NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ROTHSCHILD, J.

These appeals involve two orders under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1), providing for an award of attorney fees and costs to the prevailing defendant after the granting of a special motion to strike.1 We affirm the orders.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Kevin Cammarata, the former owner of several subscription-based adult entertainment websites, filed a complaint alleging that "under pressure from and as a result of the unlawful practices of the [d]efendants . . . [he] sold his business at an unfavorable price." According to Cammarata, Bright Imperial Limited (Bright), the owner of a tube-based adult entertainment website, which unlike a subscription-based website offers content for free and makes money from advertising, allowed customers to view adult entertainment videos on its website below cost for the purpose of injuring his business in violation of Business and Professions Code section 17043; unlawfully used its videos as "loss leaders" in violation of Business and Professions Code section 17044; and engaged in "unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices or acts" in violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200. Cammarata maintained that Generation Financial, Ltd., Bangbros.com, Inc., Fling.com, LLC, Utherverse, Inc., Mansef Productions, Inc., Brazzers Technology, Inc., LALIB Limitada and Stallion.com FSC Limited—advertisers on Bright's website (the advertising defendants)—aided and abetted Bright in accomplishing the tortious conduct.

Bright and the advertising defendants each filed a special motion to strike the complaint as a SLAPP suit (strategic lawsuit against public participation) pursuant to section 425.16. As to Bright's motion, the trial court granted the special motion to strike as to all causes of action except that under Business and Professions Code section 17200 and dismissed the case against Bright in part. As to the motion of the advertising defendants, the court granted the motion in total and dismissed the case against the advertising defendants in its entirety. Cammarata appealed both orders. Bright filed an appeal from the order on its special motion to strike, contending that the trial court should have granted the motion as to all causes of action and dismissed the case in its entirety.

While the appeal was pending, Bright and the advertising defendants filed motions under section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1), providing that "a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney's fees and costs." Bright requested $115,436.85 in attorney fees and $3,801.03 in costs. The advertising defendants requested $81,292.90 in attorney fees.2 The trial court issued an order on Bright's motion for attorney fees and costs, finding "[t]he amount requested is excessive. The court grants the motion in the amount of $35,000." The trial court issued an order granting the advertising defendants' motion for attorney fees in part and stating that "[t]he amount requested i[s] excessive. The court grants $40,000." Cammarata appealed both orders. Bright filed an appeal from the order on its motion for attorney fees and costs, and the advertising defendants filed an appeal from the order on their motion for attorney fees.

While the appeals from the attorney fee orders were pending, on January 26, 2011, as modified on February 24, 2011, we issued our opinion on the appeals from the underlying order on the special motions to strike of Bright and the advertising defendants. As to the advertising defendants, we affirmed the order granting their special motion to strike in its entirety. As to Bright, we affirmed the order granting the special motion to strike as to the causes of action under Business and Professions Code sections 17043 and 17044, but reversed the order insofar as it denied the motion as to the cause of action under Business and Professions Code section 17200 and remanded to the trial court with directions to grant the motion as to that cause of action. (Cammarata v. Bright Imperial Limited (Jan. 26, 2011, as modified on Feb. 24, 2011, B218226) [nonpub. opn.].)

DISCUSSION

1. Appealability of the Order on Bright's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs

As to the appeals from the order on Bright's motion for attorney fees and costs, Bright filed a motion to dismiss Cammarata's appeal and its own cross-appeal on the ground that the order is interlocutory and thus nonappealable because the underlying order on Bright's anti-SLAPP motion left pending the cause of action under Business and Professions Code section 17200 and did not dispose of the entire case against Bright. (See Doe v. Luster (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 139, 145-150 [interlocutory order awarding or denying fees under anti-SLAPP statute not immediately appealable]; but see Baharian-Mehr v. Smith (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 265, 273-275 [although separate fee order should not be heard on interlocutory appeal, appeal could be taken from fee award that is made at the same time and is "part and parcel of the appeal on the anti-SLAPP motion itself"].) In our prior opinion, however, we determined that the trial court should have granted Bright's anti-SLAPP motion as to all causes of action and remanded with directions for the court to grant the anti-SLAPP motion as to the remaining cause of action under Business and Professions Code section 17200. Based on this disposition, we construe the order granting Bright's anti-SLAPP motion as an order granting the motion in full and dismissing the case in its entirety. With that construction, the order granting Bright's motion for attorney fees and costs is an appealable postjudgment order (§ 904.1, subd. (a)(2)), and we treat Cammarata's notice of appeal and Bright's notice of cross-appeal as having been filed from the newly construed order (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(d) [allowing Court of Appeal to treat a notice of appeal as prematurely filed]). Bright's motion to dismiss thus is denied.

2. Cammarata's Appeals from the Orders on the Section 426.16, Subdivision (c)(1), Motions

Cammarata appeals from the orders on the motions by Bright and the advertising defendants under section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1), contending only that, if the underlying orders granting the anti-SLAPP motions are reversed, then the monetary awards to Bright and the advertising defendants should be reversed as well. We, however, affirmed the order granting the anti-SLAPP motion of the advertising defendants, and affirmed the order granting the anti-SLAPP motion of Bright, reversing only to the extent we determined the trial court should have granted the motion in total and dismissed the entire case against Bright. Accordingly, Cammarata's argument for reversal of the orders under section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1), is moot.

3. Bright's and the Advertising Defendants' Appeals from the Orders on the Section 426.16, Subdivision (c)(1), Motions

As noted, section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1), provides that "a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney's fees and costs." Although based on the statutory language an award is mandatory, the Legislature "did not intend recovery of fees and costs as a windfall." (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.) "The defendant may recover fees and costs only for the motion to strike, not the entire litigation." (Id. at p. 1320.) "The prevailing party is entitled to a reasonable award [citation]; consequently, the trial court need not simply award the sum requested. [Citation.] To the contrary, ascertaining the fee amount is left to the trial court's sound discretion. [Citations.] Trial judges are entrusted with this discretionary determination because they are in the best position to assess the value of the professional services rendered in their courts. [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 1321; see also G.R. v. Intelligator (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 606, 620 ["`a defendant who brings a successful special motion to strike is entitled only to reasonable attorney fees, and not necessarily to the entire amount requested'"].)

"We review an anti-SLAPP attorney fee award under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. [Citations.] The trial court's fee determination `"`will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.'"' [Citation.] An attorney fee dispute is not exempt from generally applicable appellate principles: `The judgment of the trial court is presumed correct; all intendments and presumptions are indulged to support the judgment; conflicts in the declarations must be resolved in favor of the prevailing party, and the trial court's resolution of any factual dispute arising from the evidence is conclusive.' [Citation.] [¶] When the trial court substantially reduces a fee or cost request, we infer the court has determined the request was inflated. [Citation.] The trial court is not required to issue a statement of decision. [Citations.]" (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1322-1323.)

Bright and the advertising defendants appeal from their respective monetary awards of $35,000 and $40,000, both contending that the trial court failed to demonstrate its use of the lodestar method in calculating fees and abused its discretion in discounting their requests pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1), because they have not been fully compensated for the amounts they spent defending Cammarata's lawsuit. We disagree.

Initially, the contention that we should reverse their monetary awards because the record does not show that the trial court used the required lodestar method to calculate their attorney fees lacks merit. Although the attorney fee calculation on an anti-SLAPP motion begins with the lodestar figure determined by the number of hours reasonably spent multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate prevailing in the community for similar work (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1321), the trial court was not required to specify its application of the lodestar method, as no statement of decision is necessary on a fee award, and we presume the court applied the proper law. (Id. at p. 1323 [rejecting complaint that "the trial court failed to `acknowledge' the lodestar method" because "[t]here is no requirement . . . that the trial court provide a statement of decision [citation] or otherwise detail its fealty to the law, which we presume"].)

Moreover, no abuse of discretion in the reduction of the fee requests is shown on this record. Although Bright and the advertising defendants are entitled to a fee award as prevailing parties on their respective anti-SLAPP motions, they are not necessarily entitled to the amount of fees they requested. Because the anti-SLAPP motions prepared by Bright and the advertising defendants were similar in nature, and billing entries indicate collaboration on them, some duplication of time is evident. Bright and the advertising defendants point to no discovery conducted in connection with the anti-SLAPP motions that caused them to incur fees for such efforts in addition to preparing and litigating their motions. As a result, the trial court was entitled, based on the expertise of counsel, the subject of the complaint and the anti-SLAPP papers, a review of the billing entries submitted, the value of the time spent by Cammarata's counsel in the anti-SLAPP proceedings and its own experience with civil matters, to determine that the almost $200,000 requested by Bright and the advertising defendants together exceeded the reasonable amounts necessary to compensate Bright and the advertising defendants for prevailing on the special motions to strike. (Maughan v. Google Technology, Inc. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1248-1253 [affirming reduction of $112,288.63 in attorney fees and costs requested to $23,000 based on trial court's reliance on time spent by plaintiffs' counsel on the motion and its "own experience and expertise in handling complex cases"]; Christian Research Institute v. Alnor, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1328-1329 [affirming reduction of requested compensable time from more than 600 hours to 71 hours based on excessive billing].)3

Bright also contends that its monetary award should be reversed because the trial court did not award it any costs as statutorily required. But the order is a ruling on Bright's motion for attorney fees and costs and states "[t]he amount requested is excessive. The court grants the motion in the amount of $35,000." Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume that the $35,000 award represents the amount the trial court found is appropriate to compensate Bright for both its attorney fees and costs.

DISPOSITION

The orders are affirmed. The parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.

We concur:

MALLANO, P. J.

CHANEY, J.