Filed: Jun. 07, 2019
Latest Update: Jun. 07, 2019
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER STIPULATION LAWRENCE J. O'NEILL , Chief District Judge . Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for change of plea and sentencing on June 10, 2019. 2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the change of plea and sentencing
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER STIPULATION LAWRENCE J. O'NEILL , Chief District Judge . Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for change of plea and sentencing on June 10, 2019. 2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the change of plea and sentencing ..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER STIPULATION
LAWRENCE J. O'NEILL, Chief District Judge.
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for change of plea and sentencing on June 10, 2019.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the change of plea and sentencing until June 17, 2019, and to exclude time between June 10, 2019, and June 17, 2019, under Local Codes 7 and T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to prepare to sentencing in light of the parties' agreement to combine change of plea and sentencing.
b) The parties' signed plea agreement is with the Court for its consideration.
c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The government does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of June 10, 2019 to June 17, 2019, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(1)(G) and (7)(A), B(iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial and the defendant's need to prepare for sentencing.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
Dated: June 6, 2019 McGREGOR W. SCOTT
United States Attorney
/s/ LAURA D. WITHERS
LAURA D. WITHERS
Assistant United States Attorney
Dated: June 6, 2019 /s/ REED B. GRANTHAM
REED B. GRANTHAM
Counsel for Defendant
SEBASTIAN LOZANO-MENDOZA
FINDINGS AND ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
