MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF REMAND
JACQUELINE CHOOLJIAN, Magistrate Judge.
I. SUMMARY
On December 21, 2015, Bruce M. Smith ("plaintiff") filed a Complaint seeking review of the Commissioner of Social Security's denial of plaintiff's applications for benefits. The parties have consented to proceed before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the Court on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment, respectively ("Plaintiff's Motion") and ("Defendant's Motion"). The Court has taken both motions under submission without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15; December 22, 2015 Case Management Order ¶ 5.
Based on the record as a whole and the applicable law, the decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED AND REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and Order of Remand.
II. BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION
On July 15, 2011, plaintiff filed applications for Supplemental Security Income and Disability Insurance Benefits alleging disability on July 15, 2011, due to arthritis in both knees, diabetes (type II), high blood pressure, obesity, and kidney stones. (Administrative Record ("AR") 20, 128, 136, 162). The ALJ examined the medical record and heard testimony from plaintiff (who was represented by counsel) and a vocational expert on January 7, 2014. (AR 36-64).
On March 14, 2014, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not disabled through the date of the decision. (AR 20-26). Specifically, the ALJ found: (1) plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments: morbid obesity, type II diabetes, and hip and knee pain (AR 22); (2) plaintiff's impairments, considered singly or in combination, did not meet or medically equal a listed impairment (AR 23); (3) plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity to perform medium work (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(c), 416.967(c)), and specifically could lift/carry 25 pounds frequently and 50 pounds occasionally, but was further limited to occasional climbing, kneeling, and crawling (AR 23); (4) plaintiff was able to perform his past relevant work as a warehouse worker and a delivery driver (AR 25); and (5) plaintiff's allegations regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of subjective symptoms were not entirely credible (AR 24).
The Appeals Council denied plaintiff's application for review. (AR 1).
III. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Sequential Evaluation Process
To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must show that the claimant is unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The impairment must render the claimant incapable of performing the work the claimant previously performed and incapable of performing any other substantial gainful employment that exists in the national economy. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A)).
In assessing whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ is required to use the following five-step sequential evaluation process:
(1) Is the claimant presently engaged in substantial gainful activity? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step two.
(2) Is the claimant's alleged impairment sufficiently severe to limit the claimant's ability to work? If not, the claimant is not disabled. If so, proceed to step three.
(3) Does the claimant's impairment, or combination of impairments, meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1? If so, the claimant is disabled. If not, proceed to step four.
(4) Does the claimant possess the residual functional capacity to perform claimant's past relevant work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five.
(5) Does the claimant's residual functional capacity, when considered with the claimant's age, education, and work experience, allow the claimant to adjust to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled.
Stout v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration, 454 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920).
The claimant has the burden of proof at steps one through four, and the Commissioner has the burden of proof at step five. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
B. Standard of Review
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), a court may set aside a denial of benefits only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is based on legal error. Robbins v. Social Security Administration, 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Flaten v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995)).
Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citations and quotations omitted). It is more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance. Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882 (citing Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 183 (9th Cir. 1990)). To determine whether substantial evidence supports a finding, a court must "`consider the record as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the [Commissioner's] conclusion.'" Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1993)). An ALJ's decision to deny benefits must be upheld if the evidence could reasonably support either affirming or reversing the decision. Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882 (citing Flaten, 44 F.3d at 1457). In addition, federal courts may review only the reasoning in the administrative decision itself, and may affirm a denial of benefits only for the reasons upon which the ALJ actually relied. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1010 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
Even when an ALJ's decision contains error, it must be affirmed if the error was harmless. Treichler v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 2014). An ALJ's error is harmless if (1) it was inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination; or (2) despite the error, the ALJ's path may reasonably be discerned, even if the ALJ's decision was drafted with less than ideal clarity. Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). A reviewing court may not conclude that an error was harmless based on independent findings gleaned from the administrative record. Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). Where a reviewing court cannot confidently conclude that an error was harmless, a remand for additional investigation or explanation is generally appropriate. See Marsh v. Colvin, 792 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted).
IV. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinions of Dr. Kristof Siciarz, an examining physician — i.e., that plaintiff essentially could only perform a limited range of light work ("Dr. Siciarz's Opinions"). (Plaintiff's Motion at 5-8; AR 200-05). Assuming (but not deciding) that the ALJ properly rejected Dr. Siciarz's Opinions, as defendant contends (Defendant's Motion at 2-3), the Court finds a limited remand is still warranted since the ALJ's residual functional capacity assessment is not supported by substantial evidence, and the Court cannot find that the ALJ's error was harmless.
Here, the ALJ rejected Dr. Siciarz's Opinions as "unsupported" and also found "the assessment of State agency medical consultant S. DeLosSantos . . . not fully credible . . . ."1 (See AR 25). Since the ALJ rejected what appear to be the only specific medical opinions regarding plaintiff's functional abilities, and the ALJ also found that the record contained "scant medical evidence" (AR 25), it appears that the ALJ's assessment of plaintiff's residual functional capacity was based solely on the ALJ's own, lay interpretation of plaintiff's testimony and the raw data from individual treatment records. (AR 25) ("Giving some weight to [plaintiff's] subjective complaints, in combination with objectively supported diagnoses, the undersigned finds support for a residual functional capacity for medium work with occasional climbing, kneeling and crawling."). As a lay person, however, "an ALJ is `simply not qualified to interpret raw medical data in functional terms.'"2 Padilla v. Astrue, 541 F.Supp.2d 1102, 1106 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (quoting Nguyen v. Chater, 172 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 1999) (per curiam), and citing Day v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975)); see also Manso-Pizarro v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 76 F.3d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1996) ("With a few exceptions . . . an ALJ, as a layperson, is not qualified to interpret raw data in a medical record."); Ferguson v. Schweiker, 765 F.2d 31, 37 (3d Cir. 1985) (ALJ may not substitute his interpretation of laboratory reports for that of a physician); Banks v. Barnhart, 434 F.Supp.2d 800, 805 (C.D. Cal. 2006) ("[ALJ] must not succumb to the temptation to play doctor and make . . . independent medical findings.") (citations and quotation marks omitted). Consequently, the ALJ's residual functional capacity assessment is not supported by substantial evidence. See Penny, 2 F.3d at 958 ("Without a personal medical evaluation it is almost impossible to assess the residual functional capacity of any individual."); Tagger v. Astrue, 536 F.Supp.2d 1170, 1181 (C.D. Cal. 2008) ("ALJ's determination or finding must be supported by medical evidence, particularly the opinion of a treating or an examining physician.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Lopez-Navarro v. Barnhart, 207 F.Supp.2d 870, 882 (E.D. Wis. 2002) ("[ALJ] may not properly find that a claimant has a certain capacity to perform work-related activities without the support of a physician's medical assessment.") (quotation marks and citations omitted); Winters v. Barnhart, 2003 WL 22384784, *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2003) ("The ALJ is not allowed to use his own medical judgment in lieu of that of a medical expert.") (citations omitted); Gonzalez Perez v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 812 F.2d 747, 749 (1st Cir. 1987) (ALJ may not "substitute his own layman's opinion for the findings and opinion of a physician") (citation omitted).
The Court cannot confidently conclude that the ALJ's error was harmless. At the hearing, the ALJ observed, in pertinent part, that if plaintiff was unable to perform work at the medium exertional level (e.g., was limited to a range of "light" work, as Dr. Siciarz opined), a finding of "disabled" would necessarily be directed by the Medical-Vocational Guidelines appearing in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2 (commonly known as "the Grids"). (AR 63). Thus, it is unclear if the failure to rely on a physician's medical assessment of plaintiff's functional abilities was inconsequential to the ALJ's ultimate nondisability determination.
V. CONCLUSION3
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is reversed in part, and this matter is remanded for further administrative action consistent with this Opinion.4
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
