GONZALO P. CURIEL, District Judge.
In this civil rights case, Mark and Melissa Mann and their four minor children allege that defendant County of San Diego ("County") and several of its employees from defendant County of San Diego Health and Human Services Agency ("HHSA") violated the family's civil rights during a child abuse investigation that led to the removal of the minor children from the family's home. (ECF No. 1.) Before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment.
Defendants move for summary judgment, or partial summary judgment, on issues of immunity. (ECF No. 77.) Plaintiffs have filed a response in opposition to Defendants' motion, (ECF No. 97), and Defendants have filed a reply in support of their motion, (ECF No. 101).
Plaintiffs move for partial summary judgment on four discrete factual and legal issues that form the basis of their eight causes of action.
The Court deems the parties' motions suitable for disposition without oral argument.
Plaintiffs are two parents, Mark and Melissa Mann, who have four children: N.G.P.M., born in 2004, and three triplets born in 2006—N.E.H.M., M.C.G.M., and M.N.A.M. Mr. and Ms. Mann have a history of having difficulty controlling the behavior of their children and of disciplining their children by striking them with wooden spoons.
The facts giving rise to this case began on April 5, 2010. At that time, Mr. Mann was responsible for caring for the children in the evening when Ms. Mann was at work. After making smoothies for the children, N.E.H.M. (one of the triplets) began misbehaving. Mr. Mann told the children to go upstairs to bathe while he cleaned up a smoothie that one of the children had spilled. A short time later, Mr. Mann discovered N.E.H.M. was splashing soapy water around the bathroom. Mr. Mann therefore struck N.E.H.M. once with a wooden spoon. Mr. Mann was apparently aiming for N.E.H.M.'s buttocks but missed and struck her lower back instead. Because N.E.H.M. was naked (in preparation for taking a bath), the spoon left a red welt with the outline of a spoon on N.E.H.M.'s lower back. N.G.P.M. reported that another of the triplets, M.N.A.M., was also splashing soapy water. Mr. Mann thus had M.N.A.M. step out of the bathtub, and Mr. Mann struck him once on the buttocks with the wooden spoon. This also left a mark.
The next day, April 6, 2010, N.E.H.M.'s preschool director called Mr. Mann after observing the mark left on her lower back. Mr. Mann went to the preschool and explained the circumstances of the prior night. The preschool director told Mr. Mann she was nonetheless required to report the incident as an instance of possible child abuse. The preschool director called HHSA's child abuse hotline in Mr. Mann's presence and reported the incident, including Mr. Mann's explanation and the fact that Mr. Mann was cooperative and willing to talk about the incident.
On the same day, April 6, 2010, a HHSA protective social worker, defendant Andrea E. Cisneros (now Hernandez) ("Cisneros") went to the Mann home to investigate, but no one was home.
On April 7, 2010, Cisneros went to interview N.G.P.M. (the then six-year old) at her school pursuant to California Penal Code § 11174.3.
After the school interview, Cisneros went back to the Mann home. Ms. Mann was home, and she let Cisneros in to physically inspect and interview the children. Cisneros photographed the mark on N.E.H.M.'s lower back. Ms. Mann stated Mr. Mann was stressed and that he had a "horrible" night with the children on April 5, 2010. Ms. Mann stated she was open to receiving services. Cisneros then left the home, stating she would next interview Mr. Mann before discussing her investigation results "in committee."
When Cisneros left the home, she consulted with her supervisor, defendant Lisa J. Quadros ("Quadros"). Quadros told Cisneros that Cisneros needed to return to the Mann home to have Ms. Mann sign a voluntary safety plan. Cisneros thus returned to the home and told Ms. Mann she needed to complete an additional form. Ms. Mann took issue with signing the form because it stated that Mr. Mann could not be left alone with the children and because Ms. Mann believed Cisneros should talk to Mr. Mann about the incident before she signed anything. Cisneros told Ms. Mann that if she did not want to engage in voluntary services, which included signing a safety plan, the children could be removed from the home. Ms. Mann then signed the safety plan.
After Cisneros left, Ms. Mann called Quadros to complain that Cisneros said she would talk to Mr. Mann and then discuss her findings with a committee before taking action but, instead, came back to get the safety plan signed. In her deposition, Quadros testified that Cisneros did not use best practices when she returned to the home, and that, if she had used such practices, the dynamic between Ms. Mann and Cisneros would have been different. Quadros said, for example, that Cisneros should have told Ms. Mann that Cisneros was stepping outside to talk with her supervisor and would return.
After interviewing Ms. Mann and the children on April 7, 2010, Cisneros went to Mr. Mann's work where she interviewed him. Mr. Mann recounted the events of the evening of April 5, 2010. Mr. Mann said he was open to receiving services. Cisneros then had Mr. Mann sign a safety plan, in which Mr. Mann agreed not to use physical discipline on the children. Mr. Mann also explained that Ms. Mann had called him and was very upset that her safety plan required that Mr. Mann not be left alone with the children. Thus, Mr. Mann and Cisneros agreed that his safety plan would require him to have a third party present only when help was needed to adequately care for the children. Similar to her conversation with Ms. Mann, Cisneros told Mr. Mann that his children could be removed from the home if he was not cooperative with voluntary services, which included signing a safety plan.
On April 8, 2010, Cisneros called Ms. Mann to inform Ms. Mann that Cisneros would need to return to the home to also photograph the mark on M.N.A.M.'s buttocks (the mark left by Mr. Mann when he had M.N.A.M. get out of the bath tub). Ms. Mann stated she did not want Cisneros to return to the home because of Cisneros' the previous day. Ms. Mann called Quadros to request a new social worker, which Quadros refused. Ms. Mann then asked to speak with Quadros' supervisor, defendant Gilbert Ferro ("Ferro"). After Ms. Mann talked to Ferro, Ferro agreed to have a more experienced social worker accompany Cisneros to the home.
Later that day, on April 8, 2010, Cisneros and a more experienced social worker, defendant Angela Redmond ("Redmond"), visited the home. While there, the social workers noticed an additional bruise on M.N.A.M.'s forehead, which Ms. Mann explained was the result of him bumping his head on the counter top. The social workers stated they would also need to photograph M.N.A.M.'s forehead, which upset Ms. Mann. Ms. Mann allowed the social workers to take the picture then told them to get out of the house. The social workers took the pictures and left.
That evening, on April 8, 2010, Ms. Mann called Quadros and left a message stating she "just lost it" when Redmond said they would need to photograph M.N.A.M.'s forehead. Ms. Mann stated, "it just feels manipulative like you're making this out to be something that it's really not." She continued, "I said go ahead take the picture and I'd like you to leave and probably wasn't as courteous as I could have been. But this is really difficult." Ms. Mann asked that Quadros return her call to discuss her concerns.
Quadros did not return Ms. Mann's call on April 8, 2010, so Ms. Mann called Quadros again on April 9, 2010. During that conversation, Ms. Mann asked what she could do to show the children were not in danger and volunteered to take the children to their pediatrician. Quadros asked that the children be taken to the Chadwick Center at Rady Children's Hospital ("Children's Hospital") for an examination.
That day, April 9, 2010, Mr. Mann took N.E.H.M. and M.N.A.M. to Children's Hospital where they met Cisneros. At Children's Hospital, a physician conducted a "Suspected Child Physical Abuse and Neglect Examination" on the two children in Cisneros' presence. The physician, non-defendant Dr. Joyce Adams, observed the mark on N.E.H.M.'s lower back and concluded it was consistent with Mr. Mann's story. Dr. Adams further stated, "It is clear that parents need additional help in managing the behavior of the children and learning effective non-physical ways of discipline." Dr. Adams did not make a mandatory report of suspected child abuse, noting the incident was "already reported to CPS." Regarding M.N.A.M., Dr. Adams observed a small red abrasion on M.N.A.M.'s buttocks. As for the bruise on M.N.A.M.'s forehead, Dr. Adams concluded the injury was "most likely accidental."
At some point around this time, and without first informing Mr. and Ms. Mann, Cisneros began preparing an "Application and Declaration for Protective Custody Warrant" ("Warrant Application") and a "Detention Report" to initiate dependency proceedings for the removal of the Mann children from their home. Over the following weekend, April 10-11, 2013, Cisneros prepared a draft Warrant Application and Detention Report. Cisneros' draft Detention Report was thirteen pages long and included entries from the Delivered Service Log ("DSL") indicating Mr. and Ms. Mann had complied with the requests of Cisneros and other HHSA employees. The draft Detention Report also contained facts regarding Ms. Mann's complaints to Quadros and Ferro, and their responses to Ms. Mann's complaints.
On Monday, April 12, 2013, Cisneros gave Quadros her draft Detention Report and Warrant Application. At Quadros' direction, Cisneros deleted approximately two pages of information. As identified by Plaintiffs, such deleted information included:
Cisneros also added language, stating, "Mrs. Mann was not cooperative with me" as to the April 8, 2010 visit with Redmond. Notwithstanding these conclusions, Cisneros testified at her deposition that she could not recall an instance where either Mr. or Ms. Mann did not comply with a request by HHSA personnel. Cisneros agreed the parents ultimately cooperated with HHSA.
As noted by Defendants, the final Detention Report
Based on the Detention Report and the Warrant Application (which incorporated much of the Detention Report), the Juvenile Court Division of the San Diego Superior Court ("Juvenile Court") issued a Protective Custody Warrant, and, on April 12, 2013, the children were removed from the home and sent to Polinsky Children's Center ("Polinsky").
Upon their arrival, a nurse took the children's vital signs, checked for lice, and otherwise did a cursory examination. The next morning, on April 13, 2013, a physician (the now dismissed defendant Dr. Nancy Graff), performed medical examinations on the four children, which she testified was done pursuant to a Juvenile Court general order and pursuant to a contract with the County.
Dr. Graff testified that, when children were brought in on allegations of abuse, she would look closely for any evidence of physical abuse, and would document and photograph any signs. Dr. Graff also testified that parents (even non-offending parents) were not notified of the examination and were not allowed to be present at the examination because parents were not allowed in Polinsky except for visitation and, even then, parents were to remain in the visitation area.
Around the same time as the examinations on April 13, 2010, Mr. and Ms. Mann were at the detention hearing at the Juvenile Court. After the detention hearing, Mr. and Ms. Mann signed consent forms, that included permission for HHSA to administer "medical, developmental, dental, and mental health care . . . while he or she is any facility operated by [HHSA] . . ., if the treatment is recommended by a licensed physician. . . ." The consent forms further stated that "[m]edical . . . care can include: Routine admission and placement examinations, including blood test, immunization, cervical cultures . . . X-ray examination, local anesthesia, medical or psychiatric diagnosis or treatment."
Sometime after the detention hearing, HHSA submitted a report, pursuant to California's Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act ("Reporting Act"), that the agency had made a "substantiated" finding of physical abuse by Mr. Mann. This resulted in Mr. Mann being listed as a "substantiated" child abuser on California's Child Abuse Central Index ("CACI"). Along with two attorneys, Mr. Mann attended a hearing for the removal of his name from CACI but decided not to proceed with the hearing after being told he could only be represented by one attorney at the hearing.
The children were released from Polinsky on April 14, 2013, to the custody of their paternal grandmother who agreed to move into the Mann home. During the pendency of the court investigation, Mr. and Ms. Mann were not to be left alone with the children.
On April 17, 2013, Cisneros and Quadro were relieved from the case, and a court investigation social worker, defendant Kelly Monge ("Monge") was assigned to the case under the supervision of defendant Susan Solis ("Solis"). After Monge and Solis took over the investigation, they continued to have concerns that Mr. and Ms. Mann did not have sufficient control over their children and would again resort to inappropriate physical discipline. Despite this, Monge and Solis later said Mr. and Ms. Mann were "ideal clients." On June 24, 2010, Monge and Solis offered Mr. and Ms. Mann the opportunity to engage in "Voluntary Court Services." Mr. and Ms. Mann declined, however, because they would have been required to admit the allegations contained in HHSA's petition.
On July 14, 2010, after a trial, the Juvenile Court, Judge Cynthia Bashant, found that Mr. Mann's inflicted physical harm for disciplinary reasons and that the discipline was excessive. The Court found, however, that the physical harm itself was not excessive. The Juvenile Court observed that the real issue was whether there was a substantial risk that the child would suffer serious physical harm inflicted non-accidentally in the future and whether Mr. and Ms. Mann would continue to use corporal punishment as they had in the past. Ultimately, the Juvenile Court found there was not a substantial risk of future serious physical harm, concluding that the court did "not find by a preponderance of the evidence that the allegations in the petition have been proved." The Juvenile Court thus dismissed HHSA's petition.
Subsequent to the Juvenile Court's dismissal of HHSA's petition, Mr. Mann demanded that HHSA withdraw its "substantiated" finding of child abuse from CACI. HHSA declined, stating Mr. Mann's proper recourse was to request an administrative hearing where he could present the reasons why the "substantiated" finding should be withdrawn.
On April 7, 2011, Mr. and Ms. Mann, N.G.P.M., M.N.A.M., N.E.H.M., and M.C.G.M. ("Plaintiffs") filed a complaint against the County of San Diego, HHSA, Polinsky, Cisneros, Quadros, Redmond, Ferro, Monge, Solis (all nine collectively, "Defendants"), and five other now dismissed defendants. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiffs assert eight causes of action for: (1) assault; (2) battery; (3) false imprisonment; (4) violation of federal civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (5)
Plaintiffs sue based on Defendants' representations and conduct during the investigation, including interviewing N.G.P.M. at school; omitting evidence in the Detention Report and Warrant Application that the parents complied with HHSA's requests during the investigation; the medical examinations at Polinsky without parental consent or presence; and Mr. Mann's continued inclusion on CACI as a substantiated abuser. Now the parties each move for summary judgment.
Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c);
A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Where the party moving for summary judgment does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it may show that no genuine issue of material fact exists by demonstrating "there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case."
If the moving party meets the initial burden, the nonmoving party cannot defeat summary judgment merely by demonstrating "that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts."
"Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment."
The court may not make credibility determinations, and inferences to be drawn from the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.
Cross-motions for summary judgment do not necessarily permit the court to render judgment in favor of one side of the other.
Defendants move for summary judgment on the following issues and claims: (1) qualified immunity bars Plaintiff's § 1983 claim; (2) the social workers properly obtained and executed the protective custody warrant; (3) absolute immunity bars Plaintiff's civil rights claims; (4) the medical examinations at Polinsky were authorized by court order and constitutional; (5) Mr. Mann was listed on CACI pursuant to state law; (6) the County's policies are not unconstitutional; (7) Defendants are entitled to statutory immunities and privileges; and (8) Plaintiff's false arrest
Plaintiffs claim, in their fourth cause of action, that Defendants violated Plaintiffs' First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Defendants contend they are qualifiedly immune from such a claim.
"[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."
"If the law was clearly established, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct."
In sum, "[w]hether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the `objective legal reasonableness' of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were `clearly established' at the time the action was taken."
Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiffs' civil rights claims to the extent they are based on Defendants' (1) the interview of N.G.P.M. at her school, (2) obtaining and executing the protective custody warrant, (3) examination of the children at Polinksy, and (4) listing of Mr. Mann on CACI.
Defendants assert it was not unconstitutional to interview N.G.P.M. pursuant to California Penal Code section 11174.3.
In
The social worker petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the determination that the interrogation of the minor was unconstitutional.
Plaintiff's assert that, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's vacatur of the Fourth Amendment portion of the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Defendants assert (1) the social workers' actions in obtaining and executing the protective custody warrant was not unconstitutional because the warrant was presumptively valid and, even if it were not valid, the social workers' good-faith reliance on the warrant was justified and therefore constitutional; and (2) Plaintiffs' claimed right to be free from judicial deception in juvenile court proceedings was not clearly established at the time the social workers obtained the warrant.
A warrant affidavit is presumptively valid.
Further, a judge-issued warrant "normally suffices to establish that a law enforcement officer has acted in good faith in conducting the search," and thus a search pursuant to a warrant "will rarely require any deep inquiry into the reasonableness of the search."
Defendants argue that, under the
Plaintiffs argue in response that it does not matter that Cisneros and Quadros included instances of the parents' cooperation with HHSA. Plaintiffs assert that what matters is that Cisneros and Quadros did not include
"[I]n applying the qualified immunity standard, the determination of whether the facts alleged could support a reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause is a question of law determined by the court."
The Court first notes there is no dispute regarding which facts were included or omitted in the Detention Report and Warrant Application. That said, this Court finds the omitted facts regarding the parents' cooperation and Ms. Mann's complaints about Cisneros were material to the Juvenile Court's decision to issue the protective custody warrant and should have been included. Had the Juvenile Court been aware, for example, that Ms. Mann offered to take her children to their pediatrician, and that both parents agreed to take N.E.H.M. and M.N.A.M. to Children's hospital, then it is very likely the Juvenile Court would have found Cisneros' claim that the parents were uncooperative to be unsubstantiated.
Further, the only instance of what could be considered hostility occurred on April 8, 2010, when Ms. Mann became upset and told Cisneros and Redmond to take the pictures of the bruise on M.N.A.M.'s forehead and leave. This Court would have found the complete phone message that Ms. Mann left for Quadros later that evening requesting to speak to Quadros about Ms. Mann's behavior toward Cisneros and Redmond, in addition to Ms. Mann's prior complaints regarding Cisneros' conduct (including Ferro's agreement to have Redmond accompany Cisneros to the Mann home), valuable in evaluating whether Ms. Mann was actually hostile toward HHSA personnel. Thus, as to the second prong of the
Thus, the question remains whether Cisneros and Quadros intentionally or recklessly falsified the Detention Report and Warrant Application. Plaintiffs assert the social workers were retaliating against the parents for challenging their authority. Plaintiffs support this theory with the fact that, after Ms. Mann's complaints about Cisneros, HHSA surreptitiously prepared and filed the Detention Report and Warrant Application to remove the children from the home, in addition to the fact that Quadros and Cisneros removed exculpatory evidence from Detention Report and Warrant Application. Defendants, on the other hand, provide Cisneros' and Quadros' declarations indicating they did not misrepresent, fabricate, or conceal any facts in the Detention Report and Warrant Application.
Genuine issues of fact remain and, as such, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of whether the protective custody warrant was presumptively valid.
Defendants further argue that Plaintiffs' federal right not to have deliberately fabricated evidence used in a civil juvenile proceeding was not clearly established, for purposes of qualified immunity, until December 2010—after the events in this case. Plaintiffs assert such a right was clearly established.
In
In determining whether the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, the Ninth Circuit first held that the fabrication of evidence against the plaintiff violated her Fourteenth Amendment due process right to be free from deliberately fabricated evidence in a civil child abuse proceeding.
The court distinguished
In
The Court thus finds this case is more akin to
Defendants are therefore not entitled to qualified immunity at this juncture for their actions in obtaining and executing the protective custody warrant.
Defendants argue the Polinsky medical examinations conducted on April 13, 2010 were not unconstitutional or illegal because they were done pursuant to the Juvenile Court's General Order, which incorporates recommendations by the American Academy of Pediatrics, and because the parents consented to the examinations.
Relying on
Plaintiffs rely on
In
The
The
In
Contrary to
This Court further disagrees with
The Court further finds disputed factual issues exist as to whether the examinations were done primarily for investigatory purposes. Dr. Graff testified in her deposition that, when children are admitted on allegations of physical abuse, she looks for and documents signs of abuse. Dr. Graff also stated in her declaration that initial screenings were necessary to inform the physician of any urgent medical needs, to establish a baseline for medical treatment, and to protect other children in the facility. Further, the examinations took only ten to twenty minutes, and mostly involved an assessment of the children's general physical well-being (e.g., eyes, ears, nose/mouth/teeth, heart, lungs, etc.). Moreover, the examination form itself is entitled "Admission Physical Examination."
Lastly, there are disputed issues as to whether the parents consented to the Polinsky examinations, and if so, whether the examinations were within the consents given. Defendants offer evidence that the parents consented to the examinations, and Plaintiffs argue the parents' consents were coerced and occurred after the examinations were completed (though, the timing of the examinations and the parents' signing of the consent forms is unclear).
In sum, because there are disputed issue regarding whether the Polinsky examinations were overly intrusive, purely investigatory in nature, and done without the "non-offending" parent's presence, it is unclear whether the examinations were unconstitutional.
Plaintiffs argue that, while the American Academy of Pediatrics' recommends "initial health screenings" for children entering foster care or protective custody, such a screening is different than the "comprehensive health screening" authorized by the Juvenile Court's General Order. Plaintiffs also assert that, when read with the
Here, unlike the
Regarding Plaintiffs' argument that the General Order is a constitutionally defective warrant is based on their contention that the primary purpose of the exams was investigatory in nature. As discussed above, there are disputed issues as to whether the primary purpose of the exams was investigatory in nature. Thus, while the examinations may have been conducted pursuant to the Juvenile Court's General Order, it is unclear whether the General Order is constitutionally sound under the Fourth Amendment.
Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity because the right to be free from examinations such as those conducted at Polinsky has not been clearly established at the time the examinations were done.
Relying on
Relying on
Plaintiffs have failed to provide authority establishing that the Polinsky examinations, including the exclusion of "non-offending" parents, violated a clearly established right. Defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity to the extent Plaintiffs' civil rights claims rest on the Polinsky examinations.
Plaintiffs assert Defendants have violated Mr. Mann's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by refusing to remove him as a "substantiated" child abuser on CACI after the Juvenile Court dismissed HHSA's petition in July 2010.
Defendants assert Mr. Mann is listed on CACI as a "substantiated" child abuser pursuant to state law. More specifically, Defendants argue the "substantiated" finding was done pursuant to California Penal Code § 11165.4, which provides that "`unlawful corporal punishment or injury' means a situation where any person willfully inflicts upon any child any cruel or inhuman corporal punishment or injury resulting in a traumatic condition."
In
On remand, the district court in
This case is distinguishable from the
To the extent California provides a hearing for the removal of his name from CACI, as required by the Ninth Circuit in
Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate the existence of a clearly established constitutional right to the withdrawal of a "substantiated" child abuse finding in light of a juvenile court's finding that, while a parent did inflict a physical injury in administering excessive discipline, the children were not at future risk of substantial harm. Thus, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity to the extent Plaintiffs' civil rights claims rest on Defendants' refusal to withdraw their substantiated finding of abuse.
In sum, Defendants' are qualifiedly immune from Plaintiffs civil rights claims to the extent they rest on (1) the interview of N.G.P.M. at school, (2) the Polinsky examinations, and (3) the listing of Mr. Mann on CACI as a "substantiated" child abuser. The Court finds there are disputed issues underlying Defendants' claim of qualified immunity as to the obtaining and execution of the protective custody warrant.
Defendants argue the social workers are entitled to absolute immunity from Plaintiffs' civil rights claims because they were witnesses who testified in judicial proceedings. Defendants further argue the social workers are entitled to absolute immunity from Plaintiffs' civil rights claims because were acting in a prosecutorial capacity.
The Court rejects both of these arguments because neither witness nor prosecutorial immunity apply when there are allegations that a social worker made misrepresentations or was otherwise deceptive in testifying or instituting prosecutorial proceedings.
Plaintiffs claim the following County policies violate the constitution: (1) coercing parents into signing safety plans; (2) detaining and/or removing children without exigent circumstances; (3) using false and misleading information to obtain protective custody warrants; (4) detaining and/or removing children without determining whether the scope of the intrusion is reasonably necessary to avert the specific injury; (5) continuing to detain and/or remove children beyond a reasonable time after the basis for detention and/or removal has been negated; (6) requiring medical examinations without the knowledge, consent, or presence of parents, exigency, medical need, or a court order; (7) acting with deliberate indifference through inadequate training; (8) reporting parents as child abusers on CACI after a court has found allegations of abuse untrue.
A county's unlawful policies can result in § 1983 liability if the policies caused a violation of a constitutional right.
Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs'
Plaintiffs argue in response that it has established constitutional violations with respect to: (1) the Polinsky examinations, including the exclusion of non-offending parents; (2) the County's CACI policy; and (3) the de facto policy of excluding exculpatory evidence in court filings.
Plaintiffs do not argue that any of the other alleged policies violated their constitutional rights; Defendant is therefore entitled to summary judgment on whether these other alleged policies deprived Plaintiffs' of their constitutional rights.
Further, as discussed above, the Court has found that disputed issues exist as to whether Plaintiffs' rights were violated by the omission of exculpatory evidence of the Detention Report and Warrant Application. The Court has further found there are disputed issues as to whether the Polinsky examinations were unconstitutional. Lastly, the Court has found that Mr. Mann has not suffered a violation of his due process rights by the County's refusal to withdraw its finding of "substantiated" abuse. Accordingly, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs'
Defendants argue they are entitled to the statutory privileges contained in California Government Code §§ 821.6 and 820.2 and in California Civil Code § 47.
Government Code § 821.6 provides: "A public employee is not liable for injury caused by his instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding within the scope of his employment, even if he acts maliciously and without probable cause."
Government Code § 820.2 provides: "Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused."
Civil Code §§ 47(a) and (b) provide that a communication is privileged if it is one made "[i]n the proper discharge of an official duty," or one made "[i]n any . . . judicial proceeding."
Plaintiffs do not argue that any of the above privileges are inapplicable. Plaintiffs instead argue that any such statutory privileges are overcome by California Government Code § 820.21, which provides:
Given Defendants' admission that the Cisneros and Quadros failed to disclose known exculpatory evidence to the Juvenile Court in connection with obtaining the protective custody warrant, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that Government Code § 820.21's provision that "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law" means that Defendants are not statutorily immune under Government Code §§ 821.6, 820.2 or Civil Code § 47 to the extent the social workers acted with malice.
As addressed above, however, Plaintiffs claim, and Defendants dispute, that the social workers were retaliating against Plaintiffs for challenging the social workers' authority. Retaliation, of course, implies intentional conduct meant to harm another for purposes of revenge. The Court thus finds that disputed issues exist as to whether Government Code § 820.21 overcomes the statutory immunities afforded by Government Code §§ 821.6, 820.2 and in Civil Code § 47.
Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' false arrest claim because probable cause has been established as set forth herein. Defendants further argue they are entitled to Plaintiffs' Civil Code § 52.1 claim because Plaintiffs have failed to establish an underlying constitutional violation.
Plaintiffs first note they have not asserted a false arrest claim, but have instead asserted a false imprisonment claim (third cause of action). As to their Civil Code § 52.1 claim, Plaintiffs assert they have established constitutional violations as set forth herein.
The Court first finds Defendants have failed to explain why they are entitled to summary judgment with regard to Plaintiffs' false imprisonment claim based on a finding of probable cause. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants' motion in this regard.
Further, the Court agrees with Defendants that Civil Code § 52.1 is an enabling statute and does not confer any substantive rights, but instead allows a party to recover damages if they can demonstrate their state or federal constitutional rights have been violated.
Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' prayer for punitive damages because Plaintiffs can offer no evidence that Defendants were motivated by evil motive or intent, or were recklessly or callously indifferent to Plaintiffs' federally protected rights.
The Supreme Court has held that, "a jury may be permitted to assess punitive damages in an action under § 1983 when the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others."
As discussed above, there are disputed issues with regard to Plaintiffs' claim that Defendants retaliated against them. Whether Defendants were retaliating against Plaintiffs is relevant to whether Defendants were motivated by evil motive or intent, or whether they acted in reckless disregard to Plaintiffs' federally protected rights. Thus, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on this issue.
Plaintiffs move for summary judgment on the following issues: (1) Cisneros and Quadros deceived the Juvenile Court in obtaining the protective custody warrant; (2) the medical examinations at Polinsky violated Plaintiffs' constitutional rights; (3) the County's policy of excluding non-offending parents from the medical examinations violated Plaintiffs' constitutional rights; and (4) the County violated Mr. Mann's due process rights be refusing to withdraw its "substantiated" finding of abuse after the Juvenile Court petition was dismissed.
"`To support a § 1983 claim of judicial deception, a plaintiff must show that the defendant deliberately or recklessly made false statements or omissions that were material to the finding of probable cause.'"
As discussed above, the Court finds Cisneros and Quadors omitted material facts in the Detention Report and Warrant Application. Again, however, whether Cisneros and Quadros deliberately or recklessly made the omissions and representations in the Detention Report and Warrant Application is disputed. Thus, Plaintiffs are not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of judicial deception.
Relying on
As discussed above, however, the Court finds that, because there are disputed issue regarding whether the Polinsky examinations were overly intrusive or purely investigatory in nature, it is unclear whether the examinations themselves were unconstitutional. Also as discussed above, the Court finds disputed issues exist as to whether the County is justified in its policy of excluding "non-offending" parents. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of whether the examinations themselves were unconstitutional nor on the issue of whether excluding the "non-offending" parent from the examinations was unconstitutional.
Plaintiffs argue Defendants violated Mr. Mann's due process rights be refusing to withdraw the "substantiated" finding of abuse after the Juvenile Court petition was dismissed. As discussed above, however, state law provides Mr. Mann with due process in the form of a hearing under Penal Code § 11169(d). Thus, Plaintiffs' are not entitled to summary judgment on this issue.
Based on the foregoing,
1. Defendants' motion for summary judgment, (ECF No. 77) is
2. Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, (ECF No. 80), is
3. The hearing on the parties' motions, currently set for August 9, 2013, is
