WILLIAM Q. HAYES, District Judge.
The matter before the Court is the motion to dismiss (ECF No. 8) filed by Defendant Leadership Studies, Inc. ("Leadership").
On August 17, 2015, Leadership filed a related case against Blanchard Training and Development Studies, Inc. ("Blanchard"), Leadership Studies, Inc. v. Blanchard Training and Development, Inc. et al., 15cv1831-WQH-KSC, (the "Leadership Complaint") alleging claims of breach of written contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, trademark infringement, unfair competition, copyright infringement, accounting, and declaratory relief. (ECF No. 1, Ex. A). In the Declaration of Josh Lawler filed by Leadership in support of its motion to dismiss, Leadership Attorney Josh Lawler declares that on August 18, 2015, he sent an email to counsel for Blanchard regarding the lawsuit filed by Leadership. Attorney Josh Lawler declares that he requested counsel for Blanchard to confirm that he was authorized to accept service of process on behalf of Blanchard. (ECF No. 8-1 ¶ 5). Attorney Josh Lawler declares that on August 18, 2015, he received an email response from counsel for Blanchard stating, "Give some thought to not serving us for a period of time if your client can formulate a settlement proposal in the near future." Id. ¶ 5. Attorney Josh Lawler declares that Leadership "forebore serving its complaint based solely on the parties' ongoing discussions, including efforts to avert litigation." Id. ¶ 18.
On September 25, 2015, Plaintiff Blanchard initiated this action by filing a Complaint (the "Blanchard Complaint") against Leadership requesting declaratory relief, injunctive relief, fees and costs. (ECF No. 1).
On October 1, 2015, the Leadership Complaint was served on Blanchard.
On October 16, 2015, Defendant Leadership filed the motion to dismiss the Blanchard Complaint. (ECF No. 8). On November 9, 2015, Blanchard filed an opposition. (ECF No. 11). On November 16, 2015, Leadership filed a reply. (ECF No. 12).
On February 25, 2016, the Court heard oral argument.
(ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 1-10). Blanchard requests declaratory judgment on the issue of laches, acquiescence, expiration of statute of limitations, abandonment and non-infringement of Situational Leadership trademark, and non-infringement of federally registered trademark due to lack of priority. Blanchard requests
Id. at 25-26. Blanchard requests that "Plaintiff be declared a prevailing party in this action and that this action be declared an exceptional case under 15 U.S.C. § 1117," which would allow the Court to award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party. Id. at 26.
Leadership contends that "[w]here, as here, there is already-pending litigation that encompasses all of the factual and legal issues raised in a declaratory relief action. . . the second lawsuit should be stricken or dismissed." (ECF No. 8-1 at 8). Leadership contends that the appropriate procedure for Blanchard to obtain the relief it seeks is to serve an answer to the Leadership Complaint with defenses and counterclaims. Leadership contends that "while resolution of the pre-existing [Leadership] Lawsuit necessarily will resolve all of the issues raised in the Blanchard Lawsuit, the reverse is far from true." Id. at 14. Leadership contends that the Blanchard Complaint
(ECF No. 8-1 at 7). Leadership contends that there is no need for a separate lawsuit.
Blanchard contends that the "first-to-file rule" does not apply in this case because the cases are related and pending before the same judge. (ECF No. 11 at 5). Blanchard contends that the Blanchard Complaint "serves the purposes of the Declaratory Judgment Act and there are no considerations here relating to forum shopping or duplicative litigation leading to conflicting results." Id. at 9 n. 2. Blanchard contends that "responding to the Leadership Studies Complaint is not a viable way to clarify the legal relations at issue at this time" because it "expects that the Leadership Studies Complaint will be dismissed, at least in part." Id. at 17. Blanchard contends that the claims made and relief sought in the Declaratory Judgment Complaint are necessary to settle the dispute.
The Declaratory Judgment Act provides: "In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of the United States . . . may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought." 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). "[T]he district court must first inquire whether there is an actual case or controversy within its jurisdiction." Principal Life Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 394 F.3d 665, 669 (9th Cir. 2005). "[I]f the court finds that an actual case or controversy exists, the court must decide whether to exercise its jurisdiction by analyzing the factors set out in Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491, 62 S.Ct. 1173, 86 L.Ed. 1620 (1942), and its progeny." Robinson, 394 F.3d at 669. The Brillhart factors are non-exclusive and state that, `[1)][t]he district court should avoid needless determination of state law issues; [2)] it should discourage litigants from filing declaratory actions as a means of forum shopping; and [3)] it should avoid duplicative litigation.'" Id. at 672 (quoting Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220, 1225 (9th Cir. 1998)). Other considerations include:
Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1225 n.5.
A court's determination whether to entertain an action for declaratory relief is discretionary. "[T]he Declaratory Judgment Act is `deliberately cast in terms of permissive, rather than mandatory, authority.'" Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1223 (quoting Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Utah v. Wycoff, 344 U.S. 237, 250 (1952)).
The first-to-file rule "is a generally recognized doctrine of federal comity which permits a district court to decline jurisdiction over an action when a complaint involving the same parties and issues has already been filed in another district." Pacesetter Systems, Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 678 F.2d 93, 94-95 (9th Cir. 1982). The first-to-file rule can also be applied when two cases are filed in the same district. See e.g., Wallerstein v. Dole Fresh Vegetables, Inc., 967 F.Supp.2d 1289, 1294 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (finding that "the first to file rule is not limited to cases brought in different districts."); Intervet, Inc. v. Merial Ltd., 535 F.Supp.2d 112, 114-15 (D.D.C. 2008) (finding that "when two actions are functionally the same, except the plaintiff in one action is the defendant in the other and vice versa, and both actions are pending in the same district court . . . [t]he first-to-file rule provides a reasonable means to determine which action should be dismissed.").
"The most basic aspect of the first-to-file rule is that it is discretionary. . . ." Alltrade, Inc. v. Uniweld Products, Inc., 946 F.2d 622, 628 (9th Cir. 1991). "While no precise rule has evolved, the general principle is to avoid duplicative litigation, and to promote judicial efficiency." Barapind v. Reno, 225 F.3d 1100, 1109 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations and internal quotations omitted). "The first-to-file rule was developed to `serve the purpose of promoting efficiency . . . and should not be disregarded lightly.'" Alltrade, Inc., 946 F.2d at 625 (quoting Church of Scientology v. United States Dep't of the Army, 611 F.2d 738, 750 (9th Cir. 1979)). "[I]t is not an abuse of discretion, and therefore not reversible error, for a district court judge to weigh the facts and conclude that the rule should apply. The decision and the discretion belong to the district court." Alltrade, Inc., 946 F.2d at 628. Courts analyze three factors in determining whether to dismiss a case pursuant to the first-to-file rule: "(1) chronology of the two actions; (2) similarity of the parties; and (3) similarity of the issues." Brighton Collectibles, Inc. v. Coldwater Creek, Inc., No. 06-cv-1848, 2006 WL 4117032, at * 2 (Nov. 21, 2006 S.D. Cal) (citing Alltrade, 946 F.2d at 625); Wallerstein, 967 F. Supp. 2d at 1293.
In this case, Leadership filed its complaint over one month before Blanchard filed its complaint for declaratory relief. Although Blanchard served its complaint on Leadership before Leadership formally served its complaint on Blanchard, the Leadership Complaint was the first complaint filed for purposes of the first-to-file rule.
The Blanchard Complaint attaches the Leadership Complaint as an exhibit and requests that the Court issue injunctive relief prohibiting Leadership and its affiliates from bringing the types of claims against Blanchard that are alleged in the Leadership Complaint. (See ECF No. 1 at 25-26, Ex. A). The issues in the two complaints overlap to such an extent that the Court would necessarily have to reference and analyze the Leadership Complaint in order to assess the merits of the Blanchard Complaint. The Court finds that the case brought by Leadership has the capacity to resolve the claims asserted by both parties, including any defenses and counterclaims that Blanchard may allege in its answer to the Leadership Complaint.
Blanchard contends that bringing its defenses and requests for declaratory and injunctive relief in an answer to the Leadership Complaint will not provide it an adequate remedy because the Leadership Complaint may be dismissed pursuant to a pending motion to dismiss. However, after Blanchard made this argument in its opposition to the motion to dismiss, Leadership filed an amended complaint in the related case and Blanchard has filed a motion to dismiss only Leadership's copyright claims, not the trademark or breach of contract claims. Therefore, whether or not Blanchard is successful in its motion to dismiss, there will be claims pending against Blanchard in the related case. The Court finds that exercising jurisdiction over the complaint for declaratory relief would create duplicative litigation, and would not settle all aspects of the controversy. See Principal Life Ins. Co., 394 F.3d at 672; see also Pacesetter Systems, 678 F.2d at 96 ("Declaratory relief is intended to serve a unique function in patent disputes, eliminating multiple litigation and protecting competitors from infringement actions that are threatened but not pursued. In contrast to those policies, Pacesetter's declaratory judgment action multiplies litigation. It does not shield Pacesetter from an unfair threat of an infringement action. . . .") (citations omitted). The Court concludes that in the interests of judicial efficiency and sound judicial administration, the motion to dismiss the Blanchard Complaint is granted.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to dismiss (ECF No. 8) filed by Defendant Leadership Studies, Inc. is granted. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff, dismissing the case without prejudice.