JOINT PETITION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR APPROVAL OF PLAINTIFFS' NEGOTIATED ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS

ROBERT C. JONES, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

After four years of hard-fought litigation, the parties have reached a settlement to resolve all of Plaintiffs' claims as to the alleged harms they suffered in Clark County foster care, including any claims for attorneys' fees and costs. Under the settlement, the four minor Plaintiffs and three adult Plaintiffs are to receive a cumulative total of $1,575,000.1 Additionally, Clark County Defendants2 will pay attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of $500,000, which will not be deducted from Plaintiffs' awards. The Clark County Board of County Commissioners approved the parties' settlement at a public hearing on November 18, 2014, and Plaintiffs' Petition to Approve Compromise Settlement and Distribution ("Petition") was filed under seal with this Court on November 21, 2014 (Dkt. 386) and approved on January 9, 2015 (Dkt. 400).

Plaintiffs and Clark County Defendants now petition this Court for approval of the negotiated fees and costs settlement pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1988. As demonstrated below, Plaintiffs are entitled to recover their fees and costs, and the amount negotiated is fair and reasonable. The settlement amount does not come close to compensating Plaintiffs' counsel for the more than 17,000 hours of work expended on this case along with the roughly $306,439.06 they have spent out-of-pocket. There is a strong presumption that the lodestar method results in a reasonable fee, Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 552-53 (2010), and the compromise of $500,000 in fees represents less than 15 percent of Plaintiffs' counsel's lodestar, which is $3,355,260.50.3 The negotiated fees and costs also amount to less than 25 percent of the total settlement amount, and Plaintiffs' counsel have waived their right to recover any contingency fee from the clients.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are former foster children who were in the custody of Clark County's Department of Family Services ("DFS"). They filed suit on April 13, 2010, seeking redress for alleged harms suffered while in foster care.4 They sued for violations of their federal constitutional and statutory rights under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, as well as for violations of Nevada state law. SAC ¶¶ 198-281.

Following four years of litigation, seven Plaintiffs remain in the case, four of whom are minors. A brief summary of the minor Plaintiffs' claims in the SAC are as follows:

These children's path to settlement has been long and complex. They initially sued County and State Defendants, who filed a total of five motions to dismiss at three different stages, along with multiple joinders and a motion for reconsideration. After the Court granted the initial motions to dismiss in October 2010, Plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which reversed in part and remanded the case. Based on the motion to dismiss rulings and the appeal, Plaintiffs amended their complaint twice.5

The discovery that began in the summer of 2010 and re-commenced in the fall of 2012 was protracted and hard fought and filled with motion practice by Plaintiffs and Defendants. Plaintiffs took nearly forty depositions, and County Defendants deposed all but one Plaintiff in addition to taking six other depositions. County Defendants produced over 120,000 pages of documents that Plaintiffs' counsel organized and reviewed. Declaration of Mark W. Danis, Dkt. 389, filed under seal in support of Plaintiffs' Petition and Memorandum in Support of Negotiated Attorneys' Fees and Costs ("Danis Decl.") ¶ 6.

The parties' extensive litigation efforts are demonstrated by the 400-plus docket entries in this case to date.

As the case neared the close of discovery, Plaintiffs and Defendants engaged multiple expert witnesses in the following fields: child welfare systems, child psychology, child psychiatry, and life care planning.

On May 27, 2014, Magistrate Judge Leen convened the parties for a settlement conference. Dkt. 333. After an all-day in-person meeting and follow-up conference call discussions over a period of approximately one month, the parties reached agreement on settlement amounts. Declaration of Leecia Welch, Dkt. 390, filed in support of Plaintiffs' Petition and Memorandum in Support of Negotiated Attorneys' Fees and Costs ("Welch Decl.") ¶ 15. County Defendants have agreed to pay a total of $1.575 million to the seven Plaintiffs who remain in this case. Petition at 2. The settlement for the four minor Plaintiffs totals $925,000. Id. The remaining amount — $650,000 — represents the settlement amount for the three Plaintiffs who were minors when they filed this suit but who have now reached the age of majority.6 Id. at 3.

The parties also reached a compromise on Plaintiffs' claim for attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1988. The parties have agreed to settle the claim for fees and costs for a total of $500,000. Petition at 4. County Defendants have agreed to pay attorneys' fees and costs directly; thus, no fees or costs will be deducted from the recovery of the Plaintiffs. Id.; Welch Decl. ¶ 15.

Following agreement on the basic terms of the settlement, Plaintiffs' counsel spent substantial time over the next five months to bring the case to closure. Welch Decl. ¶ 16. The unique circumstances of each Plaintiff, coupled with several being minors and the fact that they live in three different states, necessitated a variety of different settlement structures. After several months of negotiation and research as to viable financial alternatives, the parties agreed that the four minor Plaintiffs will receive their settlement funds through one or more of: a special needs trust, an annuity, and a blocked financial account. Welch Decl. ¶ 16. In addition to selecting these settlement structures, the parties resolved numerous other issues before finalizing the settlement terms. Welch Decl. ¶ 16.

Given the resources expended over the course of nearly five years, the negotiated fee amount is fair and reasonable. Indeed, the amount that Plaintiffs have agreed to accept represents a reduction of more than 85 percent off Plaintiffs' lodestar claim. Further, the compromise is intended to cover Plaintiffs' costs, in addition to their fees, and Plaintiffs' counsel have expended more than $306,439.06 in costs and expenses litigating this case. Danis Decl. Ex. B, Welch Decl. Ex. B, Declaration of Bruno Wolfenzon, Dkt. 391, filed in support of Plaintiffs' Petition and Memorandum in Support of Negotiated Attorneys' Fees and Costs ("Wolfenzon Decl.") Ex. B.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiffs Are Entitled to Attorneys' Fees and Costs Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1988 and Under the Parties' Settlement Agreement.

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1988, courts have authority to award attorneys' fees in actions brought under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The Ninth Circuit has interpreted this statute to mean that "a court's discretion to deny fees under Section 1988 is very narrow and . . . fee awards should be the rule rather than the exception." Mendez v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 540 F.3d 1109, 1126 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Herrington v. Cnty. of Sonoma, 883 F.2d 739, 743 (9th Cir. 1989)). This interpretation supports Congress's intent that Section 1988 "provide many victims of civil rights violations with effective access to the judicial process." See City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 576 (1986).

Through this settlement Plaintiffs are the prevailing party for purposes of recovering their reasonable fees and costs. The parties entered into a settlement providing for payments to each Plaintiff and for payment to Plaintiffs' counsel of an agreed amount for fees and costs under Section 1988. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, payment of the negotiated fees and costs will be made directly to Plaintiffs' counsel and will not be deducted from any individual Plaintiff's settlement amount.

B. The Parties' Settlement Agreement Is Fair and Reasonable.

Settlements involving minors require the court to play an oversight role "to determine whether the settlement serves the best interests of the minor." Robidoux v. Rosengren, 638 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). The court's inquiry, however, should not "place[] . . . undue emphasis on the amount of attorney's fees provided for in a settlement. . . ." Id. The Ninth Circuit has clarified that when reviewing a settlement agreement involving minor plaintiffs, "[m]ost importantly, the district court should evaluate the fairness of each minor plaintiff's net recovery without regard to the proportion of the total settlement value designated for adult co-plaintiffs or plaintiffs' counsel — whose interests the district court has no special duty to safeguard." Id. at 1182 (citing Dacanay v. Mendoza, 573 F.2d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 1978)).7

In Robidoux, the Ninth Circuit reversed where the court below looked to state law in reviewing the minors' settlement. 638 F.3d at 1182. The district court had rejected the proposed settlement because it allowed for 56 percent of the total settlement to go toward attorney's fees and the practice in state court was to award attorneys a maximum of 25 percent of the settlement. Id. at 1179-80. In reversing, the Ninth Circuit held that "[s]o long as the net recovery to each minor plaintiff is fair and reasonable in light of their claims and average recovery in similar cases, the district court should approve the settlement as proposed by the parties." Id. at 1182.

Here, the net amounts to the minor Plaintiffs are fair and reasonable. Each will receive between $100,000 and $350,000, with no deduction for attorneys' fees or costs. Petition at 3, 4. These awards match or exceed settlements that courts have approved in other litigation where foster children sued Clark County Department of Family Services for harms suffered while in County custody. See, e.g., Order on Petition for Compromise of Minors' Claims with Clark County, 4, Fullmer v. Brown, No. 2:09-cv-01442-BES-PAL (D. Nev. Dec. 7, 2011) (approving net awards of $20,000; $30,000; and $100,000 to minor plaintiffs); Order at 3, Johnson v. Clayton, No. 2:08-cv-01810-RCJ-LRL (D. Nev. Dec. 28, 2010) (approving net awards of $36,769.17 and $33,407.09 to the two minor plaintiffs); Order on Amended Petition to Approve Compromise Settlement and Distribution at 4, Mix v. Jones-Johnson, No. 2:06-cv-411-RLH-LRL (D. Nev. Aug. 19, 2009) (approving net awards of $11,500; $34,500; and two awards of $92,000 to the four minor plaintiffs).

Even if the Court were to look to the customary fee percentage taken from settlements of minors in Nevada, the fee proposal here — less than 25 percent of the total settlement amount — is less than what courts have approved in other cases. Order at 2, Johnson v. Clayton (approving a settlement where 33 percent of the total award is made as payment for attorneys' fees); Order at 6, Mix v. Jones-Johnson (approving settlement where 35 percent of the total award is designated as attorneys' fees).

On November 21, 2014, Plaintiffs separately filed a petition for this Court's approval of the minors' settlement. Plaintiffs outline below the reasonableness of the attorneys' fee settlement in an effort to assist the Court's inquiry into whether the overall settlement agreement is in the minors' best interests. For the reasons set forth below, there can be no question that the fees and costs portion of the overall settlement is reasonable and should be approved along with the petition to approve the minors' compromise.

C. The Fees and Costs Agreed to by the Parties Are Reasonable.

1. Plaintiffs have agreed to settle for a significant reduction of their fee claim.

The Supreme Court explained in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983), that the "most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." This figure, the "lodestar," is the presumptive reasonable fee. Id. at 433. Once the lodestar is reached, the court may adjust it upward or downward based on the factors that the Ninth Circuit outlined in Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975). Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Lake Elsinore 521, LLC, No. 2:11-cv-00386-GMN-LRL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126866, **6-7 (D. Nev. Nov. 1, 2011) (explaining that "[c]alculation of reasonable attorney's fees is a two-step process" consisting of first calculating the lodestar and second examining the award in light of the Kerr factors); see also LR 54-16(b)(3).

Here, Plaintiffs have agreed to settle their claim for attorneys' fees and costs for a fraction of the full amount to which their counsel are entitled based on the lodestar calculation. To achieve the results in this case — obtaining payment of over $1.5 million to their clients — Plaintiffs' counsel expended 17,480.20 hours of compensable time. Danis Decl. ¶ 12; Welch Decl. ¶ 13; Wolfenzon Decl. ¶ 5. This equates to a lodestar of $3,355,260.50 at reasonable hourly rates for the Las Vegas Market. Danis Decl. ¶ 12; Welch Decl. ¶ 13; Wolfenzon Decl. ¶ 5. The fees and costs settlement also constitutes less than 25 percent of the total recovery in the case, far below what courts in Nevada have held to be reasonable percentages when taken as a contingency fee.8 See § III(B), supra.

Complete time records and hourly rate information are attached as exhibits to the declarations in support of this Petition.9 A summary of Plaintiffs' counsel's hourly rates, hours worked, and total lodestar is as follows:

For purposes of this case, Plaintiffs' counsel have calculated their lodestar using reasonable hourly rates charged for similar work in the Clark County legal market. These rates range from $200 per hour for a junior associate with 0-3 years of experience to $250 per hour for a senior partner. Wolfenzon Decl. ¶ 7; Declaration of Karie Wilson, Dkt. 392, filed under seal in support of Plaintiffs' Petition and Memorandum in Support of Negotiated Attorneys' Fees and Costs ("Wilson Decl.") ¶ 4. The Clark County rates that Plaintiffs use here are at or below rates that courts in the District of Nevada have approved in other cases. See, e.g., Mendez v. Reinforcing Ironworkers Union Local 416, No. 2:09-cv-02332-LRH-NJK, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120893, **11-12 (D. Nev. Aug. 23, 2013) (awarding $415 per hour to an attorney with 16 years of experience); Van Asdale v. Int'l Game, Tech., No. 3:04-cv-00703-RAM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56715, *8-11 (D. Nev. May 24, 2011) (awarding $450 per hour for an attorney with 40 years of experience, $350 per hour for a 19-year attorney, and $120 per hour for paralegal work).10

In arriving at their lodestar, Plaintiffs' counsel exercised billing judgment. Senior attorneys have reviewed the time records from their respective firms to ensure that the services for which time is submitted were reasonable and were actually and necessarily performed in the prosecution of this case. Danis Decl. ¶ 10; Welch Decl. ¶ 11; Wolfenzon Decl. ¶ 5. For example, Morrison & Foerster has written off in excess of $600,000 of time in an exercise of billing judgment. Danis Decl. ¶ 9. The National Center for Youth Law similarly has not billed for time spent by legal personnel who worked fewer than 30 hours on the case. Welch Decl. ¶ 11. Morrison & Foerster has waived its claim to travel time and the National Center for Youth Law has charged only half-time for travel. Danis Decl. ¶ 9; Welch Decl. ¶ 11. Local counsel Alverson Taylor Mortenson & Sanders is waiving its right to recover fees. Wilson Decl. ¶ 3. The fees presented in this Petition were reasonably and necessarily incurred in the course of this four-and-a-half-year litigation, involving three rounds of motions to dismiss, significant additional motion practice, and extensive fact and expert discovery. Danis Decl. ¶ 6; Welch Decl. ¶¶ 8-11; Wolfenzon Decl. ¶¶ 4, 5; see also § II, supra.

2. The Kerr factors weigh in favor of approving this fee settlement.

In Kerr, the Ninth Circuit enumerated twelve factors for courts to consider in determining whether the lodestar should be adjusted in the course of awarding attorneys' fees. 526 F.2d at 70.11 In this case, each of the Kerr factors weighs in favor of an upward adjustment of attorneys' fees. Even so, rather than seeking an enhancement of their lodestar, Plaintiffs have taken a significant reduction in the amount to which they are legally entitled, making approval of the negotiated fee settlement all the more reasonable.

A. The Results Obtained and the Amount Involved: Plaintiffs in this case have settled their claims for a total of $1.575 million, with each individual award ranging from $100,000 to $350,000. Petition at 3. The settlement amounts for the minor Plaintiffs substantially exceed settlements in other litigation by former foster children against Clark County Department of Family Services. See § III(B), supra (citing cases in which settlement awards to minors ranged from $20,000 to $100,000).

Plaintiffs could not have achieved this result without significant expenditure of attorney time and resources, as demonstrated by Plaintiffs' counsel's lodestar, which totals $3,355,260.50 at rates typically charged in the Clark County legal market. § III(B)(1), supra. Plaintiffs have substantially achieved the goals of the lawsuit by winning significant monetary damages for the harms they allegedly suffered while in foster care.12

B. The Time and Labor Required: Plaintiffs' counsel have worked over 17,000 hours spanning more than a four-year period to achieve the results in this case. Danis Decl. ¶ 12; Welch Decl. ¶ 13; Wilson Decl. ¶ 3; Wolfenzon Decl. ¶¶ 4, 5. Plaintiffs' counsel engaged in intensive litigation activities, as demonstrated by the 400-plus docket entries to date. Further, the fee award the parties have negotiated is intended to cover Plaintiffs' significant litigation costs and out-of-pocket expenses, which total $306,439.06. § III(C)(3), infra. These fees and costs were incurred in the course of such activities as taking and defending roughly 50 depositions; hiring four experts to review case files, interview Plaintiffs, and write expert reports; and engaging in extensive motion practice during discovery proceedings. Id.; § II, supra.

C. The Novelty and Difficulty of the Questions Involved: The Supreme Court has recognized that civil rights litigation brought under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 constitutes "complex Federal litigation" on par with antitrust litigation. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 893 (1984). As Plaintiffs brought suit under Section 1983, they have met the prong of demonstrating that their lawsuit presents novel and difficult legal questions. See SAC ¶¶ 198-227, 276-281.

D. The Skill Requisite To Perform the Legal Service Properly: This case required specialized skill spanning a variety of practice areas, ranging from litigation of federal civil rights suits, to expertise in child welfare systems, to expertise in personal injury and emotional trauma resulting from alleged abuse in foster care. The significant discovery in which the parties engaged required the ability to manage and examine tens of thousands of documents related to County Defendants' child welfare agency. Danis Decl. ¶ 6. Plaintiffs' counsel Morrison & Foerster contributed its expertise in complex federal litigation and in discovery management. Danis Decl. ¶ 2. The National Center for Youth Law additionally contributed its significant specialized knowledge of foster care systems and its expertise representing low-income children. Welch Decl. ¶¶ 2, 3, 9.

E. The Preclusion of Other Employment by the Attorney Due to Acceptance of the Case: Generally speaking, counsel's decision to litigate a case necessarily precludes work on other cases. See, e.g., Riker v. Gibbons, No. 3:08-cv-00115-LRH-VPC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120841, at *27 (D. Nev. Oct. 28, 2010). That is particularly so in this case, where Plaintiffs' counsel expended over 17,000 hours over the course of more than four years — all time in which Plaintiffs' counsel were limited in their ability to accept other employment as a result of time devoted to this suit.

F. The Customary Fee: As addressed in section III(C)(1), supra, Plaintiffs' counsel have calculated their lodestar based on the rates customary to lawyers of comparable skill and experience for similarly complex litigation. At the rates customarily charged by attorneys practicing in Clark County, Plaintiffs through their fee settlement are accepting an award that is less than 15 percent of the amount which they could reasonably claim. Measured in a different way, the fees compromise amounts to less than 25 percent of the total recovery at issue, and is thus far less than the 33 and 35 percent contingency arrangements that courts in the District of Nevada have approved as appropriate in other cases involving minors. See § III(C)(1), supra.

G. Whether the Fee Is Fixed or Contingent: Plaintiffs' counsel's ability to obtain fees was contingent on obtaining a successful outcome in this case. Plaintiffs are former foster children and are generally indigent, and Plaintiffs' counsel advanced all the expenses of this litigation. Danis Decl. ¶ 8; Welch Decl. ¶¶ 10, 18. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs are not asking for a lodestar enhancement based on this factor and have in fact agreed to accept much less than their full fees in the settlement of this case.

H. The Time Limitations Imposed by the Client or the Circumstances: This case imposed significant time limitations due to the pace of the litigation and the fact that most of Plaintiffs' counsel had to travel from out of state in order to attend hearings or visit their clients. Even after the parties agreed to the settlement in principle, the complexity of settling damages claims involving large sums of money to Plaintiffs required an additional five months of research and negotiations before the parties were prepared to sign the Settlement Agreement and Release. Welch Decl. ¶ 16.

I. The Experience, Reputation, and Ability of the Attorneys: The firms representing Plaintiffs are well known and respected throughout the legal communities in which they practice. See § III(C)(2)(D), supra. The two lead partners on the case from Morrison & Foerster have more than 60 years of litigation experience combined. Danis Decl. ¶¶ 3, 4, Ex. A. The two lead senior attorneys on this case from the National Center for Youth Law have nearly 60 years of litigation experience combined, almost exclusively in the arena of child welfare litigation. Welch Decl. ¶¶ 5, 7. They have successfully represented children in foster care in suits across the country, including in Arkansas, Washington, and Utah. Id. Resumés for the primary attorneys on this case for each firm are attached to the Declarations of Mark Danis (Ex. A) and Leecia Welch (Ex. A).

J. The Undesirability of the Case: For a number of reasons, this was an "undesirable" case for Plaintiffs' counsel to undertake. The litigation was extremely time-consuming, complex, and expensive. See §§ III(C)(2)(C), (D), supra; § III(C)(3), infra. The transient nature of foster care placements presented additional logistical hurdles. Many of the Plaintiffs moved multiple times, and all of the Plaintiffs exited foster care during the course of this lawsuit. All of the minor Plaintiffs now live outside of Nevada, in three different states, and Plaintiffs' counsel have had to navigate relevant laws in each of those states. Welch Decl. ¶ 16. Finally, Plaintiffs' counsel undertook this litigation without any payment from clients and with the knowledge that they might not recover their attorneys' fees or out-of-pocket expenditures. Danis Decl. ¶ 14; Welch Decl. ¶¶ 10, 18.

K. The Nature and Length of the Professional Relationship with the Clients: Plaintiffs' counsel have long relationships with the Plaintiffs and/or with their Next Friends that date back to 2009 or earlier. Welch Decl. ¶ 8. Plaintiffs' counsel have traveled to four different states to visit the clients where they live. Id. ¶ 9. Plaintiffs' counsel have developed close relationships with each client, which is of special importance where the clients have been in foster care and have often experienced much instability in their relationships with the adults in their lives. Id. ¶¶ 8-9.

L. Awards in Similar Cases: The negotiated attorneys' fee amount here is reasonable in light of fee awards in similar cases. In other cases involving multi-year litigation where children sue public agencies for damages under Section 1983 based on alleged child abuse and neglect, courts have approved fee awards that for exceed the negotiated amount proposed here. See, e.g., Guerrero v. Brentwood Union Sch. Dist., No. 13-03873 LB, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47167, at **13-14 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2014) (approving payment of at least $1.675 million in attorneys' fees); Stipulation and Order Approving Payment of Counsel Fees and Costs and Approving Final Distributions at ¶¶ 7-9, K.J. v. Div. of Youth & Family Servs., No. 1:04-cv-03553-JBR (D.N.J. Mar. 15, 2006) (approving payment of $1.35 million in attorneys' fees, $72,389.90 in costs, and $24,550.84 in interest).

3. The fee settlement is reasonable in light of the substantial costs and out-of-pocket litigation expenses that Plaintiffs' counsel have expended.

Since 2009, Plaintiffs' counsel have incurred significant costs and out-of-pocket litigation expenses in the prosecution of this case. Danis Decl. ¶ 8; Welch Decl. ¶ 10. "Costs" include those costs allowable under 28 U.S.C. Section 1920, as itemized in the Bill of Costs attached as exhibits to the Declarations of Mark Danis, Leecia Welch, and Bruno Wolfenzon. "Out-of-pocket litigation expenses" include those expenses that are ordinarily charged to fee-paying clients and thus are recoverable as part of the overall attorneys' fees award. Dang v. Cross, 422 F.3d 800, 814 (9th Cir. 2005); Harris v. Marhoefer, 24 F.3d 16, 19 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Woods v. Carey, 722 F.3d 1177, 1179 n.1 (9th Cir. 2013) ("Expenses normally charged to fee-paying clients include `photocopying, paralegal expenses, and travel and telephone costs.'") (quoting Thornberry v. Delta Air Lines Inc., 676 F.2d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir.1982)).

In total, Plaintiffs' counsel have incurred $124,064.84 in costs, including photocopying and hearing and deposition transcript charges, which are recoverable as a part of Plaintiffs' fees and costs award. Additionally, Plaintiffs' counsel have incurred $182,374.22 in other out-of-pocket litigation expenses that were necessary and reasonable for representation, including travel for depositions and court appearances, long-distance telephone costs, postage, and expert fees.13 A summary of the expenditures is below.

Plaintiffs' counsel is not seeking separate reimbursement of these amounts, and out-of-pocket litigation expenses and costs will be paid out of the negotiated fees and costs award. Welch Decl.; Petition at 4.

IV. CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs have achieved significant results in this case, having reached a settlement of $1.575 million for the four children and three adult Plaintiffs. To reach a complete settlement of the case, the parties agreed to a negotiated compromise of $500,000 in attorneys' fees and costs, which will not come out of Plaintiffs' recovery. The amount that Plaintiffs' counsel will receive under the settlement agreement is fair and reasonable, and constitutes less than 25 percent of the total settlement. For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court approve the parties' negotiated compromise of attorneys' fees and costs, to be paid as described in the Settlement Agreement and Release.

ORDER.

IT IS SO ORDERED.