ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE Re: Dkt. No. 14

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS, District Judge.

Plaintiff Mojdeh Hariri-Vijeh filed suit on July 9, 2015 against defendant Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, alleging defendant wrongfully denied plaintiff's claim for disability benefits. (Dkt. No. 1. ("Compl.").) The complaint asserts two claims: (1) breach of contract; and (2) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks punitive and treble damages under California Civil Code sections 32941 and 3345,2 respectively. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 23.)

On August 27, 2015, defendant filed a motion to strike the portions of plaintiff's complaint seeking treble damages under Section 3345. (Dkt. No. 14. ("Mot."), 1:7-10.) Plaintiff opposes the motion. (Dkt. No. 18.)

Having carefully considered the papers submitted3 and the pleadings at issue, and for the reasons stated herein, the Court hereby DENIES defendant's motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff insured, a licensed dentist, was issued an individual disability insurance policy by defendant insurer in November 2013. (Compl. ¶¶ 3, 5.) Thereafter, at some point "in or around 2014," plaintiff was diagnosed with adhesive capsulitis of the shoulder, commonly known as "frozen shoulder." (Id. ¶ 13.) Her symptoms include pain and fatigue in her hands, arms, shoulder, and back, and plaintiff states she has "experienced severe pain and immobility in those areas." (Id. ¶¶ 13, 14.) The side effects of medication add to her suffering and "repetitive motions exacerbate . . . symptoms." (Id. ¶ 13.) According to plaintiff, "constant use" of the impacted areas is "required" while practicing dentistry. (Id. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff's orthopedic surgeon provided defendant with medical records detailing plaintiff's condition and apparently recommended she "entirely" cease working. (Id. ¶ 14.)

Defendant ultimately denied plaintiff's claim for disability benefits, finding she was able to continue working as a dentist despite contrary reports and opinions of her treating physicians. (Id. ¶ 16.) When plaintiff requested a copy of her claim file, defendant did not oblige, making it difficult for plaintiff to "adequately respond." (Id. ¶ 16.) In the absence of disability income, plaintiff was "forced to sell her dentistry practice." (Id. ¶ 17.) Plaintiff suffers from emotional distress and anxiety as a result of defendant's decision. (Id. ¶ 17.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A court "may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). "The function of a [Rule] 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial. . . ." Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993) rev'd on other grounds, 510 U.S. 517 (1994)). "Motions to strike are generally disfavored because they are often used as delaying tactics and because of the limited importance of pleadings in federal practice.'" Shaterian v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 829 F.Supp.2d 873, 879 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (quoting Rosales v. Citibank, Fed. Sav. Bank, 133 F.Supp.2d 1177, 1180 (N.D. Cal. 2001)).

Given the disfavored status of Rule 12(f) motions, "courts often require a showing of prejudice by the moving party before granting the requested relief." Sanchez v. City of Fresno, 914 F.Supp.2d 1079, 1122 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (quoting California Dep't of Toxic Substances Control v. Alco Pac., Inc., 217 F.Supp.2d 1028, 1033 (C.D. Cal. 2002)). "If there is any doubt whether the portion to be stricken might bear on an issue in the litigation, the court should deny the motion." Holmes v. Elec. Document Processing, Inc., 966 F.Supp.2d 925, 930 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (quoting Platte Anchor Bolt, Inc. v. IHI, Inc., 352 F.Supp.2d 1048, 1057 (N.D. Cal. 2004)). Whether to grant a motion to strike is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court. See Whittlestone, 618 F.3d at 973 (citing Nurse v. United States, 226 F.3d 996, 1000 (9th Cir. 2000)).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant moves to strike portions of the complaint that request treble damages under Section 3345. (Mot. 1:7-10.) Defendant makes three primary arguments: (1) the claim should be stricken because a trebling of damages under Section 3345 is precluded as a matter of law where premised upon common law claims; (2) the claim should be stricken as insufficiently supported by plaintiff's factual allegations; and, (3) alternatively, the claim should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). The Court treats each in turn.

First, a court cannot grant a motion to strike on the basis that damages that are precluded as a matter of law. See Whittlestone, 618 F.3d at 971 ("Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not authorize a district court to strike a claim for damages on the ground that such damages are precluded as a matter of law.") The Court is unpersuaded by the two non-binding cases proffered by defendant to the contrary. (Mot. 2:1-9.) In Tapley v. Lockwood Green Engineers, Inc., the Eighth Circuit merely held that "[i]f and when the case is ultimately appealed from final judgment, the issue presented here can be more appropriately dealt with at that time." 502 F.2d 559, 560 (8th Cir. 1974). Thus, Tapley does not directly address the present issue. Id. In further support of its position, defendant cites Bureerong v. Uvawas, which states "a motion to strike may be used to strike any part of the prayer for relief when the damages sought are not recoverable as a matter of law." 922 F.Supp. 1450, 1479 n.34 (C.D. Cal. 1996). However, Bureerong has since been abrogated by Whittlestone. See Pallen Martial Arts, LLC v. Shir Martial Arts, LLC, 2014 WL 2191378 at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2014) ("In light of Whittlestone, Bureerong is no longer good law."). Defendant provides no authority that allows the Court to stray from the binding standard set forth in Whittlestone.4 Therefore, the motion on this ground is denied.

Second, defendant argues that the request for treble damages should be stricken because it is unsupported by sufficient factual allegations. (Dkt. No. 16. ("Reply"), 1:15-19.) However, "[t]he proper medium for challenging the sufficiency of factual allegations in a complaint is through Rule 12(b)(6) not Rule 12(f)." Kelley v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 750 F.Supp.2d 1132, 1146 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (citing Consumer Solutions REO, LLC v. Hillery, 658 F.Supp.2d 1002, 1020 (N.D. Cal. 2009)). Defendant cites a lone case to support its proposition that a motion to strike may be employed in this manner. See Storm Mfg. Grp. Inc. v. Weather Tec Corp., 2013 WL 5352698, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2013). Storm, however, is inapposite. There, the court merely declined to rule on the motion to strike, having already dismissed the damages claim in question in connection with the motion to dismiss. Storm, 2013 WL 5352698, at *10 ("Since plaintiff's request for punitive damages against Weather Tec is subject to dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court declines to consider defendants' motion to strike that request pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f)."). Thus, the motion on this ground is also denied.5

Finally, in the alternative, defendant requests the Court convert its 12(f) motion to strike into a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Kelley, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 1146 (E.D. Cal. 2010) ("[W]here a motion is in substance a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, but is incorrectly denominated as a Rule 12(f) motion, a court may convert the improperly designated Rule 12(f) motion into a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.") (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Court declines to do so in light of the procedural posture of the request. Specifically, defendant first raised this alternative request in its reply brief. Consequently, the parties have not briefed the relevant issues under the applicable Rule 12(b)(6) framework. See also footnote 4, supra.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby DENIES defendant's motion to strike.

This Order terminates Docket Number 14.

IT IS SO ORDERED.