LAUREL BEELER, Magistrate Judge.
This is an employment dispute between plaintiff Wendie Finnan and her former employer Zurich American Insurance Company ("Zurich") and a Zurich supervisory manager, Rory Angold. Ms. Finnan alleges that the defendants induced her to move with her disabled husband from Florida to California to start a job with Zurich paying $180,000 a year. Once she started at Zurich, however, it turned out to be impossible for her to earn $180,000 a year because Zurich was not interested in the clients that she brought in. Ms. Finnan also alleges that before she was hired, Mr. Angold commented that she looked like an old schoolteacher and that he wanted to hire someone young and attractive to have "T&A" in the territory as opposed to someone like Ms. Finnan (who is over fifty). After Ms. Finnan was hired, Mr. Angold supported younger male employees but did not support her. Six months after Ms. Finnan started with Zurich, Zurich reduced its workforce and eliminated Ms. Finnan's position. Ms. Finnan alleges that Mr. Angold played a role in her termination and that he did so based on her age, gender, and appearance.
Ms. Finnan filed suit in California Superior Court, bringing claims (1) against Zurich and Mr. Angold for violation of California Labor Code §§ 970-977, (2) against Zurich for violation of California Government Code §§ 12940 et seq. for wrongful termination based on gender and age discrimination, (3) against Zurich and Mr. Angold for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, (4) against Zurich and Mr. Angold for intentional infliction of emotional distress, (5) against Zurich and Mr. Angold for fraud, (6) against Zurich and Mr. Angold for violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq. for unfair business practices, (7) against Zurich and Mr. Angold for promissory estoppel, and (8) against Zurich and Mr. Angold for fraudulent concealment.
The defendants removed the case to federal court, claiming diversity jurisdiction because Ms. Finnan is a citizen of California and Zurich is a citizen of New York and Illinois. Mr. Angold is also a citizen of California — but the defendants argue that Mr. Angold was fraudulently joined to this case and his citizenship thus should be disregarded. Ms. Finnan moved to remand the case back to state court. The defendants moved to dismiss Ms. Finnan's complaint.
The court can decide the motions without oral argument. N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). The court grants Ms. Finnan's motion to remand and denies the defendants' motion to dismiss without prejudice as moot.
Ms. Finnan and Mr. Angold are both citizens of California.
Ms. Finnan makes the following allegations in her complaint.
In 2017, Ms. Finnan was living in Florida with her disabled husband.
Ms. Frades said that Zurich was looking to hire long-term career candidates and was not interested in applicants looking just for a job or a short-term position.
In May 2017, Ms. Finnan flew to California for an in-person interview with Ms. Frades.
At the June 2017 meeting, Mr. Angold asked Ms. Finnan if she knew what the position paid.
On July 5, 2017, Ms. Finnan received an employment offer letter from Zurich.
Within a couple of weeks of Ms. Finnan's starting at Zurich, her manager (Ms. Frades) was transferred and was never replaced.
Mr. Angold supported the younger male employees and spent time with them in their territories but refused to spend time with Ms. Finnan in her territory, allegedly because of her gender, age, and appearance.
It turned out to be impossible for Ms. Finnan to earn $180,000 a year because Zurich was not interested in the types of clients that Ms. Finnan was hired and incentivized by commissions to solicit and retain.
Ms. Finnan attaches to her motion to remand a sworn declaration from Ms. Frades that contains additional assertions.
Ms. Finnan submitted an application to Zurich in April 2017 and completed an online assessment.
Ms. Frades conducted an interview of Ms. Finnan alone and said that the interview went extremely well.
Ms. Frades was unable to secure a second interview with Ms. Finnan for six weeks.
In May 2017, Mr. Danielson and Mr. Angold conducted phone interviews with Ms. Finnan.
In June 2017, Ms. Finnan had a second interview with Ms. Frades, Mr. Angold, and Mr. Danielson.
Ms. Finnan reported for work in California at Zurich on August 1, 2017.
Mr. Angold reported to Ms. Frades that Ms. Finnan was troublesome because she called underwriters, peers, instructors, and others to ask questions.
Mr. Angold supported male account executives and spent time with them in their territories but refused to spend time with Ms. Finnan in hers.
In December 2017 or January 2018, Zurich instituted a round of layoffs.
The parties filed competing motions: Ms. Finnan's motion to remand and defendants' motion to dismiss. The court first considers Ms. Finnan's motion because it goes to federal subject-matter jurisdiction, a threshold inquiry.
Subject to certain limitations, a defendant in state court may remove an action to federal court if the case could have been filed originally in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Original jurisdiction may be based on diversity or federal-question jurisdiction. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. To invoke diversity jurisdiction, the complaint must allege that "the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between [] citizens of different States[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).
"Diversity removal requires complete diversity, meaning that each plaintiff must be of a different citizenship from each defendant." Grancare, LLC v. Thrower ex rel. Mills, 889 F.3d 543, 548 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996)). "In determining whether there is complete diversity, district courts may disregard the citizenship of a non-diverse defendant who has been fraudulently joined." Id. (citing Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Cockrell, 232 U.S. 146, 152 (1914)). "There are two ways to establish fraudulent joinder: `(1) actual fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts, or (2) inability of the plaintiff to establish a cause of action against the non-diverse party in state court.'" Id. (quoting Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1044 (9th Cir. 2009)). "Fraudulent joinder is established the second way if a defendant shows that an `individual joined in the action cannot be liable on any theory.'" Id. (internal brackets omitted) (quoting Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co., 139 F.3d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998)). "But `if there is a possibility that a state court would find that the complaint states a cause of action against any of the resident defendants, the federal court must find that the joinder was proper and remand the case to the state court.'" Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1046)).
"A defendant invoking federal court diversity jurisdiction on the basis of fraudulent joinder bears a `heavy burden' since there is a `general presumption against finding fraudulent joinder.'" Id. (internal brackets omitted) (quoting Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1046)). "Fraudulent joinder must be proven by clear and convincing evidence." Hamilton Materials Inc. v. Dow Chem. Corp., 494 F.3d 1203, 1206 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Pampillonia v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 138 F.3d 459, 461 (2d Cir. 1998)). Courts refuse to find fraudulent joiner "where a defendant raises a defense that requires a searching inquiry into the merits of the plaintiff's case, even if that defense, if successful, would prove fatal." Grancare, 889 F.3d at 548-49 (citing Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1046). Additionally, "[i]f a defendant cannot withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the fraudulent inquiry does not end there. For example, the district court must consider . . . whether a deficiency in the complaint can possibly be cured by granting the plaintiff leave to amend." Id. at 550. A court may find fraudulent joinder only if the claim against the non-diverse defendant is "wholly insubstantial and frivolous." Id. at 549.
The defendants here have not met their "heavy burden" to show that Mr. Angold "cannot be liable on any theory" and that Ms. Finnan's claim against him is "wholly insubstantial and frivolous." Cf. Grancare, 889 F.3d at 548-50. For example, Ms. Finnan pleads (among other claims) a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") against Mr. Angold. Ms. Finnan's complaint and Ms. Frades's declaration (which Ms. Finnan could amend her complaint to include, and thus which the court must consider, Grancare, 889 F.3d at 550) allege that Mr. Angold opposed hiring Ms. Finnan because of her age, gender, and appearance, instead wanted to hire "T&A" for her position, and after Zurich hired her, discriminated against her and excluded her from opportunities offered to other employees — and ultimately terminated her — based on her age, gender, and appearance. This may potentially plead an IIED claim. Cf., e.g., De Ruiz v. Courtyard Mgmt. Corp., No. C 06-03198 WHA, 2006 WL 2053505, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2006) ("`Behavior may be considered outrageous, and sufficient to sustain an IIED claim, if a defendant abuses a relation or position which gives him power to damage the plaintiff's interest.'") (internal brackets omitted) (quoting Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal.3d 932, 946 (1979)); Gibson v. Am. Airlines, No. C 96-1444 FMS, 1996 WL 329632, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 1996) (allegations that defendants "at all times intended to terminate plaintiff and not allow her to advance" and denied plaintiff rights that were given to other employees could plead an IIED claim).
Because the defendants have not shown that Mr. Angold was fraudulently joined and because there is no diversity of citizenship between Ms. Finnan and Mr. Angold, remand is appropriate.
The court grants Ms. Finnan's motion and remands the case to the Superior Court for the County of Marin. The court denies defendants' motion to dismiss as moot, without prejudice to any motion the defendants might bring before the state court.