STIPULATION TO CONTINUE CHANGE OF PLEA HEARING; FINDINGS AND ORDER

LAWRENCE J. O'NEILL, Chief District Judge.

STIPULATION

COMES NOW, Defendant, Robert Mueller, by and through his attorney of record, Monica L. Bermudez and The United States of America, by and through his counsel of record hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for change of plea on June 3, 2019.

2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the change of plea hearing to June 17, 2019 at 10:15 a.m. before the Honorable Lawrence J. O'Neill, and to exclude time between the date of this stipulation and June 17, 2019 under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(i) and (iv). The government joins in this request.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. Counsel for defendant will be on medical leave for eight weeks beginning June 3, 2019. David Torres has agreed to stand in for counsel to assist in the change of plea. Mr. Torres will be unavailable on June 3, 2019 due to attending a training seminar in New York. Mr. Torres has agreed to appear on the matter on June 17, 2019 to assist with the change of plea.

b. The government does not object to, and agrees with, the requested continuance.

c. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

d. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of the date of this stipulation to June 17, 2019, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(i) and (iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

IT IS SO FOUND. The time period of the date of this order to June 17, 2019, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(i), (ii) and (iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

IT IS SO ORDERED.