MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ALICIA G. ROSENBERG, Magistrate Judge.

Gregory Emison filed this action on September 13, 2012. (Dkt. No. 3.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties consented to proceed before the magistrate judge on October 5, and October 12, 2012. (Dkt. Nos. 8-9.) On May 29, 2013, the parties filed a Joint Stipulation ("JS") that addressed the disputed issue. The court has taken the matter under submission without oral argument. Having reviewed the entire file, the court affirms the decision of the Commissioner.

I.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 8, 2011, Emison filed an application for disability insurance benefits, alleging an onset date of September 5, 2010. Administrative Record ("AR") 28. The application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. Id. Emison requested a hearing. On March 26, 2012, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") conducted a hearing at which Emison, a medical expert ("ME"), and a vocational expert ("VE") testified. AR 28, 60-84. On April 4, 2012, the ALJ issued a decision denying benefits. AR 25-37. On June 22, 2012, the Appeals Council denied the request for review. AR 8-12. This action followed.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the Commissioner's decision to deny benefits. The decision will be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial evidence, or if it is based upon the application of improper legal standards. Moncada v. Chater, 60 F.3d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 1995); Drouin v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 1992).

"Substantial evidence" means "more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance — it is such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion." Moncada, 60 F.3d at 523. In determining whether substantial evidence exists to support the Commissioner's decision, the Court examines the administrative record as a whole, considering adverse as well as supporting evidence. Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. When the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the Court must defer to the Commissioner's decision. Moncada, 60 F.3d at 523.

III.

DISCUSSION

A. Disability

A person qualifies as disabled, and thereby eligible for such benefits, "only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 21-22, 124 S.Ct. 376, 157 L. Ed. 2d 333 (2003).

B. The ALJ's Findings

The ALJ found that Emison met the insured status requirements through June 30, 2015. AR 30. He had the following severe impairments: non-Hodgkin's lymphoma (in remission), status post-right shoulder arthroscopic surgery, right shoulder degenerative joint disease, right elbow pain, and bilateral symmetrical sensorineural hearing loss. Id.

Emison had the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform light work1 not involving "sitting, standing and/or walking in excess of 6 hours total per 8 hour workday, lifting/carrying in excess of 10-20 lbs., climbing ladders, performing balancing tasks or working at heights, more than occasional use of his dominant right upper extremity above shoulder level, using his left upper extremity to perform forceful tasks or more than frequent fine and gross manipulative tasks, or performing any work tasks requiring acute hearing or working in noisy environments." AR 32-33. Emison is capable of performing past relevant work as a studio artist. AR 36-37.

C. Credibility

Emison argues that the ALJ improperly discounted his credibility.2

"To determine whether a claimant's testimony regarding subjective pain or symptoms is credible, an ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis." Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2007). At step one, "the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment `which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.'" Id. (quoting Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc)). The ALJ found that Emison's medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged symptoms. AR 34.

"Second, if the claimant meets this first test, and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can reject the claimant's testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so." Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036 (citation and quotation marks omitted). "In making a credibility determination, the ALJ `must specifically identify what testimony is credible and what testimony undermines the claimant's complaints[.]'" Greger v. Barnhart, 464 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). The ALJ made no finding of malingering, but found that Emison's statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of the alleged symptoms were not credible to the extent they were inconsistent with the RFC assessment. AR 34.

In weighing credibility, the ALJ may consider factors including: the nature, location, onset, duration, frequency, radiation, and intensity of any pain; precipitating and aggravating factors (e.g., movement, activity, environmental conditions); type, dosage, effectiveness, and adverse side effects of any pain medication; treatment, other than medication, for relief of pain; functional restrictions; the claimant's daily activities; and "ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation." Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 346 (citing Social Security Ruling 88-13)3 (quotation marks omitted). The ALJ may consider (a) inconsistencies or discrepancies in a claimant's statements; (b) inconsistencies between a claimant's statements and activities; (c) exaggerated complaints; and (d) an unexplained failure to seek treatment. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002).

The ALJ acknowledged that Emison's treatment for non-Hodgkin's lymphoma "may have generally incapacitated [him] from regular work activity for a few months." AR 35. However, the statute defines disability as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment . . . which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The ALJ did not find a disabling condition for the required length of time. The ALJ discounted Emison's credibility for three reasons: (1) the available medical evidence did not support the degree of disability alleged; (2) Emison testified that he ceased working because he was laid off; and (3) there was no indication Emison was unable to perform any activities of daily living. AR 35.

"Although lack of medical evidence cannot form the sole basis for discounting pain testimony, it is a factor that the ALJ can consider in his credibility analysis." Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005).

As the ALJ noted, the medical records indicate Emison was diagnosed with non-Hodgkin's lymphoma in March 2011. AR 31, 1184-85. Emison reported "feeling well without specific complaints except for perceivable and progressing adenopathy"4 and reported feeling "slightly fatigued." AR 1184. Dr. Arzoo found Emison "remarkably asymptomatic." AR 1185. The ALJ found that the medical records indicated Emison was in complete remission within less than a year, August 1, 2011. AR 34, 383-84, 403.

The ALJ noted that, after remission, "the frequency of the claimant's follow-up chemotherapy treatment is lessened and, by extension, his episodes of post-treatment fatigue and stomach upset." AR 34. The ALJ noted that these post-chemotherapy effects were not a chronic condition. Id. The medical records indicate that, after diagnosis, Emison underwent four monthly cycles of chemotherapy in April, May, June and July 2011. In September 2011, Emison began treatment with a different provider.5 AR 1098. Emison was to undergo the fifth and sixth monthly cycles of chemotherapy, followed by maintenance Rituxan once every two months for 24 months. AR 1097-98. Emison completed the fifth cycle on November 1, which he tolerated well without nausea,6 and the sixth cycle on December 1. AR 1069, 1079, 1089. On December 7 and 10, Emison was treated for nausea or vomiting. AR 1066, 1072, 1076. On December 16, Emison was diagnosed with acute bronchitis and presented with cough, sore throat, sinus congestion, nausea and loose stool. AR 1061, 1065. Emison began maintenance Rituxan treatment on January 25, 2012. He went home "in good condition." AR 781. The medical record indicates his next Rituxan dose was set for March 21, 2012. Id. At the hearing on March 26, 2012, Emison testified that he had gone to the ER the day before for nausea and weakness. AR 75. The ALJ observed that Emison was able to answer all questions alertly and appropriately.7 AR 35. This court cannot say that the ALJ's assessment of the medical record is unsupported by substantial evidence. When the records are susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, a court must defer to the Commissioner's decision. Moncada, 60 F.3d at 523.

The ALJ rejected the representative's argument that Emison would be likely to miss more than two days per month due to treatment-related side effects. As discussed above, Emison was in complete remission less than one year after diagnosis and was undergoing maintenance Rituxan once every two months (January and March 2012 as of the date of the hearing). The ALJ reasonably inferred from the medical records that the side effects were not chronic and would occur, if at all, only after treatment. The ALJ noted Emison's testimony that he could be fine after the treatment for a couple of days and then feel effects. AR 34, 75.

The ALJ noted Emison's testimony that he ceased working, not because of disabling symptoms, but because he was laid off in September 2010 prior to be being diagnosed or treated for non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.8 AR 34, 76.

The ALJ found no indication Emison was unable to perform daily activities and household chores, and Emison has not cited any contrary evidence. AR 35.

The ALJ's credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence, and this court "may not engage in second-guessing." Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959 (citing Morgan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999)).

IV.

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is affirmed.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk serve copies of this Order and the Judgment herein on all parties or their counsel.