LLEWIS A. KAPLAN, District Judge.
Before this Court are four motions — one by Bary and three by al Fawwaz — to depose witnesses located abroad, who allegedly are unable or unwilling to travel to the United States to testify in person, under Rule 15 and for letters rogatory.
Bary and al Fawwaz were indicted in this Court in 2000 for, among other things, conspiring with Usama bin Laden and others to kill Americans abroad by, among other means, bombing the United States embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Two hundred twenty four people reportedly were killed and many more injured in those bombings.
The indictment alleges that bin Laden established al Qaeda's London office, called the Advice and Reformation Committee ("ARC"), in 1994 and installed al Fawwaz at the helm.
A party to a criminal proceeding may move under Rule 15 "that a prospective witness be deposed in order to preserve testimony for trial. The court may grant the motion because of exceptional circumstances and in the interest of justice."
To satisfy the materiality requirement, the moving party must show that the proposed testimony would exculpate or, in the event that the government is the moving party, inculpate, the defendant.
To satisfy the unavailability requirement, the moving party must show that the witness is unable or unwilling to attend trial and that it has made a good faith effort to secure that witness's attendance.
Letters rogatory are "the medium, in effect, whereby one country, speaking through one of its courts, requests another country, acting through its own courts and by methods of court procedure peculiar thereto and entirely within the latter's control, to assist the administration of justice in the former country."
Bary moves to depose two witnesses — Iqbal Ahmed, in the United Kingdom, and Abdel Mageed Mohamed el Bary, in Cairo, Egypt, or another location to be agreed upon. He has not satisfied the unavailability requirement as to either.
Ahmed, Bary's counsel in the UK, allegedly was present when British law enforcement personnel questioned Bary in the fall of 1998 and was involved in his extradition proceedings.
Mohamed el Bary, defendant Bary's brother, is said to be prepared to testify about Bary's activities and treatment in Egypt and the reasons for which he sought asylum in the United Kingdom.
Such speculative concern that logistics, work, or travel schedules might prevent a witness's attendance at trial is not sufficient to satisfy the unavailability requirement.
Al Fawwaz makes three separate motions to depose nine different individuals abroad and for letters rogatory.
Al Fawwaz's first motion
Defendant's counsel in London apparently has been unable to obtain a telephone number or other contact information for Banner or the Security Service.
The MI5 agents' proposed testimony would be material. Based on al Fawwaz's representations, they would testify favorably about the nature of their official interactions with al Fawwaz from 1994 through 1998, including his relationship with bin Laden, the role that the ARC played, and the extent to which al Fawwaz was involved in terrorism related activity.
Al Fawwaz moves next to take Rule 15 depositions and for related letters rogatory concerning depositions of Naomi Wood, Abdel Bari Atwan, Dr. Mustapha Alani, Dr. Sa'ad al-Faqih, Mohammad al Massari, Mark Huband, and Abdullah Anas.
Wood allegedly was the rental agent for the office at 1A Beethoven Street that al Fawwaz and Bary occupied.
Assuming the truth of al Fawwaz's representations concerning Wood's testimony, the Court finds that the testimony could be material exculpatory evidence with respect to inculpatory documents retrieved at 1A Beethoven Street after the term of his lease expired. Wood's apparent refusal to cooperate with or respond to counsel's attempts to contact her render her unavailable and justify issuance of letters rogatory.
Al Fawwaz proposes nearly identical testimony from each of Atwan and Alani. During the relevant period, Atwan was editor-in-chief of an Arab language newspaper published in London and published or commented on certain communiques from the ARC.
Atwan's proposed opinion testimony that the ARC was not affiliated with al Qaeda would be neither material nor admissible. The foundation for this testimony is said to be conversations that Atwan allegedly had with al Fawwaz and information gained in Atwan's role as a journalist. The indictment against al Fawwaz alleges that the ARC was a front for al Qaeda. Testimony that Atwan was aware of legitimate, non-criminal activities of the ARC and unaware of any criminal activities in which the ARC or al Fawwaz participated is not exculpatory absent some reason to believe that Atwan would or should have known both the organization's facial or public nature and, to the extent it had one, its secret nature. Al Fawwaz has proffered no such reason. Atwan's proposed testimony concerning al Fawwaz's alleged statements disclaiming responsibility for or agreement with the 1996 Declaration would be material, however, because it would tend to refute the government's claim that al Fawwaz was involved in the 1996 Declaration's dissemination.
The government challenges the admissibility of this proposed testimony on hearsay grounds. At this time, at least, that objection does not appear meritorious. Al Fawwaz's alleged statement to Atwan would be admissible as a "statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind."
Atwan's refusal to travel to the United States renders him unavailable. The government incorrectly asserts that "[t]he basis for Atwan's refusal to travel to the Untied States is left unspecified by the defense."
Alani allegedly is a senior adviser in security and terrorism studies at the Gulf Research Center in Dubai who met al Fawwaz on four occasions.
The proposed testimony concerning the ARC's nature as a legitimate, peaceful organization is not material for the reasons stated above in relation to Atwan's proposed testimony.
Alani's proposed testimony concerning al Fawwaz's alleged disagreement with the 1996 Declaration would be material and exculpatory for the reasons discussed above in relation to Atwan. But as with Atwan, the government objects to this testimony on admissibility grounds. Al Fawwaz does not claim that his statement to Alani was made in the immediate wake of the 1996 Declaration's release. It accordingly does not fall under the state of mind hearsay exception.
Al Fawwaz's argument that the statement qualifies as a "verbal act" showing that he did not pledge bayat to bin Laden fails also. First, verbal acts are "limited to statements that have independent legal significance, such as contractual offers or inter vivos gifts."
Al-Faqih is a Saudi dissident who ran two different dissident organizations in London and knew al Fawwaz.
Al-Faqih's proposed testimony concerning his involvement in the purchase of a satellite telephone for another dissident organization is not material. Satellite telephones may be useful to different individuals or organizations for a range of purposes. Evidence that it was the practice of one dissident organization to use satellite telephones for security purposes thus would not negate the government's allegation that the satellite telephone that al Fawwaz allegedly purchased for bin Laden is evidence of criminality.
Nor is there any basis for believing that al-Faqih's proposed testimony concerning the nature of the ARC or dangers faced by dissidents would be material or admissible. In addition to the materiality issues discussed above in relation to Atwan's testimony, al Fawwaz has not demonstrated an adequate foundation for al-Faqih's alleged knowledge about the ARC.
Al Massari is said to be a Saudi physicist and dissident who was granted asylum by the UK.
The proposed testimony would not be material. Al Fawwaz has not sustained his burden of providing a foundation for al Massari's proposed testimony about either the ARC's nature or the purpose or use of the satellite telephone. That al Massari at one time was involved with the ARC does not support a finding that he would have personal knowledge of any of the pertinent facts — for example, that it was not an al Qaeda front. Testimony that there were secret members and that the ARC served as a dissident organization does not make it any less likely that the organization also served al Qaeda. Similarly, al Massari's belief that the satellite telephone was intended for X purpose or routinely used for Y purpose does not make it any less likely that it was used also by bin Laden or other al Qaeda members for purposes related to criminal activity.
Huband is a former journalist who lives in the UK and allegedly would testify that al Fawwaz told him that the ARC was not associated with bin Laden's 1996 Declaration.
Anas is living in the UK under a grant of asylum.
Anas's proposed testimony is not material. Testimony that bin Laden at one time was a dissident and a relief worker rather than or in addition to being the leader of a terrorist organization would not in any sense exculpate al Fawwaz. This is particularly so in light of the fact that Anas is alleged last to have seen bin Laden in 1995 and, even then, only once. This was before bin Laden's alleged "turning point" from a dissident to a terrorist in 1996.
Al Fawwaz has not explained what Anas would say about the meaning of giving bayat or the basis of his alleged knowledge. Moreover, any such testimony theoretically could have some bearing on al Fawwaz's argument that he did not do so, but the Court is reasonably certain that there are less burdensome methods of obtaining evidence concerning the definition of bayat. Al Fawwaz's argument that Anas should be permitted to testify about the ARC and its members is unpersuasive also. Al Fawwaz does not explain the basis of Anas's purported knowledge and, as discussed above, such testimony would not be material.
Finally, unavailability has not been established. Al Fawwaz has not explained if or how he has attempted to mollify Anas's safety concerns. Indeed, it appears that he even has not ascertained their exact nature.
Al Fawwaz requests this Court's assistance in obtaining his passport and a certified copy of his immigration file from the United Kingdom Home Office, which handles immigration matters. He argues that his immigration file details his reasons for being in the United Kingdom, his position as a Saudi dissident, and that his application did not go forward due to a new antiterrorism prevention law in the UK.
Al Fawwaz has failed to explain how or why he has a right to these documents under any applicable rule of discovery. The Court will not request another sovereign nation to turn over documents to which the defendant would have no clear right were those documents located here in the United States.
For the foregoing reasons, Bary's motion [DI 1296] is denied. Al Fawwaz's first motion [DI 1323] is granted. Al Fawwaz's second motion [DI 1325] is granted to the extent that he may take Rule 15 depositions of Naomi Wood and Abdel Bari Atwan, each of which shall be confined to the subjects that this Court here has concluded are material. It is denied as to his other Rule 15 deposition requests and document requests. Al Fawwaz's third motion [DI 1326] is denied.
The Court will issue the proposed letters rogatory for Paul Banner and Banner's replacement. Counsel shall submit an agreed form of letters rogatory as to Wood, who has not cooperated with al Fawwaz's counsel.
SO ORDERED.