ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Docket No. 71

EDWARD M. CHEN, District Judge.

Plaintiff Michael David Nilsen has moved for reconsideration of a part of the order issued by the Court on September 28, 2016. See Docket No. 37 (order granting various defendants' motions to dismiss). Under the Civil Local Rules for this District, "[n]o party may notice a motion for reconsideration without first obtaining leave of Court to file the motion." Civ. L.R. 7-9(a) (emphasis added). In addition, a party seeking leave of Court to file a motion for reconsideration must

Civ. L.R. 7-9(b).

The Court denies Mr. Nilsen leave to file a motion for reconsideration because he has failed to meet the standard above.

For example, Mr. Nilsen has submitted new evidence to support his argument that the Court's analysis of California Government Code § 26613 is incorrect. But Mr. Nilsen has failed to show that, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, he could not have known of this new evidence at the time of the Court's interlocutory order. Furthermore, diligence issues aside, he has failed to show that the new evidence is material because the Court held that, "[e]ven if section 26613 did in fact limit his powers, [the deputy defendant] could have `reasonably believed' that he was entitled to make this stop" and thus "would be entitled to qualified immunity." Docket No. 37 (Order at 13).

As another example, Mr. Nilsen has failed to show that the Court manifestly failed to consider material facts or dispositive legal arguments related to California Vehicle Code § 40300 et seq. In its interlocutory order, the Court explained that § 40300 et seq. had no application because the deputy defendant "did not arrest Mr. Nilsen." Docket No. 37 (Order at 12); see also Cal. Veh. Code § 40300 (providing that "[t]he provisions of this chapter shall govern all peace officers in making arrests for violations of this code without a warrant for offenses committed in their presence") (emphasis added). Although Mr. Nilsen contends that "stops . . . are indeed arrests," Mot. at 5, California Penal Code § 835 simply provides that "[a]n arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person, or by submission to the custody of an officer." Cal. Pen. Code § 835 (emphasis added). Moreover, contrary to what Mr. Nilsen suggests, there can be stops (or detentions) short of an arrest. See, e.g., Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir. 1996) (in Fourth Amendment analysis, stating that "[t]here is no bright-line rule to determine when an investigatory stop becomes an arrest"). As for Mr. Nilsen's reliance on California Vehicle Code § 40300.6, that statute does not stand for the proposition that an officer may arrest an individual for conduct not committed in his presence only where there is a traffic accident. See Cal. Veh. Code § 40300.6 (stating that "[s]ection 40300.5 shall be liberally interpreted to further safe roads and the control of driving while under the influence . . . in order to permit arrests to be made pursuant to that section within a reasonable time and distance away from the scene of a traffic accident"). As the Court stated in its interlocutory order, § 40300.5 expressly "allow[s] an officer to arrest a driver without a warrant where [he] has reasonable cause to believe that [the] driver has been driving under the influence if, inter alia, the person could injure himself or others, could destroy evidence of the crime, or could escape apprehension without immediate arrest." Docket No. 37 (Order at 12).

Accordingly, Mr. Nilsen's motion — liberally construed as a motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration — is denied.

This order disposes of Docket No. 71.

IT IS SO ORDERED.