MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHARLES F. EICK, Magistrate Judge.

PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff filed a Complaint on August 25, 2014, seeking review of the Commissioner's denial of benefits. The parties filed a consent to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge on September 29, 2014.

Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on January 26, 2015. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on April 27, 2015. The Court has taken both motions under submission without oral argument. See L.R. 7-15; "Order," filed September 3, 2014.

BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION

Plaintiff asserted disability since July 20, 2008, based on a variety of alleged physical and psychiatric impairments (Administrative Record ("A.R.") 70-81, 104-13, 241-42, 263). Following a previous stipulated remand, the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") examined the medical record and heard testimony from Plaintiff, a medical expert and a vocational expert (A.R. 4-1065).

The ALJ found Plaintiff has severe "cervical spondylosis, lumbar degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine; asthma; hypothyroidism Hashimoto;1 obesity; lupus; fibromyalgia;2 sleep apnea; Sjogren's. . . syndrome3" (A.R. 7). The ALJ also found, however, that Plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity to perform a limited range of light work (A.R. 7). In making this finding, the ALJ discounted the credibility of Plaintiff and Plaintiff's husband (A.R. 8-9). In reliance on the testimony of the vocational expert, the ALJ determined that there exist significant numbers of jobs performable by a person having the identified residual functional capacity (A.R. 11-13). The ALJ therefore denied disability benefits (A.R. 13-14).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), this Court reviews the Administration's decision to determine if: (1) the Administration's findings are supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the Administration used correct legal standards. See Carmickle v. Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Brewes v. Commissioner, 682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation and quotations omitted); see Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006).

Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations and quotations omitted).

DISCUSSION

After consideration of the record as a whole, Defendant's motion is granted and Plaintiff's motion is denied. The Administration's findings are supported by substantial evidence and are free from material4 legal error. Plaintiff's contrary arguments are unavailing.

I. Substantial Evidence Supports the Conclusion Plaintiff Can Work.

The medical evidence provides little support for Plaintiff's claim of disability and substantial support for the ALJ's rejection of that claim. Extensive medical testing during the alleged period of disability revealed little or no objective basis for many of Plaintiff's subjective complaints (A.R. 396 (normal CT head scan in September of 2008); 397 (normal x-ray of right hand in September of 2008); 399 (normal chest x-ray in June of 2008); 512-14 (normal EEG in January of 2010); 515-16 (normal EEG in October of 2009); 517-19 (normal EEG in September of 2009); 520-21 (normal EKG in August of 2009); 531 (normal chest x-ray in March of 2010); 535 (normal cervical spine x-ray in November of 2009); 536 (normal MRI of head in September of 2009); 635 (normal colonoscopy in March of 2011); 636-37 (normal endoscopy in March of 2011); 640-41 (normal x-rays of hands, wrists, pelvis and hips in June of 2011); 979 (normal pelvic ultrasound in June of 2013); 1038 (normal CT of head in March of 2010)).

Plaintiff claimed she quit work in 2008 because of, inter alia, problems with her lungs (A.R. 104). Plaintiff has had asthma since childhood, however, and her treatment records show that her asthma was stable without acute flare-ups as of November of 2008 (A.R. 333, 370).

Plaintiff complains of symptoms allegedly related to autoimmune problems (including Sjogren's syndrome). Plaintiff's treating rheumatologist did not believe that Sjogren's syndrome or any other alleged autoimmune problems disabled Plaintiff from employment (A.R. 352).

Cervical spine and lumbar spine CT scans and MRIs did show some disc desiccation, some mild degenerative changes, some disc protrusion and mild disc bulges (A.R. 532-34, 606, 972-74, 1049). Plaintiff's most recent lumbar spine MRI in July of 2013 actually shows improvement over the previous MRI, however (A.R. 976-77). None of Plaintiff's treating physicians appear to have opined that any of these alleged orthopedic problems would disable Plaintiff from all employment. Dr. Chukwuemeka Ezike, the medical expert, opined Plaintiff retains a residual functional capacity consistent with the capacity the ALJ found to exist (A.R. 87-92). The state agency physicians concurred (A.R. 551-60, 584-93). Where, as here, the opinions of non-examining physicians do not contradict "all other evidence in the record," an ALJ properly may rely on these opinions. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995); Curry v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127, 1130 n.2 (9th Cir. 1990).

With respect to Plaintiff's alleged psychiatric problems, examining psychiatrist Dr. Linda Smith opined in October of 2009 that Plaintiff had no psychiatric impairment of her ability to work (A.R. 562-69). Dr. Smith also stated that "[i]t appears she is attempting to claim to have `PTSD' but I do not see any evidence of this. It appears she is attempting to claim that she might disassociate at times, but she really cannot describe this either in any credible fashion" (A.R. 568). State agency physicians similarly opined Plaintiff has no significant mental impairment (A.R. 570-83).

Although some of the evidence appears to be in conflict, it is the prerogative of the ALJ to resolve conflicts in the record. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 509 (9th Cir. 2001). When evidence "is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation," the Court must uphold the administrative decision. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d at 1039-40; accord Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002); Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997). The Court will uphold the ALJ's rational interpretation of the evidence in the present case notwithstanding any conflicts in the record.

The vocational expert testified that a person with the residual functional capacity the ALJ found to exist could perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy (A.R. 92-98). The vocational expert's testimony furnishes substantial evidence there exist significant numbers of jobs Plaintiff can perform. See Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1340 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Barker v. Secretary, 882 F.2d 1474, 1478-80 (9th Cir. 1989); see generally Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1435-36 (9th Cir. 1995) (ALJ properly may rely on vocational expert to identify jobs claimant can perform); 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).

II. The ALJ Did Not Materially Err in Discounting the Credibility of Plaintiff or Plaintiff's Husband.

An ALJ's assessment of a claimant's credibility is entitled to "great weight." Anderson v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1121, 1124 (9th Cir. 1990); Nyman v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1985). Where, as here, the ALJ finds that the claimant's medically determinable impairments reasonably could be expected to cause some degree of the alleged symptoms of which the claimant subjectively complains, any discounting of the claimant's complaints must be supported by specific, cogent findings. See Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 2010); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995); but see Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282-84 (9th Cir. 1996) (indicating that ALJ must offer "specific, clear and convincing" reasons to reject a claimant's testimony where there is no evidence of malingering).5 An ALJ's credibility findings "must be sufficiently specific to allow a reviewing court to conclude the ALJ rejected the claimant's testimony on permissible grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit the claimant's testimony." See Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Social Security Ruling 96-7p. As discussed below, the ALJ stated sufficient reasons for deeming Plaintiff's subjective complaints less than fully credible.

In discounting Plaintiff's credibility, the ALJ placed principal reliance on perceived inconsistencies between Plaintiff's allegedly incapacitating symptomatology and her daily activities (A.R. 8-9). With regard to her alleged symptomatology, Plaintiff claimed: she must spend "90 percent" of her time in bed in her pajamas; she suffers pain everywhere in her body; she wakes up "with swollen body parts and cannot use them"; she cannot put on her socks and shoes or button her clothes on her own; she drops things regularly and falls down regularly; she has panic attacks; and she exists in a constant state of anxiety (A.R. 75, 78-79, 106, 108-09, 263). Yet, the record reflects a wide range of daily activities inconsistent with the incapacity Plaintiff claims. For example, during all of part of the alleged period of disability, Plaintiff took care of her grandson for four hours each day, swept, dusted, did dishes, cooked for and looked after her 17 year old son, and shopped for groceries two to three hours at a time (A.R. 274-76, 1008). The ALJ properly relied on the inconsistencies between Plaintiff's claims and her demonstrated activities in discounting Plaintiff's credibility. See, e.g., Thune v. Astrue, 499 Fed. App'x 701, 703 (9th Cir. 2012) (ALJ properly discredited pain allegations as contradicting claimant's testimony that she gardened, cleaned, cooked, and ran errands); Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2008) (claimant's "normal activities of daily living, including cooking, house cleaning, doing laundry, and helping her husband in managing finances" was sufficient explanation for rejecting claimant's credibility); Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2005) ("In determining credibility, an ALJ may engage in ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as considering . . . inconsistencies in claimant's testimony.").

Accordingly, the ALJ stated sufficient reasons to allow this Court to conclude that the ALJ discounted Plaintiff's credibility on permissible grounds. See Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d at 885. The Court therefore defers to the ALJ's credibility determination. See Lasich v. Astrue, 252 Fed. App'x 823, 825 (9th Cir. 2007) (court will defer to ALJ's credibility determination when the proper process is used and proper reasons for the decision are provided); accord Flaten v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 44 F.3d 1453, 1464 (9th Cir. 1995).

The ALJ also properly discounted the credibility of Plaintiff's husband. As the ALJ pointed out, the husband's statements "mirrored the claimant's allegations" (A.R. 9; see A.R. 281-88). An ALJ may discount lay witness statements where the statements are similar to the claimant's testimony and the ALJ has given legally sufficient reasons for discounting the claimant's testimony. See Valentine v. Commissioner Social Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 2009) ("In light of our conclusion that the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for rejecting Valentine's own subjective complaints, and because Ms. Valentine's testimony was similar to such complaints, it follows that the ALJ gave germane reasons for rejecting her testimony"). Because the ALJ's discounting of Plaintiff's testimony was proper, the ALJ's discounting of the husband's similar statements was also proper. See id.

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons,6 Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied and Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.