Filed: Feb. 08, 2019
Latest Update: Feb. 08, 2019
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR. , Senior District Judge . IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED by and between the defendants, Kioni Dogan, Gloria Harris, and Lavonda Bailey, by and through their undersigned defense counsel, and the United States of America, by and through its counsel, Christopher Hales, Assistant United States Attorney, that the status conference currently set for February 8, 2019 should be conti
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR. , Senior District Judge . IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED by and between the defendants, Kioni Dogan, Gloria Harris, and Lavonda Bailey, by and through their undersigned defense counsel, and the United States of America, by and through its counsel, Christopher Hales, Assistant United States Attorney, that the status conference currently set for February 8, 2019 should be contin..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER
GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR., Senior District Judge.
IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED by and between the defendants, Kioni Dogan, Gloria Harris, and Lavonda Bailey, by and through their undersigned defense counsel, and the United States of America, by and through its counsel, Christopher Hales, Assistant United States Attorney, that the status conference currently set for February 8, 2019 should be continued until March 29, 2019, and to exclude time between February 8, 2019 and March 29, 2019, under Local Code T4.
The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
1. The government has provided discovery associated with this case, which is voluminous — i.e. approximately 14,000 pages, plus media materials, to defense counsel. Both counsel for Dogan and Harris were substituted in for original counsel and have not been counsel of record the entire time since the filing of the indictment and thus have had more limited time to prepare.
2. Given the volume of discovery, defense counsel for defendants require additional time to review the discovery in this matter, to consult with their respective clients and to conduct any necessary investigation and research related to the charges, to evaluate possible settlement, to continue in settlement negotiations — which are ongoing, and to otherwise prepare for trial.
3. Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
4. The government is unopposed to the requested continuance.
5. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
6. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of February 8, 2019 to March 29, 2019, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv)[Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at counsel's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
7. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
FINDINGS And ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
