NANCY J. KOPPE, Magistrate Judge.
Pending before the Court is Third-Party Plaintiff Shana McCart-Pollak's motion to enforce the order requiring supplemental discovery responses from Third-Party Defendant Kevin Harrington. Docket No. 326. Ms. McCart-Pollak also seeks sanctions. Id. Mr. Harrington filed a response in opposition, and Ms. McCart-Pollak filed a reply. Docket Nos. 332, 340. The motion is properly decided without a hearing. See Local Rule 78-1. For the reasons outlined below, the motion to enforce is hereby
Ms. McCart-Pollak previously brought a motion to compel further responses to Requests for Production 1, 2, 3 and 4. Docket No. 295. In particular, Ms. McCart-Pollak argued that Mr. Harrington improperly asserted a lack of possession, custody, or control of responsive documents. See, e.g., id. at 7. On January 31, 2018, the Court granted Ms. McCart-Pollak's motion to compel in pertinent part as follows:
Docket No. 310 at 3-4 (emphasis added). In short, the Court held that Mr. Harrington's assertion that he searched his "records" and his "files" was insufficiently detailed, and the Court ordered that supplemental responses must be served "identifying with particularity" the search conducted.
Following the Court's order, Mr. Harrington supplemented his responses by indicating that he "searched and reviewed physical files in his home office as well as electronic files" to no avail, but that he reserves the right to supplement to provide responsive documents in the future. Docket No. 326 at 71-74. In responding to Ms. McCart-Pollak's pending motion to enforce the Court's order, Mr. Harrington asserts that he does not have responsive documents. See Docket No. 332 at 4-6. Mr. Harrington's papers are essentially unresponsive to the issue before the Court. Mr. Harrington was not ordered to state again that he has no responsive documents; he was ordered to provide a detailed explanation of the inquiry undertaken to find responsive documents. Mr. Harrington has now marginally changed his answers from searching "records" and reviewing "files," Docket No. 298-2 at 204b 5, to searching and reviewing "physical files in his home office as well as electronic files," Docket No. 326 at 5, 11, 13, 15. This response is not sufficient. Most obviously, Mr. Harrington provides no explanation of the electronic files searched or the means of searching them. Cf. F.D.I.C. v. 26 Flamingo, LLC, 2013 WL 3975006, at *3 (D. Nev. Aug. 1, 2013) (holding that declaration that electronic search was completed using various terms to "search the system" was insufficiently detailed, given that the declaration failed to provide details about the system searched, whether there were other sources of documents that could be searched, when the search was performed, or whether the documents in the "system" were in searchable format). Nor has Mr. Harrington provided any information about the physical files searched, other than that they are in his home office.
Having determined that Mr. Harrington failed to comply with the order compelling discovery, the Court turns to Ms. McCart-Pollak's request for sanctions. As a starting point, the Court must award expenses to the victor absent a showing that the loser was substantially justified or there exist unjust circumstances. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C). The losing party has the burden of establishing substantial justification or unjust circumstances. Falstaff Brewing Corp. v. Miller Brewing Co., 702 F.2d 770, 784 (9th Cir. 1983). In this case, Mr. Harrington provides no argument of any kind in response to the request for sanctions. Moreover, as outlined above, Mr. Harrington provides no legal authority or argument that his supplemental discovery responses provided a sufficiently detailed description of the search undertaken as required to comply with the Court's order. Substantial justification or unjust circumstances have not been shown. Accordingly, the Court will
In addition, when a party fails to comply with an order compelling discovery, a variety of other sanctions may be imposed, up to and including case-dispositive sanctions and initiation of contempt proceedings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vii). Additionally, the Court "may issue further just orders," Fed. R. Civ. PP. 37(b)(2)(A), which includes orders imposing Court fines, see, e.g., Pereira v. Narragansett Fishing Corp., 135 F.R.D. 24, 27 (D. Mass. 1991). Similarly, the Court may impose a fine as an "appropriate sanction" for the improper certification of discovery responses. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(3); see also Travel Sentry, Inc. v. Tropp, 669 F.Supp.2d 279, 286-87 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). In this case, the very order that Mr. Harrington and his counsel disobeyed expressly "
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Docket No. 298 at 4 (emphasis added). In short, the time for arguing that the underlying requests are objectionable has come and gone, and Mr. Harrington made a deliberate choice not to make such arguments. The current issue now before the Court is only whether Mr. Harrington adhered to the Court's order that was issued compelling supplemental disclosures, not whether there is some previously unargued basis that could have led to a different order having been issued. Cf. Kona Enterps., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (reconsideration of a prior order is not appropriate based on arguments that could have been raised previously).