ORDER

Blackburn, United States District Judge.

The matter before me is defendant American Security Insurance Company's Motion To Enforce Final Order and Judgment and for Permanent Injunction and Supporting Memorandum of Law [# 174],1 filed February 25, 2016, in which defendants HSBC Finance Corporation and HSBC Mortgage Service, Inc. join [# 175], filed February 26, 2016). I have continuing jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651,2 the express terms of my Order Granting Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, Certification of Settlement Class, Approval of Plan of Allocation and Memorandum in Support Thereof ¶ 4 at 3 [# 171], filed October 19, 2015 [hereinafter, "Final Order"], and the ancillary jurisdiction of the court, exercising its inherent powers, to enforce its judgments, see Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 356, 116 S.Ct. 862, 868, 133 L.Ed.2d 817 (1996); Metzger v. UNUM Life Insurance Co. of America, 151 Fed.Appx. 648, 651 (10th Cir.2005). I grant the motion substantively, but deny defendants' request for attorney fees and costs associated with the motion.

As directed by the Final Order (see Final Order ¶ 2 at 3), final judgment with prejudice was entered against the named plaintiffs and all members of the Settlement Class on October 20, 2015. The Final Order contemplates "[t]hat promptly after the Effective Date,[3] Settlement Class members shall dismiss with prejudice all claims, actions, or proceedings that have been brought by any Settlement Class member in any other jurisdiction and that have been released pursuant to the Settlement and this Order." (See id. ¶ 17 at 13.) At that time, a lawsuit was pending in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi challenging the same lender-placed (alternatively known as force-placed) flood insurance practices as were the subject of this action. The plaintiff in that case, Lakisha Rochelle Griffin, has refused to dismiss her claims, prompting the instant motion.4

A settlement agreement is a contract, and thus questions of its construction and scope are governed by principles of contract law. United States v. McCall, 235 F.3d 1211, 1215 (10th Cir.2000); Anthony v. United States, 987 F.2d 670, 673 (10th Cir.1993). In connection with such a contract, parties to a class action may release, on behalf of the class, both "claims not presented and even those which could not have been presented as long as the released conduct arises out of the identical factual predicate as the settled conduct." Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 107 (2nd Cir.2005) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

There can be no serious question but that Ms. Griffin is a member of the Settlement Class subject to the Final Order. The gravamen of much of Ms. Griffin's lawsuit is her allegation that HSBC, through American Security Insurance Company, wrongfully force-placed flood insurance on her property in 2008 and 2009, and perhaps thereafter as well. (Def. Motion App., Exh. A-1 ¶¶ 48-49 at 17.) That allegation places Ms. Griffin squarely within the ambit of the Settlement Class, which was defined to include "all borrowers in the United States who, between January 1, 2007, and April 20, 2015 (the `Class Period'), were charged by the HSBC defendants and/or their respective subsidiaries and affiliates as insureds or additional insureds for a lender-placed flood insurance policy." (Final Order ¶ 7 at 4.)5

Ms. Griffin's reliance for the contrary position on the Fifth Circuit's unpublished, per curiam decision in In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Products Liability Litigation, 627 Fed.Appx. 319 (5th Cir.2015), is thoroughly unpersuasive. That case is plainly distinguishable on its facts.6 Moreover, to the extent the case stands more generally for the proposition that "[i]t spurns simple reasoning to require individuals to opt out of a settlement agreement under which they were never entitled to compensation," id. at 322-23, the fact is that Ms. Griffin was entitled to and was offered compensation from the settlement in this case as a putative member of the Settlement Class.

Ms. Griffin's next argument — that the Released Claims are not implicated by her lawsuit — is no more convincing. Her attempt to distinguish the factual allegations of her complaint from those of the underlying complaint in this case misses the mark entirely, since the preclusive effect vel non of the Settlement Agreement is governed by reference to the terms of the agreement itself, not by the claims asserted in the complaint. See Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 371 F.3d 1285, 1289 (11th Cir.2004) (noting this important distinction between res judicata effect of previously litigated case and res judicata effect of settlement agreement).

As to that relevant inquiry, the scope of the "Released Claims" set forth in the Settlement Agreement is exceptionally broad, and provides, in relevant part:

(Final Order ¶ 14(b) at 8-9.) Such claims include, inter alia, "all claims related to any Released Party's placement of and charges for or related to LPFI Policies during the Class Period."7 Given that expansive definition, the minor factual distinctions between Ms. Griffin's circumstances, including the allegation that defendants force placed flood insurance despite receiving proof that she had acquired insurance independently, do not put her claims outside the scope of the Released Claims.

Finally, Ms. Griffin claims she did not receive adequate notice of the proposed settlement in this case because notice was mailed to the address of her insured property, which had been damaged in a 2013 fire. She maintains that since defendants processed her claim for the fire loss, they should have known she was not living at that address and should have made further efforts to ensure that she received actual notice.8

Setting aside the fact that this argument is supported by no actual evidence (in the form of an affidavit, declaration, or otherwise) to substantiate Ms. Griffin's claim of non-receipt, it is legally unsound. Notice meets the requirements of due process where it is "`reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.'" DeJulius v. New England Health Care Employees Pension Fund, 429 F.3d 935, 944 (10th Cir.2005) (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 657, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950)). What is required is that the class as a whole receive "the best notice practicable under the circumstances." In re Integra Realty Resources, Inc., 262 F.3d 1089, 1110-11 (10th Cir.2001); aff'd, 354 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir.2004).9 The failure of any individual class member to receive actual notice does not render notice constitutionally inadequate. DeJulius, 429 F.3d at 944. See also Burns v. Copley Pharmaceutical, Inc., 1997 WL 767763 *2 (10th Cir. Dec. 11, 1997); Silber v. Mabon, 18 F.3d 1449, 1453-54 (9th Cir.1994); US West, Inc. v. Business Discount Plan, Inc., 196 F.R.D. 576, 582 (D.Colo.2000); In re Prudential Securities Inc. Ltd. Partnerships Litigation, 164 F.R.D. 362, 368 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 107 F.3d 3 (2nd Cir.1996); In re VMS Limited Partnership Securities Litigation, 1995 WL 355722 at *2 (N.D.Ill. June 12, 1995); Trist v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Chester, 89 F.R.D. 1, 2 (E.D.Pa.1980).

Accordingly, I find and conclude that Ms. Griffin is a member of the Settlement Class who, despite constitutionally adequate notice of the proposed settlement, failed to opt out in the time allowed. She therefore is bound by the Final Order and the judgment entered in this matter. Thus, to the extent her claims in the Mississippi lawsuit come within the ambit of the Released Claims, she must be enjoined from further prosecuting those claims.

Although defendants also request attorney fees and costs incurred in filing this motion, they have provided no legal authority, nor any factual substantiation, to support such an award. The motion thus is denied insofar as it seeks such relief.

THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED as follows:

1. That defendant American Security Insurance Company's Motion To Enforce Final Order and Judgment and for Permanent Injunction and Supporting Memorandum of Law [# 174], filed February 25, 2016, is granted in part and denied in part;

2. That the motion is granted to the extent it seeks to enjoin Lakisha Rochelle Griffin from prosecuting further any of the Released Claims in the case styled Griffin v. HSBC Mortgage Services, Inc. et al., Civil Action No. 4:14-cv-00132 (N.D.Miss.), and Ms. Griffin is so enjoined; and

3. That the motion is denied insofar as it seeks attorney fees and costs incurred in connection with the filing thereof.