ANTHONY W. ISHII, Senior District Judge.
The Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians ("Picayune"), a federally recognized Indian tribe, owns and operates the Chukchansi Gold Resort and Casino, a class III gaming facility in Coarsegold, California. Picayune has filed suit against the United States Department of the Interior ("DOI"), the Secretary of the Interior ("the Secretary") and the Assistant Secretary of the DOI for Indian Affairs ("ASIA"), seeking a declaration of invalidity of several Secretarial determinations surrounding class III gaming by the North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians ("North Fork") on a 305-acre parcel of land in Madera County ("the Madera Parcel"). North Fork moves to intervene in this action permissively and as a matter of right. North Fork's motion is unopposed. It will be granted.
In approximately 2004, North Fork purchased the Madera Parcel, just north of the city of Madera and west of California State Highway 99. On March 1, 2005, North Fork submitted a fee-to-trust application to the DOI, requesting that the DOI take the Madera Parcel into trust for the benefit of the tribe pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act ("IRA"). The application was supplemented on or about March 29, 2006, with a request for a two-part determination
In 2012, a Tribal-State gaming compact
On July 19, 2013, a ballot summary and title were issued by the Attorney General of California's office for what would be commonly known as California Proposition 48 — Referendum on Indian Gaming Compacts (2014). On October 1, 2013, proponents of the referendum submitted 784,571 signatures from registered voters in support of placing Proposition 48 on the ballot for the November 2014 election. The then-Secretary of State, Debra Bowen, certified that the signatures submitted contained a sufficient number of valid signatures to place the matter on the ballot. See Cal. Const., art. II, § 9(b). On November 4, 2014, California voters voted on Proposition 48. Sixty-one percent of voters voted against the ratification of the North Fork compact.
The Court omits discussion of the multiple litigations related to North Fork's planned class III gaming facility on the Madera Parcel. Instead, it is sufficient to note that the following actions are related to this case: North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians v. State of California, No. 1:15-cv-00419-AWI-SAB (E.D. Cal.), Stand Up for California! v. U.S. Dep't of Interior and Picayune Rancheria v. United States, consolidated as Case No. 1:12-cv-02039-BAH (D.D.C.), Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians v. Brown, Madera County Case No. MCV 072004 (California Superior Court, County of Madera), Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians v. Brown, Case No. C074506 (California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District), and Stand Up for California! v. State of California, Case No. F069302 (California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 provides for both intervention as a matter of right and permissive intervention. A court must permit an applicant to intervene when:
Chamness v. Bowen, 722 F.3d 1110, 1121 (9th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks and citations omitted); accord Smith v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 830 F.3d 843, 853 (9th Cir. 2016); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). Even where a party does not have a right to intervene, a district court may permit intervention where the party "has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact" and such intervention will not "unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties' rights." Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b).
The timeliness inquiry considers the totality of the circumstances, with a focus on three factors: (1) the stage of the proceedings, (2) the prejudice to the other parties, and (3) the reason for any delay. Timeliness is measured from the date that the putative intervenor "should have been aware [that its] interests would [not] be protected adequately by the parties...." Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1121 (citation omitted).
At the time of filing of this motion, the Secretary had not filed an answer and the Court had yet to hold an initial scheduling conference; essentially the only item before the Court was Picayune's First Amended Complaint ("FAC"). Temporally, North Fork's motion was filed fewer than thirty days after Picayune filed its FAC. North Fork filed its motion at an early stage of the proceedings. See Citizens for Balanced Use v. Montana Wilderness Ass'n, 647 F.3d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 2011) (a putative intervenor's motion was timely where it was filed "less than three months after the complaint was filed and less than two weeks after the [defendant] filed its answer....")
Neither of the present parties identifies any prejudice that either would suffer if North Fork were permitted to intervene. The Court does not anticipate any prejudice to the parties if North Fork is permitted to intervene.
No explanation for delay in filing a motion to intervene is necessary here; North Fork's promptly filed its motion. North Fork's motion to intervene is timely.
Whether a putative intervenor has a sufficiently protectable interest "is a practical, threshold inquiry." Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.2d 810, 818 (9th Cir. 2001); accord California ex rel. Lockyer v. United States, 450 F.3d 436, 441 (9th Cir.2006). To demonstrate such an interest, prospective intervenor must establish that "the interest [asserted] is protectable under some law, and that there is a relationship between the legally protected interest and the claims at issue." Southwest Center for Biological Diversity, 268 F.2d at 818. Where injunctive or declaratory relief is sought, a putative intervenor has a significantly protectable interest in an action when "the relief sought by plaintiffs will have direct, immediate, and harmful effects" upon its interest. Southwest Center for Biological Diversity, 268 F.2d at 818.
Here, Picayune seeks relief that would prevent North Fork from conducting class III gaming on the Madera Parcel and could result in the Madera Parcel no longer being Indian Land at all. North Fork would be the entity primarily impacted if Picayune is granted the relief it seeks. It is well established that an Indian tribe has a protectable interest in an action challenging an agency's determination when reversal of that determination would have an impact on the tribal land. See, e.g., Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Bank of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S.Ct. 2199, 2204 (2012); No Casino in Plymouth v. United States Department of Interior, 2013 WL 5159011, *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2013). This case is no exception; North Fork has a significant protectable interest in this action.
In order to satisfy the third prong of the intervention of right inquiry, North Fork's interests the case must be such that its resolution will have an actual effect on it. Arakaki v. Cayetano, 324 F.3d 1078, 1084 (9th Cir. 2003). Disposition of this case could, as a practical matter, have an impact on North Fork's interest in maintaining the Indian lands status of and conducting class III gaming on the Madera Parcel. Because the relief sought by Picayune would directly impair North Fork's interest, litigation of this action without North Fork would render North Fork unable to protect its interest.
The showing required is minimal to establish that the existing parties may not adequately represent the putative intervenor. Arakaki, 324 F.3d at 1086.
The Secretary contends that the federal defendants adequately represent North Fork's interest. The Secretary's interest—to defend her determinations and the determinations of the assistant secretary—are certainly in line with North Fork's interest. However, as North Fork points out, at least one action by the Secretary (proscribing procedures by which North Fork could conduct class III gaming) was taken as a result of relief sought by North Fork from this Court. Where governmental defendants take action as a result of successful litigation by a putative intervenor, the governmental defendant's interest in defending that action are presumed to be less strong than the intervenor's interest. See Citizens for Balanced Use v. Montana Wilderness Ass'n, 647 F.2d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 2011).
Moreover, some Picayune's claims are more related to conduct by the State of California than to conduct by the Secretary. The federal defendants' interest in defending determinations by California that directly impact North Fork is certainly less than North Fork's interest in defending determinations by California that directly impact North Fork.
The federal defendants may not adequately represent North Fork's interests.
North Fork will be permitted to intervene in this action as a matter of right. Even if that were that not the case, North Fork would be permitted to permissively intervene because it "has a . . . defense that shares with the main action ... common question[s] of law or fact" and North Fork's intervention will not "unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties' rights."
Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that North Fork's motion to intervene is GRANTED.