ROTHSCHILD, J.
Plaintiff Peter Bolgar appeals from the summary judgment entered in favor of defendant Glen Donald Apartments, Inc. (Glen Donald). We affirm.
Bolgar owns a one-bedroom unit in Glen Donald Apartments, a 94-unit common interest development in Los Angeles. His suit against Glen Donald and various other defendants was originally dismissed after the superior court sustained defendants' demurrers without leave to amend. Bolgar appealed, and we reversed in part, concluding that Bolgar had adequately alleged a claim that Glen Donald had overcharged him for certain assessments. As we explained, "[u]nless the governing documents provide otherwise, monthly assessments and special assessments must be imposed equally on a per unit basis." (Bolgar v. Harris Properties, Inc. (June 2, 2009, B208257) [nonpub. opn.].) We affirmed the dismissal of the complaint as to all other claims and defendants.
On remand, Glen Donald moved for summary judgment. Glen Donald introduced evidence showing that the common interest development's governing documents provide that certain assessments are calculated in proportion to each unit's share of the total value of the development, while other assessments are imposed equally on a per unit basis. Glen Donald also introduced evidence showing that the assessments imposed on Bolgar were either proportional to his unit's share of the total value of the development or equal to the other units' assessments, in compliance with the governing documents and the law as stated in our prior opinion.
The summary judgment motion was originally heard on June 4, 2010, but the court continued the hearing to July 7, 2010, in order to give Bolgar an opportunity to file a properly sworn declaration in opposition. At the continued hearing on July 7, the court granted the motion. The court entered judgment on July 27, 2010, and Bolgar timely appealed.
We review the trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment de novo. (Buss v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 35, 60.)
A party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of introducing evidence sufficient to make a prima facie showing that there are no disputed issues of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849-851.) If the moving party carries that initial burden, then the burden shifts to the opposing party to introduce evidence sufficient to create a disputed issue of material fact. (Id. at p. 849.)
On appeal, the appellant bears the burden of showing that the trial court erred. (State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Pietak (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 600, 610.) Moreover, "any reference to a matter in the record" must be supported by a proper citation to the record (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C)), and we "need not consider" such matters if no such citation is given (City of Lincoln v. Barringer (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1239 & fn. 16).
Glen Donald carried its initial burden of making a prima facie showing that there are no disputed issues of material fact. Glen Donald introduced evidence showing that the assessments imposed on Bolgar complied with the governing documents and the law as stated in our prior opinion.
Bolgar does not argue that Glen Donald failed to carry its initial burden. Nor does Bolgar cite any evidence in the record that creates disputed issues of material fact. We accordingly must affirm the judgment.
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover its costs of appeal.
MALLANO, P. J. and CHANEY, J., concurs.