STIPULATION AND [] ORDER CONTINUING THE PRESENTLY-SET STATUS CONFERENCE DATE AND EXCLUDING TIME UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT SAN JOSE VENUE

RONALD M. WHYTE, District Judge.

STIPULATION

The undersigned parties in the above-captioned case request a continuance of the presently-set status conference date of August 18, 2014 to September 15, 2014, for a change of plea hearing. Defense counsel Daniel Cook has informed the government that the defendant will plead guilty to one count of filing a false tax return pursuant to a plea agreement. However, Mr. Cook's tax consultant has been unavailable due to an extended international trip. Therefore, Mr. Cook needs additional time to consult with the expert concerning the tax loss figures contained in the government's proposed plea agreement and to work out the details of the plea agreement with the United States. The parties agree and stipulate that an exclusion of time under the Speedy Trial Act from August 18, 2014 through September 15, 2014 is appropriate based on the defendant's need for effective preparation of counsel. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv). Specifically, Mr. Cook needs additional time to consult with a tax expert concerning the tax loss figures outlined in the plea agreement and present any changes to the government, work out the details of the plea agreement, and coordinate with the United States regarding the sales of properties owned by the defendant that are in the process of being sold to pay of the tax loss on the charged tax counts.

SO STIPULATED:

ORDER

Accordingly, for good cause shown, the Court HEREBY ORDERS that the status hearing scheduled for August 18, 2014 be vacated, and a change of plea hearing scheduled for September 15, 2014.

The Court FURTHER ORDERS under the Speedy Trial Act from August 18, 2014 through September 15, 2014. The Court finds, based on the aforementioned reasons, that the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. The failure to grant the requested continuance would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence, and would result in a miscarriage of justice. The Court therefore concludes that this exclusion of time should be made under 18 U.S.C. §3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv).

SO ORDERED.