ROBERT E. GERBER, Bankruptcy Judge.
In this contested matter in the chapter 11 case of Motors Liquidation Company (formerly, General Motors Corp., and referred to here as "
Upon consideration of those documents, the Court concludes that the liability in question was not assumed by New GM. However, if a proof of claim was not previously filed against Old GM with respect to the accident in question, the Court will permit one to be filed within 30 days of the entry of the order implementing this Decision, without prejudice to rights to appeal this determination.
The Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in connection with this determination follow.
In June 2007, Beverly Deutsch was severely injured in an accident while she was driving a 2006 Cadillac sedan. She survived the car accident, but in August 2009, she died from the injuries that she previously had sustained.
In January 2010, the Estate of Beverly Deutsch, the Heirs of Beverly Deutsch, and Sanford Deutsch (collectively "
In July 2009, this Court entered its order (the "
The MSPA detailed which liabilities would be assumed by New GM, and provided that all other liabilities would be retained by Old GM. The MSPA provided, in its § 2.3(a)(ix), that New GM would not assume any claims with respect to product liabilities (as such term was defined in the MSPA, "
Language in an earlier version of the MSPA differed somewhat from its final language, as approved by the Court. Before its amendment, the MSPA provided
The 363 Sale Order provides that "[t]his Court retains exclusive jurisdiction to enforce and implement the terms and provisions of this Order" and the MSPA, including "to protect the Purchaser [New GM] against any of the Retained Liabilities or the assertion of any ... claim ... of any kind or nature whatsoever, against the Purchased Assets."
The issue here is one of contractual construction. As used in the MSPA, when defining the liabilities that New GM would assume, what do the words "accidents or incidents," that appear before "first occurring on or after the Closing Date," mean? It is undisputed that the accident that caused Beverly Deutsch's death took place in June 2007, more than two years prior to the closing. But her death took place after the closing. New GM argues that Beverly Deutsch's injuries arose from an "accident" and an "incident" that took place in 2007, and that her death did likewise. But the Deutsch Estate argues that while the "accident" took place in 2007, her death was a separate "incident"—and that the latter took place only in August 2009, after the closing of the sale to New GM had taken place.
Ultimately, while the Court respects the skill and fervor with which the point was argued, it cannot agree with the Deutsch Estate. Beverly Deutsch's death in 2009 was the consequence of an event that took place in 2007, which undisputedly, was an accident and which also was an incident, which is a broader word, but fundamentally of a similar type. The resulting death in 2009 was not, however, an "incident[] first occurring on or after the Closing Date," as that term was used in the MSPA.
As usual, the Court starts with textual analysis. The key provision of the MSPA, § 2.3(a)(ix), set forth the extent to which Product Liability Claims were assumed by New GM. Under that provision, New GM assumed:
The key words, of course, are "accidents" and "incidents," neither of which are defined anywhere else in the MSPA, and whose interpretation, accordingly, must
The word "accidents," of course, is not ambiguous. "Accidents" has sufficiently clear meaning on its own, and in any event its interpretation is not subject to debate, as both sides agree that Beverly Deutsch's death resulted from an accident that took place in 2007, at a time when, if "accidents" were the only controlling word, liability for the resulting death would not be assumed by New GM. The ambiguity, if any, is instead in the word "incidents," which is a word that by its nature is more inclusive and less precise.
But while "incidents" may be deemed to be somewhat ambiguous, neither side asked for an evidentiary hearing to put forward parol evidence as to its meaning. Though it is undisputed that "incidents" remained in the MSPA after additional words "or other distinct and discrete occurrences," were deleted, neither side was able, or chose, to explain, by evidence, why the latter words were dropped, and what, if any relevance the dropping of the additional words might have as to the meaning of the word "incidents" that remained. The words "or other distinct and discrete occurrences" could have been deleted as redundant, to narrow the universe of claims that were assumed, or for some other reason. Ultimately, the Court is unable to derive sufficient indication of the parties' intent as to the significance, if any, of deleting the extra words.
So the Court is left with the task of deriving the meaning of the remaining words "accidents or incidents" from their ordinary meaning, the words that surround them, canons of construction, and the Court's understanding when it approved the 363 Sale as to how the MSPA would deal with prepetition claims against Old GM. Ultimately these considerations, particularly in the aggregate, point in a single direction—that a death resulting from an earlier "accident[] or incident[]" was not an "incident[] first occurring" after the closing.
Starting first with ordinary meaning, definitions of "incident" from multiple sources are quite similar. They include, as relevant here,
Turning next to words that surround the words "accidents or incidents," these words provide an interpretive aid to the words they modify. The word "incident[]" is followed by the words "first occurring." In addition to defining the relevant time at which the incident must take place (i.e., after the closing), that clause inserts the word "first" before "occurring." That suggests, rather strongly, that it was envisioned that some types of incidents could take place over time or have separate sub-occurrences, or that one incident might relate to an earlier incident, with the earliest incident being the one that matters. Otherwise it would be sufficient to simply say "occurring," without adding the word "first." This too suggests that the consequences of an incident should not be regarded as a separate incident, or that even if they are, the incident that first occurs is the one that controls.
Canons of construction tend to cut in opposite directions, though on balance they favor New GM. The Deutsch Estate appropriately points to the canon of construction against "mere surplusage," which requires different words of a contract or statute to be construed in a fashion that gives them separate meanings, so that no word is superfluous.
But how different the two words "accidents" and "incidents" can properly be understood to be—and in particular, whether "incidents" can be deemed to separately exist
Here application of the canon against surplusage makes clear, as the Deutsch Estate argues, that "incidents" must at least sometimes mean something different than "accidents"—but application of that canon does not tell us when and how. The second canon, noscitur a sociis, does that, and effectively trumps the doctrine of surplusage because it tells us that "accidents" and "incidents" should be given related meaning.
The Deutsch Estate argues that the Court should construe a death resulting from an earlier "accident" or "incident" to be a separate and new "incident" that took place at a later time. But ultimately, the Court concludes that it cannot do so. While it is easy to conclude that "accidents" and "incidents," as used in the MSPA, will not necessarily be the same in all cases, they must still be somewhat similar. "Incidents" cannot be construed so broadly as to cover what are simply the consequences of earlier "accidents" or other "incidents."
Applying noscitur a sociis in conjunction with the canon against "mere surplusage" tells us that the two words "accidents" and "incidents" must be understood as having separate meanings in at least some cases, but that these meanings should be conceptually related. At oral argument, the Court asked counsel for New GM an important question: if an "incident" would not necessarily be an "accident," what would it be? What would it cover? Counsel for New GM came back with a crisp and very logical answer; he said that "incident" would cover a situation where a car caught fire or had blown up, or some problem had arisen by means other than a collision.
The simple interpretation, and the one this Court ultimately provides, is that "incidents," while covering more than just "accidents," are similar; they relate to fires, explosions, or other definite events that cause injuries and result in the right to sue, as contrasted to describing the consequences of those earlier events, or that relate to the resulting damages.
Finally, this Court's earlier understanding of the purposes of New GM's willingness to assume certain liabilities of Old GM is consistent with the Court's conclusion at this time as well. When the Court approved GM's 363 Sale, this Court noted, in its opinion, that New GM had chosen to broaden its assumption of product liabilities.
Finally, the Deutsch Estate notes another interpretative canon, that ambiguities in a contract must be read against the drafter.
The Deutsch Estate's interpretation of "accident or incident" is not supportable. Thus, the Debtor's motion is granted, and the Deutsch Estate may not pursue this claim against New GM.
Transcript, at 31.