ORDER:

(1) DENYING MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER DENYING BOFI'S AMENDED MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION (ECF No. 26);

AND

(2) SETTING ORAL ARGUMENT ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION (ECF No. 45 (in 15-cv-02353))

CYNTHIA BASHANT, District Judge.

On September 7, 2016, the Court issued an order denying Bofl Federal Bank ("Bofl")'s amended motion for a preliminary injunction ("Order"). (ECF No. 70 in Case No. 15-cv-02353.) In short, the Court concluded Bofl failed to demonstrate that irreparable harm was likely to occur if its request for preliminary relief was denied. (Id. at 20:11-12.) Thus, Bofl did not meet its burden of demonstrating it was entitled to an extraordinary remedy. (Id. at 21:2-3.)

On October 5, 2016, Bofl filed a motion for clarification or, alternatively, reconsideration of the Order. (ECF No. 26.) Bofl argues the Order is erroneous because it was based on the incorrect assumption that Erhart has returned all of Bofl' s information and documents in his possession. (ECF No. 26-1 at 1:2-9.) Because Bofl believes Erhart still has access to Bofl's information and documents, it argues this Court should reconsider its ruling and also order Erhart "to permanently delete the Bofl documents and information on his desktop computer, the Lexar USB drive, and in his Gmail account and . . . Erhart's counsel, Carol Gillam . . . [to] delete any copies of the Confidential Information that Erhart provided to her." (Id. at 1:24-2:3.) Erhart opposes. (ECF No. 34.)

District courts have the authority to entertain motions for reconsideration of interlocutory orders at any time before the entry of final judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e); Amarel v. Connell, 102 F.3d 1494, 1515 (9th Cir. 1996); Balla v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 869 F.2d 461, 465 (9th Cir. 1989). To determine the merits of a request to reconsider an interlocutory order, courts apply the standard required under a Rule 59(e) reconsideration motion. See Hydranautics v. FilmTec Corp., 306 F.Supp.2d 958, 968 (S.D. Cal. 2003). Reconsideration is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) if: (1) the district court "is presented with newly discovered evidence," (2) the district court "committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust," or (3) "there is an intervening change in controlling law." Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2011).

Here, Bofl fails to demonstrate reconsideration is warranted. The Court has not been presented with newly discovered evidence, and there has not been an intervening change in controlling law. Thus, the remaining basis for reconsideration is if this Court "committed clear error or the [Order] was manifestly unjust." See ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d at 1263. Bofl argues the "clear error" ground for reconsideration applies. (ECF No. 26-1.)

The Court did not commit clear error. Even if the Court were to assume, for the sake of argument, that Erhart still has access to some of Bofl's confidential information, the Court would still conclude Bofl has not demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief As discussed in the Order, Bofl must show it is likely that Erhart will disclose confidential information— causing irreparable injury—absent preliminary relief See, e.g., Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7,20,22-23 (2008). The Order was not predicated on only whether Erhart has returned Bofl's information. Rather, the Court reasoned the record as a whole indicated Bofl has not demonstrated Erhart is likely to disclose confidential information. (Order 18-21.) This record included the fact that Erhart submitted to a deposition and provided the requested declaration to Bofl regarding his use of Bofl's information. (Id. 18:19-21.) It also included a lack of evidence that Erhart had "progressively disclosed more and more of Bofl's confidential information." (Id. 19:18.) The Court further reasoned:

(Id. 20:1-7.) This conclusion would not be changed by only the fact that Erhart may still have access to some of Bofl's information. Bofl must still demonstrate a likelihood that Erhart would disclose the information he purportedly has access to absent preliminary relief Bofl did not satisfy this burden in moving for a preliminary injunction, and Bofl has not satisfied it now.

As for the modified relief Bofl seeks in its present motion, this relief appears simple: an order requiring Erhart and his counsel to delete any copies of Bofl's information and documents. Bofl is even willing to offer the services of its forensic consultant to assist Erhart and his counsel. But this order would still be an injunction—a mandatory one. See Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 879 (9th Cir. 2009) ("A mandatory injunction `orders a responsible party to `take action." (quoting Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 484 (1996))). Consequently, Bofl must satisfy the requirements for obtaining this preliminary, extraordinary relief For the same reasons discussed above and in this Court's prior ruling, this modified, mandatory injunction is not warranted.

In light of the foregoing, the Court DENIES Bofl's motion to clarify or reconsider the Court's order denying Bofl's amended motion for a preliminary injunction (ECF No. 26).

In addition, the Court ORDERS the parties to appear on January 30, 2017, at 10:30 a.m. in Courtroom 4B for oral argument. See Civ. L.R. 7.1(d)(1). The parties should be prepared to discuss Bofl's motion for summary adjudication of Erhart's twelfth through twenty-fourth affirmative defenses (ECF No. 45 in Case No. 15-cv-02353).

IT IS SO ORDERED.