ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT DEANCO HEALTHCARE, LLC'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO STRIKE

[Dkt. Nos. 17, 18]

DEAN D. PREGERSON, District Judge.

Presently before the Court are Defendant Deanco Healthcare, LLC's ("Defendant") Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike. (Dkt. Nos. 17, 18.) After considering the parties' submissions, the Court adopts the following Order.

I. BACKGROUND

This case involves Defendants the County and City of Los Angeles, the County's Department of Public Social Services ("DPSS"), the Los Angeles Police Department ("LAPD"), and several members of those Departments, as well as Defendant Deanco Healthcare, LLC. (See Compl., Dkt. No. 1.) The Plaintiff, Donald Austen, alleges that these parties violated his constitutional rights and committed several state law torts, all arising out of an incident that resulted in Austen's involuntary residence at Defendant Deanco's Mission Community Hospital for a seventy-two hour psychiatric hold. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 42.)

According to Plaintiff's Complaint, Plaintiff is the President and Founder of a nonprofit organization, Thursday's Child, that serves endangered children. (Id. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff alleges he contacted the Los Angeles County DPSS on February 2, 2015, to see if he could get grants for his organization's "youth mental health outreach programs," and he was told that he would be contacted the next morning. (Id. ¶ 17.) The next day, Plaintiff alleges that he received a call from "Jessica," a DPSS Mental Health Services employee, who provided Plaintiff with a name and number to call for the grant, but Plaintiff explained that he had no success calling that number in the past. (Id. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff told Jessica she should call the number, let them know Plaintiff would be calling, and then call him back. (Id.)

Later that day, Jessica called Plaintiff back and "inexplicably began asking Austen if he was suicidal." (Id. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff denied he was suicidal, but Jessica was persistent with her questioning, leading Plaintiff to demand to speak with a supervisor, being put on hold, and then hanging up and calling back. (Id.) Jessica then connected Austen with her supervisor, who refused to give Austen more information other than her name; eventually, Austen was told the name of the head of the department at DPSS and Austen ended the phone call. (Id.) Austen then called the department head and left a message. (Id.)

However, Plaintiff alleges that Jessica then called 911 "in her official capacity, and under color of law" in order to get a "welfare check" on Plaintiff, claiming Plaintiff was a client of the DPSS. (Id. ¶ 24.) According to Plaintiff, Jessica claimed that Plaintiff was "not coherent and tangential" on the phone and had told her that he had suicidal thoughts, but had told her that if Jessica sent police he was "going to take them out," and then hung up. (Id. ¶ 25.) Plaintiff claims this was all a purposeful and knowing lie by Jessica. (Id. ¶¶ 20-26.) Jessica allegedly provided 911 with Plaintiff's address and made noncommittal statements as to whether Plaintiff was a client of DPSS and what Thursday's Child was. (Id. ¶ 28-30.)

Then, the LAPD sent a helicopter, officers, and a SWAT team to Austen's location, where Thursday's Child is headquartered. (Id. ¶ 32-33.) Plaintiff received a phone call from an Officer Holguin who asked if he was suicidal; Plaintiff denied that he was. (Id. ¶ 32.) Plaintiff later received a second call from Holguin, demanding he come outside, where the helicopter and SWAT team were. (Id. ¶ 33.)

When Plaintiff went outside, he saw the tactical team, the police car, and an officer holding a gun pointing at Plaintiff's gate. (Id. ¶ 34.) Austen was told to lie down on the ground, and then was handcuffed, but he was told "cuffs go on, but they also come off," with Holguin stating that the police only sought to talk to Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 35.)

Handcuffed, Plaintiff alleges he was walked to the center of his street, where he was on display to the growing crowd of neighbors watching the spectacle. (Id. ¶¶ 36-40.) Officers Holguin and Morales informed Plaintiff that they "had gone door to door to tell [the neighbors] that Austen was suicidal and a threat to others." (Id. ¶ 39.) Then, Plaintiff was taken to a police station, where he was eventually asked if he had received a psychiatric evaluation, which Plaintiff denied. (Id. ¶ 41.)

Then, Holguin and Morales took Plaintiff to Mission Community Hospital ("MCH"), where Plaintiff was told he would be placed on a seventy-two hour psychiatric hold. (Id. ¶ 42.) Morales told Austen that "he was not under arrest, and that `unfortunately' they did not have cause to do so `or [they] would have.'" (Id. ¶ 43 (alteration in original).) Austen asked what would happen if he was found to be mentally sound and Holguin told him "that she was writing her report in a way that he would not be released early no matter what." (Id. ¶ 44.)

However, Holguin and Morales left Austen "in the care of the MCH" after removing his handcuffs and did not fill out an intake form or do any other process. (Id. ¶ 45.) The intake nurse at MCH "asked if Austen was dangerous to others or himself" and the officers said he was not, removed his cuffs, and led Austen to a gurney "where he sat — unrestrained and unwatched — for several more hours." (Id. ¶ 46.)

Plaintiff alleges that MCH "is under contract with the County of Los Angeles and City of Los Angeles to serve as a holding facility for persons involuntarily taken into custody under California Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150." (Id. ¶ 47.) Plaintiff also alleges that MCH, including its intake nurse, knew that he was not a danger to himself or others, and that the officers told MCH and the nurse that he was not a danger. (Id. ¶ 52.) There was no probable cause, Plaintiff states, to take him into custody, but MCH did take him "into involuntary custody in violation of his constitutional rights to liberty under the 4th and 14th Amendments and in direct violation of the specific provisions of California Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150." (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that the officers and MCH failed to provide required warnings under section 5150. (Id. ¶¶ 53-55.)

While at MCH, Austen's blood was drawn "against his will," and he was interviewed by an emergency room doctor, although not about his mental health, given sleeping pills and antibiotics, and then taken to a locked psychiatric unit. (Id. ¶¶ 56-58.) Plaintiff alleges that no "psychiatrist or trained mental health evaluator from MCH ever interview[ed] Austen or examine[d] him to assess him as required" by section 5150. (Id. ¶ 57.) Eventually, Austen was visited by a psychologist, detective, and intern from "DSV"1 who all apologized for the incident but claimed to lack authority to release him. (Id. ¶ 59.) On February 7, 2015, Plaintiff alleges that he was finally released from custody, but came home to see that the police had searched his entire home in his absence. (Id. ¶ 60.)

Defendant Deanco Healthcare, LLC, d/b/a Mission Community Hospital, has moved this Court to dismiss the seven causes of action against it: (1) violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments under Section 1983 for excessive force and illegal detention; (2) violation of due process under Section 1983; (3) violation of California's Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150; (4) false arrest and imprisonment; (5) negligent infliction of emotional distress; (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (7) false light invasion of privacy. (Mot. Dismiss at 2.) Defendant also seeks to strike from the complaint any reference to or prayer for punitive damages and attorneys' fees, at least as it relates to its own actions as alleged in the complaint. (Notice of Mot. Strike at 2-3.) The Court notes that the parties have agreed that the ninth, tenth, and eleventh causes of action in the complaint are no longer alleged against Defendant Deanco. (Notice of Mot. To Dismiss at 2.)

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion to Dismiss

A 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss requires a court to determine the sufficiency of the plaintiff's complaint and whether it contains a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must (1) construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and (2) accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, as well as all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them. See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001), amended on denial of reh'g, 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001); Pareto v. F.D.I.C., 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998).

In order to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint must "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). However, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. at 678. Dismissal is proper if the complaint "lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory." Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561-63 (dismissal for failure to state a claim does not require the appearance, beyond a doubt, that the plaintiff can prove "no set of facts" in support of its claim that would entitle it to relief).

A complaint does not suffice "if it tenders `naked assertion[s]' devoid of `further factual enhancement.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. The Court need not accept as true "legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations." Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003).

B. Motion to Strike

Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that the "court may strike from a pleading . . . any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Immaterial matter is that which has no bearing on the claims for relief or the defenses being pled. Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 2010). Impertinent matter consists of statements that do not pertain, and are not necessary, to the issues in question. Id. Under Rule 12(f), the court has the discretion to strike a pleading or portions thereof. MGA Entm't, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 2005 WL 5894689, at *4 (C.D. Cal. 2005). "A motion to strike under Rule 12(f) should be denied unless it can be shown that no evidence in support of the allegation would be admissible, or those issues could have no possible bearing on the issues in the litigation." Gay-Straight Alliance Network v. Visalia Unified Sch. Dist., 262 F.Supp.2d 1088, 1099 (E.D. Cal. 2001). In considering a motion to strike, the court views the pleadings in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See In re 2TheMart.com Secs. Litig., 114 F.Supp.2d 955, 965 (C.D. Cal. 2000)).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Dismiss

1. Federal Claims

First, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to identify any specific employee of MCH and connect that employee with wrongdoing to rise to the level of a constitutional violation as is required for a section 1983 claim. (Mot. at 5.) Further, Defendant claims, even if such specific conduct were alleged, there is no vicarious liability under section 1983, so the first two causes of action should be dismissed. (Id. at 5-6.) Second, Defendant challenges whether there is state action by MCH because it is a private actor undertaking a civil commitment and merely alleging a broad conspiracy is insufficient to state a claim. (Id. at 6-8.)

Plaintiff argues that no one, including MCH, followed the proper procedures under section 5150 and that MCH has direct corporate liability under section 1983 because it failed to have proper policies and procedures. (Opp'n at 6-8.) Plaintiff argues that such an argument can be inferred from the Complaint, but asks for leave to amend if needed. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff also argues that Defendant MCH is a state actor, whether directly or through conspiracy. (Id. at 9-13.)

Defendant's Reply argues that Plaintiff's Opposition and complaint "admit[] that none of the facts necessary to plead a § 1983 claim have been met" because there are no allegations of a formal corporate policy, a violation by someone with authority, or ratification of some action, and therefore there is no corporate defendant liability. (Reply at 2.) Defendant also argues that merely pleading that Defendant was a state-contracted facility is inadequate to show state action. (Id. at 3.) Further, Defendant claims there are no specific facts pled in the complaint as to a conspiracy between the LAPD and MCH. (Id. at 4.)

To state a claim under section 1983, "a plaintiff must show (1) that Defendants deprived him or her of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) that, in doing so, Defendants acted under color of state law." Jensen v. Lane Cnty., 222 F.3d 570, 574 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal alteration and quotation omitted). "It is established that involuntary confinement or civil commitment is a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protections." Id. (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979)).

"Liability under section 1983 arises only upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant. . . . There is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983." Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). However, "[w]here plaintiffs have based their claim for liability directly on unconstitutional policies or customs and not on the doctrine of respondeat superior, it is erroneous for a district court to dismiss the individual defendants." Sanders v. Kennedy, 794 F.2d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Monell v. New York City Dep't Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).

Plaintiff's first two causes of action under Section 1983 allege violations of Plaintiff's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and to be free of excessive force and illegal detention. (Compl.) In his Opposition, Plaintiff argues that no one at MCH followed necessary section 5150 procedures for evaluating whether there was probable cause to execute a psychiatric hold on Plaintiff, which in turn violated his constitutional rights. (Opp'n at 3-6.) Plaintiff argues that MCH is directly responsible for this violation of Plaintiff's rights, as is required under section 1983 law, because Plaintiff argues that the hospital's policies and procedures caused Plaintiff's rights to be violated. (Id. at 6-7.)

However, as Defendant argues, there is no mention in the complaint of Defendant MCH's procedures and policies. As currently pled, Plaintiff's complaint reads like it alleges vicarious liability, which does not state a claim under section 1983. Therefore, these two causes of action against Defendant Deanco are dismissed for failure to state a claim, but leave to amend is granted.

As for the claim that MCH is not a state actor, the Court finds that the complaint pleads sufficient facts to demonstrate that MCH is a state actor in its role of detaining individuals in section 5150 psychiatric holds. The Ninth Circuit in Jensen held a private physician acting on behalf of a private hospital in committing an individual for a mental health evaluation was a state actor under the "close nexus/joint action test." 222 F.3d at 574-76. This was because the evaluation was initiated by government workers who worked closely with the private actors and helped develop and maintain the policies of the private actors. Id. at 575. Similarly here, Plaintiff has alleged a close relationship between MCH and the government actors, including that Plaintiff's detention was initiated by government actors who then handed Plaintiff off to MCH. According to Plaintiff, MCH has a contractual relationship with the County and the City to hold individuals taken into custody under section 5150. (Compl. ¶ 47.) This is sufficient to show that there is state action.

2. State Claims

a. Violation of Section 5150

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to show a violation of California's section 5150, the civil commitment statute. (Mot. at 8-9.) Defendant claims that there are very limited civil remedies for a violation of that statute, and such remedies require a knowing and willful violation of the act because the statute also gives immunity to healthcare facilities like MCH. (Id. at 9.) Here, Defendant argues, Plaintiff has merely argued that "MCH violated the LPS Act by failing to provide an assessment or failing to provide a psychiatrist interview," and there are no allegations in the complaint that there was a knowing and willful violation of the statute. (Id. at 9-10.)

Plaintiff argues that the state law claims are properly pled because MCH failed to follow the required section 5150 procedures, which entitles Plaintiff to civil damages. (Opp'n at 14-17.) Further, Plaintiff claims his failure to identify any particular individual as responsible for MCH's detaining him is not fatal to his claims because MCH as a whole is responsible, and because Plaintiff did name some individuals in the complaint. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, MCH and its employees were aware that there was no probable cause for detaining Austen and still did so. (Id. at 20.) Further, there is no immunity, Plaintiff argues, because MCH failed to act in accordance with the section 5150 procedures. (Id. at 18.) Lastly, any exemption from liability is "narrow" according to Plaintiff, and so there is still negligence liability available under the statute. (Id. at 19-20.)

Defendant responds that any section 5150 hold was placed on Plaintiff by the LAPD, and not MCH, and so MCH cannot be held to have violated the procedures of section 5150 when MCH was not the party that initiated the hold and MCH had no knowledge that there was a lack of probable cause for the hold. (Reply at 5-6.) Further, Defendant argues that Plaintiff still cannot show that Defendant can be held liable under a civil damages remedy because there is no pleading that MCH or any party on MCH's behalf acted "knowingly and willfully" as the statute requires. (Id. at 7.)

Relatedly, Defendant also argues that the complaint as currently pled is confusing as to whether there was a section 5150 hold in place, and if so, who ordered the hold. (Mot. at 10-11; Reply at 5-6.) Defendant argues that at the least, the confusion must be rectified through amendment, but that if the LAPD is alleged to have ordered the hold, then Defendant is immune from civil suit under the statute. (Id.)

A civil damages suit under the Lanterman-Petris Act, of which section 5150 is a part, requires a knowing and willful violation of section 5150 or the other parts of the statute governing mental health commitments. See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5259.1 ("Any individual who is knowingly and willfully responsible for detaining a person in violation of the provisions of this article is liable to that person in civil damages.").

The Court finds that the Complaint as currently alleged does clearly state that MCH violated section 5150 by failing to provide required warnings and follow required procedures. The Complaint alleges that this was knowingly and willfully done because MCH and its employees had knowledge that Plaintiff was not a danger to himself or others, that there was no probable cause to detain him, and that MCH failed to provide proper evaluation throughout the seventy-two hour detention period. The precise allegation of who ordered the section 5150 hold is unclear, Plaintiff argues, because no section 5150 hold was ever appropriate and so no proper section 5150 hold took place.

Instead, according to Plaintiff, MCH and the other Defendants held Plaintiff for a psychiatric hold in a locked psychiatric unit without proper cause or procedures followed under section 5150. Therefore, based on these facts pled in the Complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a claim for MCH holding Plaintiff in violation of section 5150 and that MCH did so knowingly and willfully.

However, MCH argues that section 5259.1's civil damages provision requires an "individual" to be named as the bad actor, not a facility such as MCH. Plaintiff argues this is inconsistent with MCH's position regarding its immunity under section 5278, which also protects "individuals." See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5278. Neither party has cited cases that would require the Court to rule either way, but Defendant has not cited any cases that support its proposed reading of the statute. Plaintiff has cited cases, including one where a defendant healthcare facility was not granted immunity out of hand on the basis of this individual language in the civil damages or immunity statutes. See Jacobs v. Grossmont Hosp., 108 Cal.App.4th 69, 71-72 (2003). Therefore, the Court will allow the civil damages action against Defendant Deanco to go forward; Defendant's motion to dismiss is denied as to these claims.

c. Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Causes of Action

Similar to the argument above, Defendant argues that since the complaint is unclear as to who ordered the section 5150 hold, Plaintiff's allegations that stem from the ordering of that hold without probable cause cannot be alleged against Defendant, who did not order the section 5150 hold but was instead following the LAPD's orders. (Mot. at 11.) Thus, Defendant argues, because the factual underpinnings for false imprisonment and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress were caused by other defendants, these claims should be dismissed as to MCH. (Id. at 11-12.)

Plaintiff argues that his fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of actions are adequately pled. (Opp'n at 20.) He claims that because he was held without probable cause — and because MCH knew there was no probable cause — there is a legal basis for these causes of action, regardless of who or whether a section 5150 evaluation and report was completed. (Id.)

As discussed above, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently pled a violation of section 5150; thus, the state law causes of action relying upon such a violation are also sufficiently pled because they rest on the same factual allegations. Therefore, the motion to dismiss these causes of action is denied.

d. False Light

Defendant argues that the cause of action for invasion of privacy and false light should be dismissed because there was no publication of false information by Defendant, as all the relevant conduct alleged in the Complaint took place before Plaintiff was a patient at MCH. (Mot. at 12.)

Plaintiff responds that his arrest and detention "threatens Plaintiff's appearance to the public" because, for example, Plaintiff will be unable to own a gun in some states if he has been detained for mental health reasons recently. (Opp'n at 21.) However, Plaintiff concedes that he has "no intent to purchase a gun." (Id.)

Defendant's Reply points out that Plaintiff's position does not change the fact that there must be some connection between this specific Defendant's conduct and the alleged misconduct, which here has to be publication of a false statement about Plaintiff. (Reply at 7-8.)

California courts have explained the tort of false light as "a species of invasion of privacy, based on publicity that places plaintiff before the public in a false light that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and where the defendant knew or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the plaintiff would be placed." Price v. Operating Eng'rs Local Union No. 3, 195 Cal.App.4th 962, 970 (2011) (citing Rest. 2d Torts § 652E).

Plaintiff's arrest and initial detention were alleged to be done by the LAPD officers outside Plaintiff's home, in the presence of his neighbors. These actions were not taken by Defendant Deanco, and so Deanco cannot be held liable for those actions. Further, it is unclear if publication is alleged in the complaint, and the argument regarding gun ownership Plaintiff brings in Opposition is inapposite. Therefore, there appears to be no facts alleged against Defendant Deanco that support the false light cause of action, so it is dismissed with leave to amend.

B. Motion to Strike

Defendant has also moved the Court to strike specific language from the complaint. (Notice of Mot. Strike, dkt. No. 18, at 2-3.) Primarily, Defendant wants the Court to strike all allegations for punitive damages and attorneys fees against it. (Mot. Strike, dkt. no. 18-1, at 4, 7.) Defendant argues that there is no legal basis for these claims of relief and the facts pled in the Complaint do not support the imposition of these forms of relief. (Id.)

Plaintiff responds that this motion is premature at this stage of the case and confusing because there are multiple defendants with different potential liabilities. (Opp'n, dkt. no. 23, at 2-3.)

Defendant's Reply argues that the motion was timely filed and that there are no facts pled that would support punitive damages or attorneys' fees and so this motion is appropriate, at least as to Defendant Deanco. (Reply at 2-3.) Defendant argues that the fact that there are multiple defendants in the case only supports the point that the complaint must be clear as to the allegations against each of them. (Id. at 5-6.)

Plaintiff's Complaint alleges facts that support the imposition of punitive damages because he alleges actions by MCH that would show "oppression, fraud, or malice." See Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(a). However, Defendant argues that Plaintiff seeks punitive damages against it, the employer, based on actions of MCH employees, but that Plaintiff has not pled facts necessary to support the imposition of punitive damages against an employer for an employee's actions under section 3294(b).

Similar to the section 1983 problems described above, the Court agrees that Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled facts showing that the particular Defendant — Deanco, d/b/a MCH — has acted as to incur the possibility of punitive damages. Based on the requirements of the statute, Plaintiff must plead that:

Id. § 3294(b). Therefore, Defendant's motion to strike is granted as the punitive damages against Defendant Deanco, but Plaintiff has leave to amend his complaint as to allege the necessary facts.

Plaintiff's prayer for attorneys' fees against Defendant Deanco can remain if Plaintiff amends his section 1983 claims because section 1983 claims would entitle Plaintiff to attorneys' fees. Other causes of action may also entitle Plaintiff to attorneys' fees, but the Court does not rule on that ground because Plaintiff did not raise them in his Opposition. Thus, the attorneys' fees prayer is stricken from the Complaint as to Defendant Deanco, but leave to amend is granted.

IV. CONCLUSION

For all the reasons listed above, the Court DENIES in part and GRANTS in part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Defendant's Motion to Strike. Plaintiff has fourteen days from the date of this Order to amend his complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.