EDWARD M. CHEN, District Judge.
Plaintiff Anthony J. Silveria, proceeding pro se, initiated this case in E.D. Cal. in February 2018. He asserted claims of employment discrimination and whistleblower retaliation against the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Veteran. The case was ultimately transferred to the Northern District because the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred in VA's Oakland office. Defendant has successfully moved for a dismissal twice—against the first and second amended complaints. See Docket Nos. 18 and 43. Mr. Silveria subsequently filed his third amended complaint (Docket No. 80, "TAC"), and now Defendant moves to dismiss again, but with prejudice. Docket No. 84 ("Mot."). This Court vacated the January 16, 2020 hearing and decided the motion on the papers pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b).
Based on the foregoing, the Court
Mr. Silveria filed the present lawsuit on February 23, 2018. Docket No. 1. This case was transferred to this Court on December 4, 2018, following Defendant's motion to dismiss for improper venue. Docket Nos. 25, 26. Then, in dismissing Mr. Silveria's FAC, this Court encouraged Mr. Silveria to contact the Pro Se Help Desk and instructed him to group his factual allegations by each specific claim of each alleged unlawful act. Docket No. 59. In his second amended complaint, Mr. Silveria pled five claims for relief:
This Court ruled against the SAC on the merits. See Docket No. 79 ("Dismissing Order"). Claim (1) was dismissed with leave to amend, if Mr. Silveria could plead that he timely requested reconsideration. Claims (2) and (4) were dismissed with leave to amend to plead each element of the Rehabilitation Act claim and to plead the Whistleblower Protection Act claim as a mixed claim for purposes of exhaustion. Claim (5) was dismissed with leave to amend, following Mr. Silveria's receipt of his right-to-sue letter from the EEOC on July 19, 2019.
Mr. Silveria's TAC now contains seven
Initially, Mr. Silveria did not file an opposition to the pending motion to dismiss. This Court then issued an order to show cause as to why his case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute and to file a substantive response to Defendant's motion. Docket No. 98. In Mr. Silveria's response to the Court's OSC, he took the position that "[t]he defendant's motion to dismiss . . . does not provide any new arguments that weren't already adjudicated . . . ." Docket No. 99 ("OSC Resp.") at 18. As such, Mr. Silveria does not substantively respond to this motion on the merits; instead, he maintains that an opposition was not required because this Court ruled on these identical arguments.
Mr. Silveria served in the U.S. Marine Corps from 1989 to 1999. TAC ¶ 46. Thereafter, he worked as a federal employee with the U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs ("VA") from September 2009 until his removal in June 2014 where he most recently served as a Rating Veterans Service Representative ("RVSR"). Id. ¶ 111-12. Mr. Silveria claims to suffer from many disabilities: traumatic brain injury ("TBI"); concussions with Tinnitus migraines; anxiety; post-traumatic headaches from TBI; neck sprain; cervical injury; thoracolumbar spine strain with degenerative arthritis; right shoulder slap tear surgical repair; left shoulder a/c joint arthritis and supraspinatus tear; bilateral knee strain with Osgood Slaughters disease; b/l hearing loss and tinnitus from TBI and MP/K-9 duties; sinusitis and allergic rhinitis; psoriasis; psoriatic arthritis; GERD; duodental/gastric ulcer with hemorrhage; right elbow strain; right hand fracture of fifth metacarpal; right wrist sprain; migraine headaches; tension headaches; sinus headaches; asthma; right ankle sprain; left ankle ligament tear with surgical repair; cuboid fracture with surgical repair; anxiety disorder; depression; and right retinal hemorrhage. TAC ¶¶ 82-107. These alleged disabilities affect major life activities: (1) cannot stand for longer than fifteen minutes without the need to sit and elevate his leg for pain relief; (2) experiences tingling in his fingers from past surgery; and (3) has difficulty lifting anything over ten pounds. Id. ¶ 116. Despite receiving positive performance evaluations prior to 2012, he began experiencing discrimination, harassment, and retaliation because of his "protected disclosures to the OSC, EEOC, FLRA, Congress, and the VA OIG." Id. ¶ 152. His factual allegations can be summarized as follows—he was:
In the Dismissing Order, this Court laid out the procedural background preceding Mr. Silveria's complaint in federal court. It is reproduced herein with only one addition, which came before the Court for the first time in the last hearing: on July 19, 2019, Mr. Silveria received a right-to-sue letter pertaining to this non-mixed case from the EEOC.
Two formal EEO complaints are the predicate to the claims before this Court. Below is a timeline of Mr. Silveria's claims and his appeals thereafter.
As stated in the Dismissing Order, the 2013 EEO Claim is only exhausted if Mr. Silveria can properly plead that he timely requested reconsideration because, at the time of the last hearing, the Court only had a one-page e-mail indicating he sought reconsideration. The Court did not have any additional details regarding the extent the request for reconsideration was received, processed, and/or decided. The 2014 EEO Claim was responsible for three claims before this Court, as mentioned above: (1) hostile work environment and five discrete acts based on disability and reprisal by events occurring between July 2013 and July 2014; (2) the denial of Mr. Silveria's within-grade increase; and (3) a mixed-case claim based on his removal on June 29, 2014. Mr. Silveria's claim regarding denial of his within-grade increase was denied with prejudice for failure to exhaust.
Thus, Mr. Silveria's Removal Claim is the only claim subject to Defendant's current motion to dismiss.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a party may move to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. When subject matter jurisdiction is challenged, "the party seeking to invoke the court's jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing that jurisdiction exists." Scott v. Breeland, 792 F.2d 925, 927 (9th Cir. 1986). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion will be granted if the complaint, when considered in its entirety, on its face fails to allege facts sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction. See Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 (9th Cir. 2003).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint that fails to meet this standard may be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss after the Supreme Court's decisions in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), a plaintiff's "factual allegations [in the complaint] `must . . . suggest that the claim has at least a plausible chance of success.'" Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., 765 F.3d 1123, 1135 (9th Cir. 2014). The court "accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). But "allegations in a complaint . . . may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action [and] must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively." Levitt, 765 F.3d at 1135 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Defendant contends that the TAC should be dismissed because: (1) the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction on all claims except his Removal Claim; (2) Mr. Silveria fails to state a claim under the Rehabilitation Act; (3) Mr. Silveria fails to state a claim for disability retaliation; and (4) Mr. Silveria fails to plead his Whistleblower Protection Act claim as a mixed claim, which is required for it to be sufficiently exhausted. These arguments are in addition to Defendant's preliminary argument, which is that this case should be dismissed for failure to substantively respond to the motion to dismiss. In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court will not accept Defendant's preliminary argument, and will address the merits.
A court may not entertain employment discrimination claims by a Federal-employee plaintiff unless he or she has first exhausted the administrative process required by federal statute. See Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820, 832 (1976); Thompson v. Brennan, 2018 WL 558934, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2018). "[S]ubstantial compliance with the presentment of discrimination complaints to an appropriate administrative agency is a jurisdictional prerequisite." Sommatino v. U.S., 255 F.3d 704, 708 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis in original). Newly-raised discrimination claims falling outside the scope of an administratively-considered complaint must be dismissed. Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 644 (9th Cir. 2003). The exhaustion requirement applies equally to Rehabilitation Act claims. See Leorna v. U.S. Dep't of State, 105 F.3d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1997); Thompson, 2018 WL 558934, at *3.
The ordinary procedure for a federal employee who seeks to exhaust her Rehabilitation Act claims is to initially file an EEO complaint with her agency and then, once the agency has issued its final decision, appeal that decision to either the EEOC or a federal district court. Sloan v. West, 140 F.3d 1255, 1259 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1614.310(a)). An employee may also file an action in district court if—after 180 days from the date of appealing to the EEOC—the EEOC does not issue a final decision on the matter. 29 U.S.C. § 1614.407(b).
The Civil Service Reform Act ("CSRA") created the Merit System Protection Board ("MSPB"), which is a "quasi-judicial Government agency" that adjudicates Federal employee appeals of agency personnel actions. Id. at 1258-59. "Generally, the MSPB is authorized to review `adverse employment actions,' which fall into one of five categories: a removal, a suspension for more than 14 days, a reduction in grade, a reduction in pay, or a furlough of 30 days or less." Sloan, 140 F.3d at 1259.
The MSPB also has pendent jurisdiction over discrimination claims brought in connection with an "adverse action" otherwise appealable to it. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.302. This means that an employee seeking to pursue a claim of discrimination that is related to an adverse action (a "mixed" claim) has two options: (1) she can file a "mixed case complaint" with the agency EEO department that can then be appealed to the MPSB; or (2) she can file a "mixed case appeal" directly with MSPB. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.302(b).
"A mixed case complaint is a complaint of employment discrimination filed with a federal agency based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, disability, or genetic information related to or stemming from an action that can be appealed to the . . . [MSPB]." 29 C.F.R. § 1614.302(a)(1). "A mixed case appeal is an appeal filed with the MSPB that alleges that an appealable agency action was effected, in whole or in part, because of discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, disability, age, or genetic information." 29 C.F.R. § 1614.302(a)(2).
When a mixed case is appealed to the MSPB, the MSPB must determine whether it has jurisdiction over the employee's claims. A finding by the MSPB that it lacks jurisdiction to hear a claim at one time was only appealable to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit; now, such a finding is appealable to a district court. See Perry v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 137 S.Ct. 1975, (2017). On the other hand, if the MSPB finds it has jurisdiction over the appeal, then the administrative judge decides the claim(s) on the merits (of both the discrimination and adverse action claims); the employee then has the option of seeking further MSPB review. Sloan, 140 F.3d at 1260. If the employee does not appeal the ALJ's decision to the MSPB panel within 30 days, the AJ's decision becomes final and the employee can either appeal any related discrimination claims to the EEOC or file an action in the federal district court as to the discrimination claim. Id.
In the case at bar, Defendant claims that Mr. Silveria has failed to plead administrative exhaustion of all claims except his Removal Claim. Mot. at 5. More specifically, Defendant argues that the within-grade increase claim cannot be replead because it was dismissed with prejudice, id. at 7, and any claims arising under the 2013 EEO Claim must fail because there are no additional factual allegations establishing Mr. Silveria requested reconsideration. Id. at 11.
This Court dismissed Mr. Silveria's within-grade increase claim with prejudice because he did not timely seek review in the Federal Circuit within sixty (60) days after the date of the MSPB's decision, which denied his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Dismissing Order at 13. However, Mr. Silveria continues to allege this claim in his TAC. See TAC ¶¶ 48-76. If Mr. Silveria disagreed with this Court's prior order, his proper recourse was a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-9. He did not file such motion. Accordingly, this Court
On July 13, 2017, Mr. Silveria was advised that he had 30 days to file a request for reconsideration with the OFO, and 90 days to file a civil action following the denial of his 2013 EEO Claim. He did not file a civil action. At the last hearing on Defendant's motion to dismiss the SAC, Mr. Silveria pointed the Court's attention to an e-mail dated August 11, 2017, with a subject line that read "Request for consolidation of EEOC claims, request for identity protection, and
Mr. Silveria has not plead new factual allegations in his TAC to support exhaustion—i.e., Mr. Silveria has
Because Mr. Silveria has failed to amend his pleading with factual allegations demonstrating that he submitted a substantive request for reconsideration and that it was actually received and considered by the EEOC, the Court now
The 2014 EEO Claim contained one non-mixed claim, which is made up of a hostile work environment claim and five discrete acts. Docket No. 66 ("Collazo Decl.") ¶ 9, Ex. 2 at 3-5. At the hearing on the motion to dismiss the SAC, Mr. Silveria provided the Court and Defendant (for the first time) with a copy of the EEOC's decision to forgo further investigations and issuing a right-to-sue letter, dated July 19, 2019. This Court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss without prejudice because this exhaustion was not plead in the SAC. Mr. Silveria, however, elected to file a separate complaint to pursue his non-mixed claims (instead of including it in the TAC), which the parties stipulated to relation and consolidation with this case. Therefore, this claim is not the subject of the current motion to dismiss because the Court ordered Mr. Silveria to file a consolidated complaint
As discussed in the Dismissing Order, judicial review in federal district court is available only with respect to a WPA claim that is brought as a "mixed" claim—one that alleges the basis for the adverse personnel action was retaliation for whistleblowing activities
The MSPB considered Mr. Silveria's WPA claim in connection with his removal appeal. In the MSPB's August 1, 2017 decision, it stated that
First RJN, Ex. 6 at 9 (emphasis added). The MSPB then went on to consider Mr. Silveria's whistleblower claim but eventually found against him. Id. at 31-32. Thus, Mr. Silveria has exhausted his whistleblower claim by presenting it to the MSPB, but only as it related to his Removal Claim as a mixed claim because agency review over pure WPA claims lie exclusively with the Federal Circuit.
In light of the foregoing, the only properly-exhausted claims before this Court are the following: (1) disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act; (2) disability retaliation; and (3) whistleblower retaliation (as a mixed-claim).
To state a prima facie case of discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act, Mr. Silveria must demonstrate that (1) he is a person with a disability, (2) who is otherwise qualified for employment as a Rating Veterans Service Representative, meaning that he can perform the essential duties of this position with or without reasonable accommodation, and (3) suffered discrimination because of his disability. See Walton v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 492 F.3d 998, 1005 (9th Cir. 2007). In the Dismissing Order, this Court found that
Dismissing Order at 19-20.
Defendant argues even assuming arguendo that Mr. Silveria satisfies the first and third elements, Mr. Silveria still nonetheless fails to plead that he is a qualified individual under the Rehabilitation Act to satisfy this prong, Mr. Silveria must sufficiently plead that he is a qualified individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that he holds. Dark v. Curry Cty., 451 F.3d 1078, 1086 (9th Cir. 2006). Defendant points to the TAC's allegations regarding Mr. Silveria's qualifications, but suggests that these allegations only speak to his qualifications from March 1, 2013—which was over a year before the discriminatory conduct at issue here. Mot. at 17.
The TAC pleads the essential functions of a RVSR. Specifically, a RVSR is responsible for "creating ratings for veterans' benefits claims, responding to veterans, typing up rating decisions, reviewing medical records, setting up examinations, creating VA documents, and attending training to keep up on all the legal, Congressional, and VA changes." TAC ¶ 122. He also pleads his initial qualifications that led to his promotion to RVSR in 2012: "[h]e completed a Bachelor o[f] Arts degree, had military service, types 60 words per minute, and was considered a qualified individual with a disability by the VA VRE program . . . ." Id. ¶ 123. However, because this Rehabilitation Act claim derives from the 2014 EEO Claim, which only concerned his June 2014 removal claim, his TAC must plead that he was qualified
Accordingly, the Court
To state a prima facie case for failure to accommodate a disability, a plaintiff must show that (1) he is disabled, (2) he is a qualified individual, and (3) that a reasonable accommodation is possible. Zukle v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir.1999); Buckingham v. United States, 998 F.2d 735, 739-40 (9th Cir.1993). A "reasonable accommodation" is defined as "[m]odifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that enable an individual with a disability who is qualified to perform the essential functions of that position[.]" 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(ii).
This Court previously dismissed this claim and instructed Mr. Silveria to "specifically allege in his complaint what accommodation he required, and whether such accommodation would allow him to perform the essential job duties." Dismissing Order at 21. Mr. Silveria continues to pursue a failure-to-accommodate claim in connection with his Removal Claim. Defendant contends that the claim is deficient because it fails to allege that Mr. Silveria could perform the essential functions of the RVSR position with a reasonable accommodation. Moreover, Defendant cites to the two reasonable accommodations identified in the TAC (e.g., an ergonomic chair/workstation and consideration of alternative employment), but it argues that the TAC falls short because it fails to explain how these two accommodations would have enabled him to perform his essential job functions. Defendant also contends that there is no allegation that Mr. Silveria applied for a vacant position or anything to that effect.
As with the disability discrimination claim, the Court
The hostile-work-environment claim appears to arise from either the 2013 EEO Claim or the non-mixed claims relating to the 2014 EEO Claim. To the extent it stems from alleged acts that were the subject of the 2013 EEO Claim, it remains dismissed with prejudice as indicated above for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. If the alleged harassment arises from the 2014 EEO Claim's non-mixed claim, then it is not currently before this Court in this motion to dismiss. The Court, therefore,
To state a claim for retaliation, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that he engaged in a protected activity; (2) that he was subsequently subjected to an adverse employment action; and (3) that a causal link exists between the two. Manatt v. Bank of America, 339 F.3d 792, 800 (9th Cir. 2003). This Court previously instructed Mr. Silveria to plead "what was the protected activity." Mot. at 21 (citing Docket No. 60).
Defendant argues that any disability-related retaliation claim must be dismissed for "failure to specify the protected activity that forms the basis of his EEO retaliation claim; failure to delineate the specific adverse actions taken in retaliation for the protected EEO activity; and failure to allege but-for causation." Reply at 7. While Defendant does not challenge that Mr. Silveria engaged in protected activity by engaging in the EEO process, his 2014 EEO Claim contains three legal theories on which he claimed retaliation: discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation (2012), national origin and physical disability (2013), and disability (2014). Defendant contends it is unclear what protected activity Mr. Silveria claims was the cause of the alleged retaliation. Mot. at 22. However, Mr. Silveria has not sufficiently pled what disability-related protected activity he engaged in that resulted in retaliation.
As with all the claims arising out of the 2014 EEO Claim and the Rehabilitation Act, the Court
Without a viable Rehabilitation Act claim, Mr. Silveria's whistleblower claim fails because he must plead his WPA claim as a mix claim in order to be administratively exhausted. Therefore, the Court
All claims subject to this motion are
Although this case will be closed, the case management conference in Case No. 18-cv-7327 EMC remains scheduled for March 19, 2020 at 9:30 a.m., as it is for management purposes for Case No. 19-cv-6600-EMC. The parties
This order disposes of Docket No. 84. The Clerk is instructed to enter Judgment and close the case.
