MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER AFFIRMING COMMISSIONER

JEAN ROSENBLUTH, Magistrate Judge.

I. PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff seeks review of the Commissioner's final decision denying her application for supplemental security income ("SSI"). The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned U.S. Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). The matter is before the Court on the parties' Joint Stipulation, filed June 5, 2015, which the Court has taken under submission without oral argument. For the reasons stated below, the Commissioner's decision is affirmed and judgment is entered in her favor.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born in 1982. (Administrative Record ("AR") 218.) She completed at least the eighth grade and worked as a landscape laborer and security guard.1 (AR 39, 85-87.)

On June 9, 2008, Plaintiff filed an application for SSI. (AR 95-96, 101, 218.) She alleged that she had been unable to work since June 3, 2008, because of "[s]chizophrenia and bipolar." (AR 218, 257.) After her application was denied, she requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge. (AR 139.) A hearing was held on September 21, 2010, at which Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, testified, as did a vocational expert ("VE"). (AR 30-62.) In a written decision issued October 6, 2010, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was disabled by her depression from June 9, 2008, through October 15, 2009, but that on October 16, medical improvement occurred and she became able to work. (AR 101-09.)

On February 24, 2012, the Appeals Council granted Plaintiff's request for review. (AR 115-22.) After noting that it "may consider the entire decision if the claimant file[s] an appeal, including the part with which the claimant agree[s]," the council determined that the ALJ had erred by failing to make sufficient findings to support her conclusion that Plaintiff had been disabled from June 2008 to October 2009, among others things. (AR 115-16.) The council therefore vacated the hearing decision and remanded to the ALJ to take certain enumerated actions. (AR 115-17.)

On October 16, 2012, a second hearing was held before a different ALJ; Plaintiff, who was still represented by counsel, testified, as did a VE. (AR 63-91.) On February 1, 2013, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not been disabled at any time since June 9, 2008. (AR 10-24.) On June 27, 2014, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. (AR 1-3.) This action followed.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the Commissioner's decision to deny benefits. The ALJ's findings and decision should be upheld if they are free of legal error and supported by substantial evidence based on the record as a whole. See id.; Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence means such evidence as a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401; Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007). It is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance. Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1035 (citing Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006)). To determine whether substantial evidence supports a finding, the reviewing court "must review the administrative record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion." Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1996). "If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing," the reviewing court "may not substitute its judgment" for that of the Commissioner. Id. at 720-21.

IV. THE EVALUATION OF DISABILITY

People are "disabled" for purposes of receiving Social Security benefits if they are unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity owing to a physical or mental impairment that is expected to result in death or which has lasted, or is expected to last, for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); Drouin v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 1992).

A. The Five-Step Evaluation Process

An ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation process to assess whether someone is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995) (as amended Apr. 9, 1996). In the first step, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; if so, the claimant is not disabled and the claim must be denied. § 416.920(a)(4)(i). If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the second step requires the Commissioner to determine whether the claimant has a "severe" impairment or combination of impairments significantly limiting her ability to do basic work activities; if not, a finding of not disabled is made and the claim must be denied. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant has a "severe" impairment or combination of impairments, the third step requires the Commissioner to determine whether it meets or equals an impairment in the Listing of Impairments ("Listing") set forth at 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix 1; if so, disability is conclusively presumed and benefits are awarded. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii).

If the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments does not meet or equal one in the Listing, the fourth step requires the Commissioner to determine whether the claimant has sufficient residual functional capacity ("RFC")2 to perform her past work; if so, she is not disabled and the claim must be denied. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). The claimant has the burden of proving she is unable to perform past relevant work. Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. If the claimant meets that burden, a prima facie case of disability is established. Id. If that happens or if the claimant has no past relevant work, the Commissioner then bears the burden of establishing that the claimant is not disabled because she can perform other substantial gainful work available in the national economy. § 416.920(a)(4)(v). That determination comprises the fifth and final step in the sequential analysis. § 416.920; Lester, 81 F.3d at 828 n.5; Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257.

B. The ALJ's Application of the Five-Step Process

At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her application date. (AR 12.) At step two, she concluded that Plaintiff had severe impairments of depressive disorder and "history of polysubstance abuse." (AR 13.) She found that Plaintiff's asthma had "no more than a minimal effect on her ability to work" and was therefore not severe (id.), a finding Plaintiff does not challenge (see generally J. Stip.). At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff's impairments did not meet or equal a listing. (Id.)

At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform a "full range of work at all exertional levels" but with the following nonexertional limitations:

(AR 14.) Based on the VE's testimony, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work as a landscape laborer. (AR 23.) The ALJ therefore found Plaintiff not disabled. (AR 23-24.)

V. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in failing to (1) fully and fairly develop the record "in compliance with the Appeals Council remand order" and (2) elicit from the VE an explanation for her conclusion that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work as a landscape laborer, which was allegedly inconsistent with the DOT. (J. Stip. at 3.)

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to "fully and fairly develop the record" because the "Appeals Council remand order indicated that the ALJ was to obtain evidence from a medical expert,3 if available, to clarify the nature and severity of [Plaintiff's] impairments," but "there is no evidence that a medical expert was obtained to testify." (Id.) She argues that her file contains a "large amount of mental health medical records that would benefit from a medical expert reviewing and assisting in determining the nature and severity" of her impairments and that "[i]t would not have been that difficult for the ALJ to request a medical expert." (Id. at 4.)

1. Relevant facts

In its February 2012 remand order, the Appeals Council vacated the October 2010 hearing decision and remanded to the ALJ to (1) "[c]larify the period at issue beginning with the claimant's alleged onset date and address whether the final determinations of any prior applications are subject to reopening under the regulations, or an extension of the deadline for filing an appeal"; (2) "[u]pdate the evidence of record and, if warranted and available, obtain additional evidence concerning the claimant's impairments," which "may include a consultative mental status examination with psychological testing and medical source statements about what the claimant can still do despite the impairments"; (3) "[o]btain evidence from a medical expert, if available, to clarify the nature and severity of the claimant's impairments"; (4) if necessary, "conduct the further proceedings required to determine whether drug addiction is a contributing factor material to the finding of disability"; (5) "[f]urther evaluate the claimant's mental impairments in accordance with the special technique described in 20 CFR 416.920a"; (6) "[g]ive further consideration to the claimant's maximum residual functional capacity during the entire period at issue and provide rationale with specific references to evidence of record in support of the assessed limitations"; (7) "[e]valuate the claimant's subjective complaints and third party statements and provide rationale in accordance with the disability regulations pertaining to the evaluation of symptoms"; and (8) "obtain evidence from a vocational expert to clarify the effect of the assessed limitations on the claimant's occupational base" if such testimony was "warranted by the expanded record." (AR 116-17.)

On remand, a different ALJ obtained updated medical records (AR 890-941) and, in October 2012, conducted a second hearing (AR 63-91). Plaintiff and a VE, but not a medical expert, testified at the hearing. (Id.) After the hearing, the ALJ solicited a psychological evaluation, which was conducted by psychologist Margaret Donohue, Ph.D., on November 24, 2012. (AR 942-50.) On December 19, 2012, the ALJ provided Plaintiff a copy of the psychological report and advised her that she may "submit any or all of the following: written comments concerning the enclosed evidence, a written statement as to the facts and law you believe apply to the case in light of that evidence, . . . any additional records you wish me to consider (including a report from the treating physician)," or "written questions to be sent to" Dr. Donohue. (AR 215.) The ALJ further advised Plaintiff that she could "request a supplemental hearing at which you would have the opportunity to appear, testify, produce witnesses, and submit additional evidence and written or oral statements concerning the facts and law." (Id.) The ALJ stated that she would grant any request for a supplemental hearing "unless [she] receive[s] additional records that support a fully favorable decision." (Id.) She advised Plaintiff that if she did not "receive a response from you within 10 days of the date you receive this notice," she would "assume that you do not wish to submit any written statements or records and that you do not wish to request a supplemental hearing or to orally question" Dr. Donohue. (AR 216.)

Plaintiff did not respond to the letter (AR 10), and on February 1, 2013, the ALJ issued her unfavorable decision (AR 10-24). On June 27, 2014, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review.4 (AR 1-3.)

2. Discussion

Plaintiff argues that reversal is warranted because the ALJ failed to comply with the portion of the Appeals Council's order directing her to "[o]btain evidence from a medical expert, if available, to clarify the nature and severity of [Plaintiff's] impairments." (AR 116; see J. Stip. at 3-5.) Plaintiff's argument fails for several reasons.

As an initial matter, the Court likely lacks jurisdiction to reverse the ALJ's decision based on her failure to comply with an Appeals Council remand order. In an analogous unpublished decision, Tyler v. Astrue, 305 F. App'x 331 (9th Cir. 2008), the Ninth Circuit found that the district court "properly declined to evaluate whether the ALJ's second decision satisfied the demands of the Appeals Council's remand" because

Id. at 332. Here, the Appeals Council found "no reason under our rules" to review the second ALJ's decision, which made it "the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security in [Plaintiff's] case." (AR 1.) Under the reasoning set forth in Tyler and several subsequent district-court opinions, this Court's review is therefore limited to assessing whether substantial evidence supports the second ALJ decision, not whether the ALJ complied with the previous remand order. See Conlee v. Colvin, 31 F.Supp.3d 1165, 1175 (E.D. Wash. 2014) (finding that "[t]here is authority in this Circuit, including [Tyler], to the effect that the Appeals Council's denial of a second request for review deprives the District Court of jurisdiction to review any failure by the ALJ to follow a prior Remand Order" and collecting cases); see also Boyd v. Astrue, No. ED CV 11-493-PJW, 2012 WL 4495627, at *1-2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2012) (finding based in part on Tyler that "the issue of whether the ALJ followed the Appeals Council's remand order is not properly before the Court"); Million v. Astrue, No. EDCV 09-1435 AGR, 2011 WL 1156631, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2011) (declining to evaluate whether ALJ complied with Appeals Council's remand order because under Tyler and other authority, "[f]ederal courts have jurisdiction to review only the final decision of the Commissioner").

But even assuming, as some authority suggests, that the Court does have jurisdiction to assess whether the ALJ complied with the Appeals Council's remand order, reversal on this basis is not warranted. See §§ 416.1477(b), 404.977(b) ("The administrative law judge shall take any action that is ordered by the Appeals Council and may take any additional action that is not inconsistent with the Appeals Council's remand order."); Widman v. Astrue, 302 F. App'x 744, 746 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that ALJ "properly complied with an Appeals Council remand order," thereby "discharging [his] duty to `take any action that is ordered by the Appeals Council'" (quoting § 404.977(b)); Pavlich v. Colvin, No. CV 13-01829-MAN, 2014 WL 4449897, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2014) (noting that "an ALJ who either fails to take an action ordered by the Appeals Council or takes an action that is `inconsistent with' the Appeals Council's remand order commits legal error" (quoting § 404.977(b))). First, it is not clear whether the ALJ failed to abide by the remand order: the council directed the ALJ to obtain testimony from a medical expert only if one was "available" (AR 116), and nothing indicates that such an expert was available during the proceedings in this case.5

Second, even accepting Plaintiff's argument that the ALJ improperly ignored the Appeals Council's directive to obtain medical-expert testimony (J. Stip. at 3-5), reversal is not warranted because substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. See Stout v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006) (nonprejudicial or irrelevant mistakes are harmless); Facen v. Colvin, No. C 12-4648 LB, 2013 WL 4516121, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2013) ("an ALJ's `failure to adhere strictly' to an Appeals Council's remand order can constitute a harmless error when substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision" (citation omitted)); Robinson v. Astrue, No. EDCV 12-00685 AJW, 2013 WL 396174, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2013) ("Irrespective of whether the ALJ complied with the Appeals Council's remand order, the issue before the Court in this action for judicial review is whether the ALJ's decision is based on substantial evidence and is free of legal error."); cf. Strauss v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 635 F.3d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that district court abused its discretion by remanding for payment of benefits based on ALJ's failure to comply with court's and Appeals Council's remand orders because "the court may not move from that conclusion directly to an order requiring the payment of benefits without the intermediate step of analyzing whether, in fact, the claimant is disabled").

As an initial matter, Plaintiff fails to point to anything allegedly erroneous about the ALJ's evaluation of the nature and severity of her impairments. Indeed, the ALJ fully assessed the medical evidence (AR 16-23) and accorded "significant weight" to the opinions of state-agency medical consultants B. Smith and R. Paxton, who both specialized in psychiatry (AR 399-14, 519-20);6 "some weight" to the opinion of examining psychiatrist Romualdo R. Rodriguez (AR 391-97); "less weight" to the opinion of examining psychologist Donohue (AR 942-50); and "little weight" to the opinion of treating psychiatrist Aryanpur (AR 487).7 (See AR 22-23); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) ("The opinions of non-treating or non-examining physicians may also serve as substantial evidence when the opinions are consistent with independent clinical findings or other evidence in the record."). The ALJ reasonably found that Plaintiff's psychological condition improved with medication (AR 17, 20)8 but that she "frequently failed to attend her therapy sessions" or take her medication (AR 16).9 The ALJ further noted that Plaintiff engaged in "numerous activities of daily living" (AR 23; see also AR 15); and indeed, Plaintiff stated that she went grocery shopping with friends (AR 75); cleaned the yard (AR 283); prepared simple meals (AR 75, 283); helped her mother with housework, including mopping, sweeping, and vacuuming (AR 51, 78); sometimes did laundry (id.); drew pictures for more than an hour at a time (AR 52, 77-78); rode her bike for an hour or two at a time (AR 53, 76-77); helped care for her three-year-old nephew (AR 53-54); used the internet on her phone (AR 77); went to the movies with friends (AR 78); watched five or six hours of television a day (id.); and attended church and Alcoholics Anonymous meetings (AR 78-79). The ALJ also noted that by January 2010, Plaintiff's psychiatrist had recommended that she apply for jobs and undergo vocational rehabilitation. (AR 16; see AR 761 (Jan. 2010, doctor noting that he "encouraged" Plaintiff to "look[] for jobs" and connect with vocational rehabilitation); see also AR 759 (Mar. 2010, doctor noting that Plaintiff was "not looking for jobs because she is awaiting Court hearing on her 3rd SSI denial"), 751 (June 2010, doctor noting that Plaintiff had "no incentive to work or connect [with] voc rehab").)10 Plaintiff does not argue that the ALJ's assessment of the evidence was in any way erroneous (see J. Stip. at 3-5), nor does she respond to the Commissioner's argument that the ALJ's failure to solicit evidence from a medical expert was harmless (id. at 9 (Commissioner's argument), 10 (Plaintiff stating in reply only that she "reiterates her initial contentions").) Because the ALJ fully discussed and assessed the evidence, which supported her nondisability finding, any error in failing to solicit a medical-expert opinion was harmless.

Plaintiff also argues that in failing to "obtain a medical expert," the ALJ "failed to assure that Plaintiff's interests were fully and fairly considered and that the record was fully and fairly developed." (Id. at 5.) It is true that an ALJ has a "duty to fully and fairly develop the record and to assure that the claimant's interests are considered." Garcia v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 768 F.3d 925, 930 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted); see also Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 2003) ("In making a determination of disability, the ALJ must develop the record and interpret the medical evidence."). But it nonetheless remains Plaintiff's burden to produce evidence in support of her disability claims. See Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459 (9th Cir. 2001) (as amended). Moreover, the "ALJ's duty to develop the record further is triggered only when there is ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence." McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 2010) (as amended May 19, 2011) (citation omitted); accord Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001).

Here, Plaintiff does not point to any particular ambiguity in the record that a medical expert would have clarified; instead, she asserts that the case "consists of a large amount of mental health records that would benefit from a medical expert reviewing and assisting in determining the nature and severity of [her] impairments." (J. Stip. at 3-4.) Such a general assertion fails to show that the evidence was ambiguous or the record inadequate. That is particularly true given that on remand, the ALJ obtained additional treatment records (AR 890-941), held a second hearing (AR 63-91), and solicited a psychological evaluation (AR 942-50). Moreover, Plaintiff was given an opportunity to submit additional evidence or request a supplemental hearing — which the ALJ said she would grant unless she "receive[d] additional records that support a fully favorable decision" — but Plaintiff did not elect to do so. (AR 10, 215-16); cf. Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1150 (ALJ may discharge duty to develop "in several ways, including . . . continuing the hearing[] or keeping the record open after the hearing to allow supplementation of the record"). Indeed, Plaintiff apparently never argued, to the ALJ or the Appeals Council, that medical-expert testimony was necessary for proper consideration of her case. Cf. Solorzano v. Astrue, No. ED CV 11-369-PJW, 2012 WL 84527, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2012) ("Counsel are not supposed to be potted plants at administrative hearings . . . [t]hey have an obligation to take an active role and to raise issues that may impact the ALJ's decision while the hearing is proceeding so that they can be addressed"). As such, the ALJ did not violate her duty to develop the record.

Remand is not warranted on this ground.

B. Plaintiff's Ability to Perform Landscape-Laborer Job

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in determining that she could perform her past relevant work as a landscape laborer "because this job requires demands that are in excess of the Plaintiff's RFC," which precluded her from "concentrated exposure to pulmonary irritants such as dust, fumes, gasses, and odors." (J. Stip. at 13.)

1. Applicable law

At step four of the five-step disability analysis, a claimant has the burden of proving that she cannot return to her past relevant work, either as actually or generally performed in the national economy. Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 844 (9th Cir. 2001); § 416.920(f). Although the burden of proof lies with the claimant at step four, the ALJ still has a duty to make factual findings to support her conclusion. Pinto, 249 F.3d at 844. The ALJ can meet this burden by comparing the physical and mental demands of the past relevant work with the claimant's actual RFC. Id. at 844-45.

To ascertain the requirements of occupations as generally performed in the national economy, the ALJ may rely on VE testimony or information from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT"), including its "companion publication," the Selected Characteristics of Occupations Defined in the Revised Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("SCO"). Id. at 845-46; SSR 00-4P, 2000 WL 1898704, at *2 (Dec. 4, 2000) (at steps four and five, SSA relies "primarily on the DOT (including its companion publication, the SCO) for information about the requirements of work in the national economy" and "may also use VEs . . . at these steps to resolve complex vocational issues"); SSR 82-61, 1982 WL 31387, at *2 (Jan. 1, 1982) ("The [DOT] descriptions can be relied upon — for jobs that are listed in the DOT — to define the job as it is usually performed in the national economy." (emphasis in original)).

When a VE provides evidence about the requirements of a job, the ALJ has a responsibility to ask about "any possible conflict" between that evidence and the DOT. See SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at *4; Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1152-54 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that application of SSR 00-4p is mandatory). When such a conflict exists, the ALJ may accept VE testimony that contradicts the DOT only if the record contains "persuasive evidence to support the deviation." Pinto, 249 F.3d at 846 (citing Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1435 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1042 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding error when "ALJ did not identify what aspect of the VE's experience warranted deviation from the DOT"). "A VE's recognized expertise provides the necessary foundation for his or her testimony," and "no additional foundation is required." Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005).

2. Relevant background

At the October 2012 hearing, the VE testified that

Plaintiff's past relevant work was properly classified as "landscape laborer," DOT 408.687-014, which was "medium" work.11 (AR 88-89.) The ALJ asked the VE whether a hypothetical individual with Plaintiff's RFC, including the requirement that she "avoid concentrated exposure to pulmonary irritants such as dust, fumes, gases and odors," would be able to perform the landscape-laborer job. (AR 89-90.) The VE answered, "Yes." (AR 90.) Plaintiff's counsel declined to question the VE regarding her testimony. (AR 91.)

In her February 2013 decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the severe impairments of major depressive disorder and history of polysubstance abuse. (AR 13.) She found that Plaintiff's "medically determinable impairment of asthma causes only a slight abnormality that would have no more than a minimal effect on her ability to work" (id.), noting that she "continued smoking cigarettes and marijuana, despite her asthma," and that her condition was controlled with medication (AR 13, 16). The ALJ nevertheless included in Plaintiff's RFC a preclusion from "concentrated exposure to pulmonary irritants such as dust, fumes, gasses, and odors." (AR 13, 14.) The ALJ noted that the VE testified that a person with Plaintiff's RFC could perform the landscape-laborer job, found that the VE's testimony was "consistent with the DOT," and concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled. (AR 23-24.)

3. Discussion

The DOT defines the landscape-laborer job as follows:

DOT 408.687-014, 1991 WL 673364.

Plaintiff argues that she is "unable to meet the work requirements" of the landscape-laborer job because she is precluded from "concentrated exposure to pulmonary irritants such as dust, fumes, gasses, and odors." (J. Stip. at 10-11.) Specifically, she argues that the landscape-laborer job

(Id. at 12.) Plaintiff argues that the VE's testimony that she could perform the job therefore conflicted with the DOT's job description, and because "[n]either the ALJ nor the VE articulated reasons for deviating from the DOT," reversal is warranted. (Id. at 12-13.)

Plaintiff's argument fails because the DOT's description of the landscape-laborer job does not reflect any limitations that are inconsistent with her RFC. As an initial matter, it is unlikely that the minor exposure to normal air pollution, dust, pollen, or fumes described by Plaintiff would constitute "concentrated" exposure to pulmonary irritants, or that it would in fact exacerbate her asthma, which the ALJ found was "nonsevere" (AR 13) — a finding Plaintiff has not challenged. Indeed, Plaintiff never testified that she had any pulmonary or other physical problems while performing her past relevant work as a landscape laborer. (Compare AR 38 (Plaintiff's testimony that she had allergies when working briefly at warehouse) with AR 38-39 (Plaintiff's testimony that she performed landscape-laborer job "okay").) In any event, however, the DOT explicitly states that "atmospheric conditions" are "[n]ot [p]resent" in the landscape-laborer job, DOT 408.687-014, 1991 WL 673364, and the DOT's companion publication, the SCO, defines "atmospheric conditions" as "[e]xposure to such conditions as fumes, noxious odors, dusts, mists, gases, and poor ventilation, that affect the respiratory system, eyes, or the skin." U.S. Dep't of Labor, Emp't & Training Admin., Selected Characteristics of Occupations Defined in the Revised Dictionary of Occupational Titles, app. D (1993). As such, the VE's testimony that Plaintiff could perform the landscape-laborer job was in fact consistent with the DOT.12 See Massachi, 486 F.3d at 1154 n.20 (noting that ALJ's "procedural error" in failing to ask VE whether testimony conflicted with DOT was harmless when no conflict existed). Reversal is not warranted on this ground.

VI. CONCLUSION

Consistent with the foregoing, and under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g),13 IT IS ORDERED that judgment be entered AFFIRMING the decision of the Commissioner and dismissing this action with prejudice. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk serve copies of this Order and the Judgment on counsel for both parties.