STIPULATION AND [] ORDER

D. LOWELL JENSEN, District Court.

WHEREAS, the parties were scheduled for a status hearing before this Court on September 26, 2013;

WHEREAS, defense counsel is continuing to review documents and data in connection with evaluating and analyzing this matter and government is in the process of responding to additional discovery issues raised by the defendant and have discussions regarding a resolution of this matter short of trial;

WHEREAS, in light of the foregoing, counsel for the parties jointly agree and stipulate that a continuance of this matter is appropriate in order to ensure effective preparation of counsel and continuity of counsel, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7), and that based on their respective calendars and the period needed for the aforementioned discovery matters, an appropriate date for a status hearing is Thursday, October 31, 2013;

THEREFORE, the parties mutually and jointly stipulate that the matter be continued until October 31, 2013, and further jointly stipulate and agree that time should be excluded from September 26, 2013, up to and including October 31, 2013. The parties agree that excluding time until October 31, 2013, is necessary, given the need to maintain continuity of counsel. The parties also agree that failing to grant a continuance would deny counsel for the defense the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation and continuity of counsel, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7). Finally, the parties agree that the ends of justice served by excluding time from September 26, 2013, until October 31, 2013, outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. Id. § 3161(h)(7).

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

For good cause shown, the Court enters this order excluding time from September 26, 2013, up to and including October 31, 2013. Specifically, the parties agree, and the Court finds and holds that such that time should be excluded until October 31, 2013, and furthermore that failing to grant a continuance and exclude time until October 31, 2013, would unreasonably deny the defendant effective preparation of counsel and continuity of counsel, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7).

Finally, the parties agree, and the Court finds and holds, that the ends of justice served by excluding time from September 26, 2013, through October 31, 2013, outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. Id. § 3161(h)(7).

IT IS SO ORDERED.