NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

JOHNSON, J.

Shawn Cavette pleaded no contest to one count of first degree burglary, a felony, admitted a prior conviction for assault with a deadly weapon and three prior prison terms, and was sentenced to 13 years in prison. Cavette appeals from his sentence, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to strike his prior felony conviction under Penal Code section 1385.1 We affirm.

BACKGROUND

An information filed May 7, 2010 charged Cavette with one count of first degree burglary in violation of section 459, a serious felony within the meaning of section 1192.7, subdivision (c). The indictment also alleged that Cavette had suffered a prior conviction of a serious or violent felony or juvenile adjudication within the meaning of the Three Strikes law, sections 667, subdivisions (b) through (i), and 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d). In addition, the information charged that Cavette had suffered three prior convictions within the meaning of section 1203, subdivisions (e)(4), for which he served three prior prison terms, within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). Finally, the information alleged that Cavette had suffered a prior conviction of a serious felony pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a)(1).

Cavette initially pleaded not guilty and denied the special allegations. He later withdrew his not guilty plea and pleaded no contest to the substantive count, and admitted all the prior strike and prior conviction allegations.

At the sentencing hearing on December 6, 2010, the victim of the burglary testified about the effects of the crime on her then 13-year-old daughter, whose bedroom Cavette burglarized. Cavette submitted a letter. A family friend explained that Cavette had been living with his elderly mother, who was in a wheelchair, and that Cavette was in rehabilitation. An individual working with Cavette through a mentoring program stated that Cavette had been focusing on the negative consequences of his past decisions (including drug addiction) and working on positive change. A fellow prisoner stated that he had prayed with Cavette, who had reached out to a number of other prisoners. Cavette's mother stated that his problem was drugs, expressed her wish to have him home, and described her participation in his support group. Cavette's sister stated that he was doing well in the program.

Cavette's defense counsel asked the court to strike Cavette's "very old" prior strike, and to sentence him to a lesser term. The prosecution argued that the maximum sentence was 19 years and Cavette, who had been in and out of prison, had turned down an offer of 13 years prior to pleading no contest. The trial court expressed sympathy for the victim and for Cavette's family, and noted Cavette's letter indicating that he had changed. Understanding that it had discretion under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, the trial court noted that the 1993 prior strike was not in "the distant past," and Cavette had served two subsequent prison sentences. The court declined to strike the prior strike. As circumstances in mitigation, the trial court noted that Cavette pleaded no contest, and found no aggravating factor. Commenting, "you could be productive and you choose not to be," the court sentenced Cavette to a total of 13 years in state prison, based on the midterm of four years for the burglary, doubled to eight years for the prior strike pursuant to the Three Strikes law. The court ordered and then stayed under section 654 a one-year enhancement on the prior conviction. The court also imposed an additional five years for the serious felony prior pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (a)(1).

Cavette filed this timely appeal.

DISCUSSION

Cavette argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to strike his second strike qualifying conviction, or select the low term for the burglary.

When the trial court imposes sentence under the Three Strike law, the court has discretion to strike one or more of the defendant's prior serious or violent felony convictions in the interest of justice. (§ 1385, subd. (a); Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 531.) The trial court must consider the defendant's background and the nature of the current offense, among other considerations. (Ibid.) The question is "whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme's spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies." (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.) "[R]emoteness alone cannot take a defendant outside the spirit of the very law that expressly rejects remoteness as a basis for avoiding the law." (People v. Strong (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 328, 342; see § 667, subd. (c)(3) ["[t]he length of time between the prior felony conviction and the current felony conviction shall not affect the imposition of sentence."].) The decision not to strike the prior conviction allegation is reviewable for abuse of discretion, and the burden is on the defendant to clearly show that the "decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it." (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376-377.) "[T]he [Three Strikes] law creates a strong presumption that any sentence that conforms to [the law's] sentencing norms is both rational and proper." (Id. at p. 378.)

We see no abuse of discretion in this case. Cavette argues that his prior strike conviction was in 1993; however, remoteness alone does not justify striking a prior conviction, and as Cavette concedes, he suffered two other convictions after the 1993 conviction. The trial court stated that it listened to the victim's statement, read Cavette's submissions and heard statements on his behalf, and understood its discretion under Romero. The court's reasoned decision not to strike the prior conviction was not irrational or improper.2

Cavette requests that the abstract of judgment be corrected to reflect that the remaining two prior prison term allegations were stricken. We note, however, that striking an enhancement allegation requires a statement of reasons (§ 1385, subd. (a)) and, lacking any such statement, it appears that the court did not strike the two allegations, although it imposed no sentence thereon. Further, the directions on the form abstract of judgment state that stricken enhancements should not be listed. We therefore could not comply with this request even if the allegations had been stricken.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

ROTHSCHILD, Acting P. J. and CHANEY, J., concurs.