JAY C. GANDHI, Magistrate Judge.
Victoria Marsh ("Plaintiff") challenges the Social Security Commissioner's decision denying her application for disability benefits. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") improperly rejected her credibility. (Joint Stip. at 2-9, 14.) The Court addresses — and rejects — Plaintiff's contentions below.
An ALJ can reject a claimant's subjective complaints by expressing clear and convincing reasons for doing so. Benton v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003). "General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant's complaints." Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995).
Here, the ALJ provided at least three valid reasons in support of his credibility determination.
First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's allegations of depression were undermined by the consultative examiner's opinion, which noted no "significant mental health problems." (Administrative Record ("AR") at 14, 409); see Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 856-57 (9th Cir. 2001) (inconsistency with objective evidence, when combined with other factors, can be a valid reason for rejecting a claimant's testimony).
Second, the ALJ observed that Plaintiff pursued a conservative treatment plan, consisting only of "over the counter Ibuprofen pain medication." (AR at 14); see Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 604 (9th Cir. 1989) (conservative treatment can discount the severity of a claimant's symptoms).
Third, the ALJ found that Plaintiff appeared to be motivated by secondary gain because she did not seek treatment "until the day after she was laid off work." (AR at 14); see Hanuscin v. Astrue, 2010 WL 4788033, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2010).
Notably, Plaintiff does not take issue with any of the above determinations. (Joint Stip. at 2-9, 14.) Instead, her claim for relief centers solely around the ALJ's finding that she exaggerated the severity of her fibromyalgia because her physical examination showed, among other things, a "full range of motion of the spine." (AR at 14.) While this conclusion appears to be erroneous,
Accordingly, the Court finds that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's decision that Plaintiff was not disabled. See Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 458-59 (9th Cir. 2001).
Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED THAT judgment shall be entered