NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ARMSTRONG, Acting P. J.

Appellant Darrin Pettis pled no contest on March 1, 2006, to one count of heroin possession in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11350. He was placed on three years formal probation with one year in a residential narcotics treatment program. On July 19, 2006, he was arrested for possession of cocaine base for sale in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11351.5. On December 6, 2006, he pled no contest to that charge. His prior probation was reinstated and he was placed on probation in the new case on the same terms and conditions.1

On June 12, 2008, appellant's probation was revoked following his arrest in this case for fake narcotics sales in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11355. The trial court held a probation violation hearing and found that appellant had violated probation. The trial court imposed the four-year sentence from his conviction for heroin possession. The trial court awarded 370 days of presentence credit, consisting of 248 actual days and 122 days of conduct credit.

Appellant filed notices of appeal in both cases. He contends that there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that he violated probation. He further contends that he is entitled to additional conduct credits under Penal Code section 4019.2 He also requests that we review the trial court's August 22, 2008, in camera hearing on his Pitchess motion. We affirm the judgment of conviction.

Facts — Probation violation

At 5:30 p.m. on June 10, 2008, Los Angeles Police Officer Jorge Trejo saw appellant take money from James Sims and give him something in return. Sims then walked away. Officer Trejo concluded that he had observed a narcotics sale and directed other officers to detain appellant and Sims.

Officer David Chapman saw appellant drop a $5 bill and four small objects that looked like cocaine base. Officer Chapman detained appellant.

The objects dropped by appellant were made of a white waxy substance which did not contain cocaine. Officer Trejo opined that appellant was selling the objects as cocaine.

James Sims testified on appellant's behalf. On June 10, Sims was on his way to the St. George Mission when he ran into appellant on the street. They "hit hands" and said hello. Sims did not give appellant money and appellant did not give Sims anything.

Although Sims was arrested, he was never charged and his parole was continued. When the police searched Sims, they told him that they found something that looked like cocaine base. Police later said that Sims had crystal methamphetamine. Sims denied having either.

Discussion

1. Sufficiency of the evidence

Following a probation revocation hearing, the trial court found that appellant had violated the "obey all laws" provision of his probation. Specifically, the trial court found the officers' testimony credible and found that a sale took place. Appellant contends that there is not sufficient evidence to support these findings. We do not agree.

A trial court is authorized to revoke probation if the interests of justice require revocation and the court had reason to believe that the probationer has violated a condition of his probation. (§ 1203.2, subd. (a).)

Probation proceedings are not a part of a criminal prosecution. The probation violation need only be shown by a preponderance of the evidence. (People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 443.)

There is ample evidence to support the trial court's finding. Officer Trejo testified that he saw Sims hand money to appellant and receive something in return. Officer Chapman saw appellant drop an item to the ground. He was later able to examine the dropped items and determine that it was an off-white solid that resembled cocaine base. It was not, however, actually cocaine base. Sims testified that when the police searched him, they found something on him that looked like cocaine base.3 The transaction took place in a high narcotics traffic area. This evidence was more than sufficient for the trier of fact to find by a preponderance of the evidence that a sale took place.

2. Section 4019

Appellant was sentenced on November 14, 2008. He contends that he should be awarded additional credits under the amended version of section 4019, which was passed in October 2009 with an effective date of January 25, 2010.

A criminal defendant in presentence custody "may . . . be eligible for presentence good behavior/worktime credits (collectively referred to as conduct credits) of up to two days for every four days of actual custody" pursuant to Penal Code section 4019, subdivisions (a)(4), (b), (c), (e), (f). (People v. Cooper (2002) 27 Cal.4th 38, 40.) Senate Bill No. 18 recently amended section 4019. The new version went into effect on January 25, 2010, crediting defendants with four days for every four days of actual custody (as opposed to the old version, which credited defendants with two days for every four days of actual custody).

Our courts have been split as to whether the amended version of section 4019 applies prospectively or retroactively.4 Appellant contends it should apply retroactively. We disagree.

Appellant relies on In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, which holds that "[w]hen the Legislature amends a statute so as to lessen the punishment[,] it has obviously expressly determined that its former penalty was too severe and that a lighter punishment is proper . . . . It is an inevitable inference that the Legislature must have intended [in the absence of clear legislative intent to the contrary] that the new statute imposing the new lighter penalty . . . should apply to every case to which it constitutionally could apply." (Id. at p. 745.)

Estrada, however, is not applicable to the present case because the amendment to section 4019 does not automatically "lessen punishment;" rather, it awards additional conduct credit to those who have earned it for good behavior or for performing assigned labor, as opposed to additional custody credit, which is awarded to a defendant simply because he or she is in presentence custody. Thus, Estrada is not binding in this context and does not require retroactive application of section 4019.

Furthermore, retroactive application of section 4019 would undermine its purpose. "[A] court [may] determin[e] whether the . . . meaning of a statute comports with its purpose." (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735.) "`The purpose of . . . section 4019 is to encourage good behavior by incarcerated defendants prior to sentencing. [Citations.]' [Citation.] `Conduct credit is awarded to prisoners in penal institutions to encourage good behavior. [Citation.]'" (People v. Silva (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 122, 127-128.) The only way to advance the statute's purpose of rewarding good behavior would be to apply it prospectively, not retroactively, because behavior can only be influenced before it has occurred. Applying section 4019 retroactively will not encourage appellant to behave appropriately in presentence custody because he is no longer in presentence custody.

We may also glean legislative intent by looking to other enhanced worktime statutes that were amended by Senate Bill No. 18. (See Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1387, which states: "The words of [a] statute must be construed in context . . . and statutes or statutory sections relating to the same subject must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent possible.") For example, Senate Bill No. 18 also amended section 2933.3, which provides credit for inmates who have completed firefighter training. (§ 2933.3, subd. (c).) The amendment added an express provision of retroactivity to the statute, providing credit to inmates dating back to July 1, 2009, even though the statute only took effect on January 25, 2010. (§ 2933.3, subd. (d).) By adding this retroactivity provision, the Legislature demonstrated that it could have added a similar provision to section 4019. Since the Legislature failed to do so, we infer that it did not intend for section 4019 to apply retroactively.

Appellant contends that if the legislature intended only prospective application of the amendments, such an application would violate his equal protection rights. He relies on In re Kapperman (1974) 11 Cal.3d 542 and People v. Sage (1980) 26 Cal.3d 498 to support his equal protection argument. Both Kapperman and Sage are inapplicable. Kapperman involves a prior version of section 2900.5 that only allowed actual presentence credits when the defendant was delivered to the state prison on or after March 4, 1972. (In re Kapperman, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 544.) Sage involves a prior version of section 4019 that allowed presentence conduct credits to misdemeanants, but not felons. (People v. Sage, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 508.) The California Supreme Court found that neither limitation related to a state interest. (Ibid.; In re Kapperman, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 545.)

As we discuss, supra, one of section 4019's principal purposes is to motivate good conduct. Appellant and others who were sentenced prior to the effective date of the amendment cannot be further enticed to behave themselves during their presentence custody. The fact that defendant's conduct cannot be influenced retroactively provides a rational basis for the Legislature's implicit intent that the amendment only apply prospectively.

Since prospective-only application is reasonably related to a legitimate public purpose, there is no equal protection violation. (People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185, 1200 [legislative classification not touching on suspect class or fundamental right does not violate equal protection guarantee if it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate public purpose].)

Thus, since section 4019 should only apply prospectively, appellant is not entitled to additional conduct credits.

3. Pitchess motion

Appellant requests that we independently review the sealed transcript of the Pitchess motion.

When requested to do so by an appellant, an appellate court can and should independently review the transcript of the trial court's in camera Pitchess hearing to determine whether the trial court disclosed all relevant complaints. (People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1229.)

We have reviewed the transcript of the in camera proceedings and see no prejudicial error in the trial court's rulings concerning disclosure.

Disposition

The judgment is affirmed.

We concur:

MOSK, J.

KUMAR, J.*