NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
OPINION
KING, J.
I. INTRODUCTION
On February 19, 2009, defendant and respondent, the City of San Bernardino (the City) adopted a resolution declaring a local emergency and authorizing the City to furlough its police officers. The furloughs became effective on March 1, 2009, and reduced the officers' hours and pay by 10 percent.
On February 25, before the furloughs were implemented, plaintiffs and appellants, the San Bernardino Police Officers Association (the SBPOA), the collective bargaining unit that represents the officers, and two individuals (petitioners), petitioned the trial court for a writ of mandate setting aside the February 19 resolution and restraining the City from implementing or enforcing the furloughs. Petitioners alleged that the February 19 resolution and threatened furloughs violated the City charter, the memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the SBPOA and the City, and Government Code section 3505.
On March 9, several days after the furloughs were implemented, the City and the SBPOA entered into a "side letter agreement" which, among other things, ended the furloughs and pay reductions effective March 10, and extended the MOU by one additional year, through December 31, 2010. In exchange, the SBPOA agreed to reduce the officers' total compensation by approximately 10 percent through June 30, 2010, principally through reducing or suspending the officers' fringe benefits. The side letter agreement did not address whether the officers were entitled to be reimbursed for the wages they lost during the 10-day period the furloughs were in effect between March 1 and 9. Nor did the side letter agreement state whether it constituted a full and final resolution of all claims by and between the parties concerning the furloughs.
Following the side letter agreement, the petition was not dismissed, amended, or supplemented, and was heard on October 15, 2009. Following the hearing, the trial court issued a statement of decision denying the petition on the ground it was moot. The court reasoned that the petition sought "injunctive relief only," and the parties had "voluntarily resolved" whether the furloughs should be enjoined. The court did not consider whether any future furloughs would be unlawful and should be enjoined, or whether petitioners' back pay claim had merit. At the October 15 hearing, the court also denied petitioners' request for leave to amend (or supplement) their petition to plead their back pay claim.
Petitioners appeal, claiming the petition is not moot because it effectively sought to enjoin any future furloughs and also effectively sought money damages for the back pay claim. Petitioners maintain the February 19 resolution authorizing the furloughs was and still is unlawful; thus, it must be set aside and the City must be enjoined from reinstituting the furloughs after the side letter agreement and MOU expire on December 31, 2010. Petitioners also claim their back pay claim was "ancillary" to their principal claim that the February 19 resolution was unlawful, and the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to consider their back pay claim, or grant them leave to amend or supplement their petition to plead the back pay claim, at the October 15 hearing.
We affirm. We conclude that a decision by this court or the trial court that the February 19 resolution and any future furloughs implemented pursuant to it are or would be unlawful would constitute an inappropriate advisory opinion, because no future furloughs have actually been threatened. We also decline to determine the validity of the February 19 resolution or any future furloughs under the public importance exception to the mootness doctrine. Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider petitioners' back pay claim, or grant petitioners leave to amend or supplement their petition to plead their back pay claim, at the October 15 hearing.
II. ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND
In adopting the February 19 resolution, namely, Resolution No. 2009-36, the common council of the City proclaimed a local emergency and authorized City officials to furlough City employees. Also on February 19, the City passed a motion authorizing the city manager and director of human resources to furlough police personnel beginning March 1, 2009.
On February 25, petitioners filed the present writ petition challenging the lawfulness of the February 19 resolution and the City's threatened furloughs of its police officers. As indicated, the petition alleged that the February 19 resolution and threatened furloughs were unlawful because they violated the City charter, the MOU, and Government Code section 3505. The petition prayed for a writ of mandate setting aside the February 19 resolution and restraining the City from imposing the furloughs or otherwise reducing the terms and conditions of the officers' employment, and for "[s]uch other and further relief that the Court deem[ed] necessary and proper."
On March 1, the City began furloughing its police officers by reducing their hours and pay by 10 percent. On March 2, the trial court denied the SBPOA's ex parte application for a temporary restraining order prohibiting the City from implementing the furloughs. Then, on March 9, the City and the SBPOA entered into the side letter agreement which, among other things, ended the furloughs effective March 10. The City approved the side letter agreement by adopting Resolution No. 2009-48 on March 10.
Pursuant to the side letter agreement, the SBPOA and the City agreed to reduce the officers' total compensation by approximately 10 percent through June 30, 2010, principally by amending several "fringe benefit" provisions of the MOU. Specifically, the SBPOA agreed to suspend the officers' uniform allowances for 2009 and 2010, and reduce by $400 per month, through June 30, 2010, the amount the City contributed toward the officers' health insurance premiums. In addition, the officers were not allowed to sell back any vacation, sick leave, or holiday time through June 30, 2010, but effective July 1, 2010, could sell back up to one-quarter of their annually accrued hours of sick leave and vacation time. Apparently in order to ease the impact of the officers' concessions, effective March 16, 2009, the officers began to accrue four additional hours of paid leave time per work week, with no expiration date or cash value, and on the same date were allowed to begin accumulating or banking an additional 15 percent in vacation time or "vacation credit accruals."
In adopting the March 9 resolution approving the side letter agreement, the City estimated that the officers' concessions would save the City approximately $2,718,400 over 16 months, apparently from March 1, 2009 through June 30, 2010. The City also agreed to "restore the ten percent (10%) employee concession prior to June 30, 2010, if the City receive[d] a Federal or State bailout or other windfall that [could] be applied to the General Fund with no limitations equal to or greater than 75% of the City's total projected deficit for that year." The side letter agreement further stipulated that the MOU, which was to expire on December 31, 2009, would be extended one year through December 31, 2010, and the SBPOA would "have input into the selection of the [City's] new Police Chief."
The petition was not dismissed, amended or supplemented following the side letter agreement, and the City answered it on April 3.
During an April 20 hearing on a motion by the SBPOA to transfer venue, which was denied, the trial court questioned whether it was necessary to proceed with the petition given that the side letter agreement had ended the furloughs. The court said petitioners, "might want to clarify by amending your petition, whatever it is that you haven't been able to work out, that you think the Court should get involved in." In response, counsel for petitioners told the court it was her understanding that the officers were still seeking reimbursement for the wages they were not paid during the time the furloughs were in effect. Counsel said: "Certainly, we can amend the complaint and allege that specifically . . . and then we can proceed that way."
Near the conclusion of the April 20 venue hearing, the court again pointed out that petitioners were "going to have to clarify whatever it is they want," and if they did not do so, "that may negate anything." The court also said, "Right now, it doesn't appear there is much left to do. But if they want to proceed with [the petition], they may need to amend it."
Petitioners did not amend the petition following the April 20 hearing, and in July and August 2009, the parties filed briefs and declarations in support of and in opposition to the petition. At the October 15 hearing on the petition, petitioners urged the court to issue a writ setting aside the February 19 resolution on the ground it was unlawful and had never been repealed, even though the side letter agreement had ended the furloughs.
Following the October 15 hearing, the trial court issued a statement of decision dismissing the petition as moot. The court noted that the petition sought "injunctive relief only," and whether the furloughs should be enjoined was a moot question because the parties had agreed to end the furloughs. The court did not address whether the February 19 resolution was unlawful or whether any future furloughs should be enjoined.
At the October 15 hearing, the court also refused to consider petitioners' back pay claim, and denied them leave to amend their petition to specifically seek reimbursement for the officers' lost wages between March 1 and 9. The court indicated that, several months earlier, it had admonished petitioners to amend their petition to clarify or specifically state the relief they were seeking in the wake of the side letter agreement, but petitioners had not done so.
III. DISCUSSION
Petitioners claim the trial court erroneously determined that all of the relief they sought in their petition was moot in view of the side letter agreement which ended the furloughs effective March 10, 2009. They argue the side letter agreement did not address and therefore did not render moot two additional questions: (1) whether the February 19 resolution was unlawful and the City should be enjoined from reinstating the furloughs after the side letter agreement and MOU expire on December 31, 2010, and (2) whether the officers are entitled to recoup their back pay for the 10-day period the furloughs were in effect between March 1 and 9.
Essentially, petitioners argue the trial court should have (1) ruled that the February 19 resolution and March 2009 furloughs violated the City charter, the MOU, and Government Code section 3505, (2) set aside the February 19 resolution on the ground it was unlawful, and (3) proclaimed that any future furloughs implemented pursuant to the February 19 resolution would also be unlawful.
Petitioners also argue the trial court should have granted them monetary damages on their back pay claim, because that claim was "ancillary" to or an integral part of their principal claim that the February 19 resolution and any furloughs were or would be unlawful. Thus, they argue, they were not required to amend their February 25 petition to specifically plead or pray for money damages on their back pay claim. Alternatively, they argue the trial court abused its discretion in denying them leave to amend their back pay claim at the October 15 hearing.
We find no error or abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.
A. The Trial Court Properly Refused to Grant Any Injunctive Relief on the Petition
"`A case becomes moot when a court ruling can have no practical impact or cannot provide the parties with effective relief.' [Citations.]" (In re Stephon L. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1227, 1231.) In other words, "[a]n issue becomes moot when some event has occurred which `deprive[s] the controversy of its life.' [Citation.]" (Giraldo v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 231, 257.)
Cases or controversies which have been rendered moot are subject to dismissal because courts generally decide only "actual" or justiciable controversies, that is, cases in which effective relief can be granted, and do not normally render advisory opinions. (Ebensteiner Co., Inc. v. Chadmar Group (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1178-1179.) A case may be dismissed as moot, for example, when the underlying claim is settled or compromised. (Id. at p. 1179 & cases cited.)
We review a trial court's determination that a case or controversy is moot for substantial evidence. (Giraldo v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 257.) We uphold a trial court's mootness determination if any substantial evidence supports it (Boccato v. City of Hermosa Beach (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 804, 808-809), and we indulge all reasonable inferences from the evidence in support of the court's determination (In re Marriage of Petropoulos (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 161, 175).
Substantial evidence plainly supports the trial court's determination that the relief sought in the petition—specifically, an injunction restraining the City from enacting or enforcing the March 2009 furloughs—became moot after the City and the SBPOA entered into the side letter agreement on March 9, which ended the furloughs effective March 10. Thus, the furloughs were no longer in effect at the time of the October 15, 2009, hearing, and an injunction prohibiting the City from implementing or enforcing them would not have afforded petitioners any relief they had not already obtained through the side letter agreement.
The trial court also properly refused to entertain petitioners' request to invalidate the February 19 resolution and declare, in advance, that any future furloughs implemented pursuant to the February 19 resolution would be unlawful. This amounted to a request for an advisory opinion, because there was no evidence that the City had threatened to reinstitute the furloughs after the side letter agreement and MOU expired on December 31, 2010. (City of South Pasadena v. Department of Transportation (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1295-1296 ["While plaintiffs need not wait until they suffer actual harm before seeking injunctive relief, there must at least be threatened harm."].) Petitioners' argument that the City may reinstitute the furloughs after the side letter agreement and MOU expire, or did expire, on December 31, 2010, was not sufficient. There must have been a threat of future harm, and there was none.
B. The Public Importance Exception to the Mootness Doctrine Does Not Apply
Petitioners argue that in the event this court upholds the trial court's mootness determination, we should nevertheless determine or remand the matter to the trial court to determine the validity of the February 19 resolution and any future furloughs under the "public importance" exception to the mootness doctrine. Under the public importance exception to the mootness doctrine, "`[i]f an action involves a matter of continuing public interest and the issue is likely to recur, a court may exercise [its] inherent discretion to resolve that issue, even though an event occurring during its pendency would normally render the matter moot.' [Citations.]" (Giraldo v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 259.)
This is not an appropriate case to apply the public importance exception. Whether the February 19 resolution and any future furloughs would violate the City charter, the MOU, or Government Code section 3505 will turn in part on facts and circumstances that have yet to occur. (See Giles v. Horn (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 206, 228 [declining to apply public importance exception when claim turned on facts not likely to recur].) For this reason, the lawfulness of the February 19 resolution and any future furloughs is not an issue this court or the trial court should address on its merits, despite its mootness.
C. The Trial Court Properly Refused to Consider Petitioners' Back Pay Claim
Petitioners argue there was no need for them to amend their petition to specifically plead their back pay claim or seek money damages on the claim, because the claim was "ancillary" to or an integral part of their principal claim that the February 19 resolution and any furloughs implemented pursuant to it were unlawful. Alternatively, petitioners argue the trial court abused its discretion in denying them leave, at the time of the October 15 hearing, to amend their petition to specifically plead their back pay claim. These arguments are unavailing.
At the time of the October 15, 2009, hearing, the trial court reasonably interpreted the February 25 petition as seeking "injunctive relief only" and as not seeking monetary damages for the officers' lost wages between March 1 and 9, 2009. To be sure, the petition was filed on February 25, before the furloughs were implemented on March 1, before the officers incurred any lost wages as a result of furloughs between March 1 and 9, and before the parties entered into the side letter agreement on March 9.
The trial court reasonably interpreted the February 25 petition, not in isolation, but in view of the ensuing March 9 side letter agreement. In view of the side letter agreement, it was clear that petitioners were no longer seeking to enjoin the March 2009 furloughs. It was therefore reasonable to expect petitioners to amend their petition to state exactly what, if any, relief they were seeking and that the parties had not resolved pursuant to the side letter agreement—before the October 15 hearing on the petition.
Indeed, petitioners should have known what relief, if any, they were still seeking on their petition shortly after the side letter agreement was made. Yet, and despite the trial court's April 20 admonition that petitioners needed to amend their petition to clarify what, if any, relief they were still seeking, petitioners offered no excuse for their failure to amend their petition before the October 15 hearing. Instead, petitioners suggested only that their original petition was broad enough to encompass any relief they decided to pursue in connection with the furloughs at the time of the October 15 hearing. The trial court reasonably disagreed, and did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to assert their back pay claim or amend their petition to specifically plead the claim at the time of the October 15 hearing.
"`"[T]he trial court has wide discretion in allowing the amendment of any pleading [citations], [and] as a matter of policy the ruling of the trial court in such matters will be upheld unless a manifest or gross abuse of discretion is shown. [Citations.]"' (. . .; see Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (a)(1).) Courts must apply a policy of great liberality in permitting amendments to the complaint at any stage of the proceedings, up to and including trial, when no prejudice is shown to the adverse party. [Citation.] However, `"even if a good amendment is proposed in proper form, unwarranted delay in presenting it may—of itself—be a valid reason for denial."' [Citation.]" (Huff v. Wilkins (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 732, 746.)
Petitioners knew about the officers' back pay claim on March 10, when the side letter agreement was approved and long before the October 15 hearing on their petition. Had petitioners wished to assert the officers' back pay claim following the side letter agreement, they should have raised it by amending or supplementing their petition, well before the October 15 hearing, to allege it was not relinquished in the side letter agreement.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The City shall recover its costs on appeal.
We concur:
Ramirez, P.J.
Hollenhorst, J.
