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U.S. v. Diaz-Escadeno, 2:17-CR-124-TLN. (2018)

Court: District Court, E.D. California Number: infdco20181213a43 Visitors: 44
Filed: Dec. 11, 2018
Latest Update: Dec. 11, 2018
Summary: STIPULATION TO CONTINUE STATUS CONFERENCE AND EXCLUDE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER TROY L. NUNLEY , District Judge . 1. By previous order, this matter was set for Status Conference/Change of Plea on December 13, 2018. 2. By this stipulation, counsel for the United States and counsel for defendant Emmanuel Diaz-Escadeno move to continue the status conference until January 3, 2019, at 9:30 a.m., and to exclude time between December 13, 2018, and January 3, 2019, un
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STIPULATION TO CONTINUE STATUS CONFERENCE AND EXCLUDE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER

1. By previous order, this matter was set for Status Conference/Change of Plea on December 13, 2018.

2. By this stipulation, counsel for the United States and counsel for defendant Emmanuel Diaz-Escadeno move to continue the status conference until January 3, 2019, at 9:30 a.m., and to exclude time between December 13, 2018, and January 3, 2019, under Local Code T4.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a) Defense counsel needs additional time to discuss the proposed plea agreement with her client and the government. To the extent that review of the agreement with her client requires reference to discovery produced in this case, defense counsel also requires time to review discovery from the government. b) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. c) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. d) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of December 13, 2018 to January 3, 2019, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

FINDINGS AND ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, the Court, having received, read, and considered the parties' stipulation, and good cause appearing therefore, adopts the parties' stipulation in its entirety as its order. The Court specifically finds the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. The Court finds the ends of justice are served by granting the requested continuance and outweigh the best interests of the public and defendant in a speedy trial.

The Court orders the time from the date the parties stipulated, up to and including January 3, 2019, shall be excluded from computation of time within which the trial of this case must be commenced under the Speedy Trial Act, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv) (Local Code T4). It is further ordered that the December 13, 2018 status conference shall be continued until January 3, 2019, at 9:30 a.m.

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.

Source:  Leagle

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