Because the ADA and FEHA share the goal of eliminating discrimination, we often look to federal case authority to guide the construction and application of FEHA, particularly where parallel statutory language is involved."); Gosvener v. Coastal Corp., 51 Cal.App.4th 805, 813 (1996) (stating that FEHA specifically incorporates the definition of disability listed in the ADA).

Finally, the remaining counts of Plaintiff's complaint are based on the premise that Plaintiff has a disability under the ADA and FEHA. As discussed above, without sufficient factual support the Plaintiff has not adequately pleaded the existence of a disability. Therefore, the other counts lack a foundation on which the claims can be based and thus fail to state a claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 1) is hereby GRANTED. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint within thirty days of the entry of this order. Failure to do so will result in this case being closed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.