PATRICK J. WALSH, Magistrate Judge.
Before the Court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons set forth below, the Petition is denied and the action is dismissed with prejudice.
In 2014, Petitioner pleaded no contest in Santa Barbara County Superior Court to false imprisonment by threat or violence, criminal threats, and two counts of assault with a deadly weapon. (Clerk's Transcript ("CT") 206-13; Reporter's Transcript ("RT") 20-22.) Petitioner also admitted that one of the victims sustained great bodily injuries. (CT 207; RT 21-22.) As part of a negotiated plea agreement, the trial court sentenced him to eight years in prison. (CT 207, 216-17.)
Petitioner appealed to the California Court of Appeal, which affirmed his conviction and sentence.
In June 2016, Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, raising the following claims:
(Petition at 8-9.)
On November 2, 2012, Santa Barbara City police officers went to Petitioner's home to investigate a report of a domestic disturbance. After contacting Petitioner, two women ran out of the home frantically screaming. The women told the officers that Petitioner had hit them with a baseball bat numerous times, smashed their cellphones, and forced them to "masturbate him." They also reported that Petitioner threatened that if they did not comply with his demands that they would be "raped, murdered, [and] buried in the basement." One of the women had noticeable injuries on her face, including a swollen lip and eye. She told officers that Petitioner hit her 50 to 60 times with the bat all over her body.
The standard of review in this case is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
A state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if it applies a rule that contradicts Supreme Court case law or if it reaches a conclusion different from the Supreme Court's in a case that involves facts that are materially indistinguishable. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). To establish that the state court unreasonably applied federal law, a petitioner must show that the state court's application of Supreme Court precedent to the facts of his case was not only incorrect but objectively unreasonable. Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010). Where no decision of the Supreme Court has squarely decided an issue, a state court's adjudication of that issue cannot result in a decision that is contrary to, or involves an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011).
Petitioner raised his claims in his habeas petitions in state court. Neither the state supreme court nor the state appellate court explained its reasons for denying them. The Santa Barbara County Superior Court, however, did. (Petition, Exh. F.) This Court presumes that the state supreme court rejected Petitioner's claims for the same reasons the superior court did. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). The Court, therefore, looks to the superior court's reasoning and will not disturb it unless it concludes that "fairminded jurists" would all agree that the decision was wrong. Richter, 562 U.S. at 102; Johnson v. Williams, 133 S.Ct. 1088, 1094 n.1 (2013) (approving reviewing court's "look through" of state supreme court's silent denial to last reasoned state-court decision); see also Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1148 n.13 (9th Cir. 2005) (applying Ylst look-through doctrine to superior court's denial of habeas petition when California Court of Appeal and California Supreme Court summarily denied subsequent petitions).
In Ground One, Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct a "reasonable pre-trial investigation." (Petition, Attachment A at 21.) He argues that counsel should have hired an investigator and expert witnesses to present evidence regarding Petitioner's "mental and emotional state" after the death of his wife. (Petition, Attachment A at 21.) He also complains that counsel failed to confer with him about raising a self-defense claim and failed to obtain evidence proving that the victims did not suffer great bodily injury. (Petition, Attachment A at 21; Traverse at 4-5.) Petitioner contends that, had counsel done a better job, he would have been able to exact a better plea deal from the prosecutor. (Traverse at 5.)
Where, as here, a defendant pleads nolo contendere, he is foreclosed from raising constitutional claims that arose prior to his plea. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973); Ortberg v. Moody, 961 F.2d 135, 137-38 (9th Cir. 1992); Hudson v. Moran, 760 F.2d 1027, 1029-30 (9th Cir. 1985). This bar applies to ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See United States v. Bohn, 956 F.2d 208, 209 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Moran v. Godinez, 40 F.3d 1567, 1577 (9th Cir. 1994) (refusing to consider the claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge defendant's confession because it was an "assertion of an alleged pre-plea constitutional violation"), amended on other grounds by Moran v. Godinez, 57 F.3d 690 (9th Cir. 1994). For that reason, Petitioner's ineffective assistance claims are denied.
In Ground Two, Petitioner claims that the prosecutor committed a Brady violation by failing to turn over evidence that the victims had "extensive criminal record[s]," had a history of mental and emotional problems, and were under the influence of alcohol and marijuana on the day of the incident.
Even were the Court willing to consider the merits of Petitioner's Brady claim, it would still deny the claim because the Santa Barbara County Superior Court's decision rejecting it was reasonable:
(Petition, Exh. F at 4-5 (internal citations omitted.)
The Court agrees that there was no Brady violation. First, the Supreme Court has never held that Brady requires the disclosure of impeachment evidence prior to a defendant's guilty plea. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002). Second, as the state court noted, much of the alleged impeachment evidence was either known by Petitioner's counsel or publically available for counsel to obtain. See Williams v. Lambert, 340 Fed. Appx. 364, 365 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding no Brady violation where "alleged recanted testimony was known by the defense during the trial court proceedings"); Owens v. Guida, 549 F.3d 399, 418 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting state courts do not unreasonably apply Brady when "the information not disclosed could have been deduced by looking at public records"). Third, the alleged impeachment evidence was not material, as it is not reasonably probable that, had the prosecution disclosed it, Petitioner would have elected to go to trial in the face of compelling evidence establishing his guilt. See Baldwin, 510 F.3d at 1148 (rejecting Brady claim because evidence was not material as it was "not reasonably probable" that timely disclosure "would have influenced [defendant's] decision to plead no contest rather than proceed to trial"). For all these reasons, Petitioner's Brady claim is denied.
In Ground Three, Petitioner claims that he was entitled to additional pre-sentence custody credits under California Penal Code § 4019. (Petition, Attachment A at 32-34.) In general, a claim of state sentencing error is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings. See Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 783 (1990). Though there is an exception to this general rule for claims grounded in alleged due process violations, see Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346 (1980), Petitioner has not established a violation here. At sentencing, Petitioner was awarded 523 actual credits, plus 80 conduct credits, for a total of 603 credits. (See Petition, Exh. D.) He claims that he should have been awarded 1046 conduct credits under California Penal Code § 4019, which provides for four days of credit for every two days spent in pre-sentence custody. Petitioner is mistaken. California Penal Code § 2933.1 limits the amount of credits to 15 percent of pre-sentence custody in cases involving violent felonies, including assault with a deadly weapon causing great bodily injury. See California Penal Code §§ 667.5(c)(8) & 2933.1. In fact, Petitioner's plea agreement specifically provided that he would actually "serve 85% of [his] prison sentence." (CT 207.) Thus, Petitioner has not shown that he is entitled to additional custody credits under California law. More importantly, he makes no credible argument that he has been arbitrarily deprived of a state law entitlement for which he should be granted habeas relief.
Accordingly, this claim is denied.
In Ground Four, Petitioner contends that his eight-year sentence is "disproportionate" to his crimes and violates the Eighth Amendment. (Petition, Attachment A at 35-36.) He argues that the evidence does not support a finding that he caused great bodily injury to a victim in the attack. (Petition, Attachment A at 35-36.) There is no merit to either contention.
Petitioner pleaded guilty and admitted that he caused great bodily injury to one of the victims. (CT 206-07; RT 21-22.) He is, therefore, foreclosed from contesting the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the extent of the injuries that she suffered. See, e.g., Walker v. Lattimore, 2010 WL 4392541, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2010) ("Petitioner pled guilty, and she may not now challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support her convictions."). Petitioner argues that a doctor evaluated the medical reports and concluded that the victim did not suffer great bodily injury. This claim was rejected by the Santa Barbara County Superior Court:
(Petition, Exh. F at 2-3.)
Finally, as a general matter, the Eighth Amendment only prohibits sentences that are disproportionate to the offense. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983). Petitioner has in no way demonstrated that his eight-year sentence was "grossly disproportionate" to his conduct here. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (finding 25-years-to-life sentence for stealing three golf clubs was not cruel and unusual for defendant with multiple priors). Accordingly, his claim that his eight-year sentence violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment is denied.
The Petition is denied and the action is dismissed with prejudice. Further, because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, he is not entitled to a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see also Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). IT IS SO ORDERED.
(Traverse at 5.) Under these circumstances, Petitioner's ineffective assistance claims cannot survive Tollett. See, e.g., Mahoney, 611 F.3d at 992 (rejecting pre-plea ineffective assistance claim for lack of prejudice where petitioner "never denied his guilt . . . or sought to withdraw his plea").
