WILLIAM ALSUP, District Judge.
Dr. Huvard signed opening and rebuttal expert reports. He holds a Ph.D. in chemical engineering with thirty-five years of experience in developing and commercializing chemical, pharmaceutical, and polymer processes. In his ten-page opening expert report, he opined that the eleven-page document Raymat provided A&C Catalysts was "wholly unacceptable for the purpose of transferring adequate and, in our professions, a commonly expected level of knowledge on the manufacturing of lauroyl lysine." He opined that the phrases "technology transfer package," "manufacturing process," and "chemical operation export instrument" all referred to the same thing, "a detailed written description of how the chemical production facility is constructed and operated to produce a product that is subject to a variety of quality and regulatory constraints." As an "example," he appended to his opening expert report a 25-page document from Japan (in English), currently available on the website for the National Institute of Health Sciences in Japan, titled "Guideline for Technology Transfer." In his rebuttal expert report, he criticized portions of Raymat's expert report, relied on a Canadian definition of "technology transfer," and pointed to internet reports of an unrelated Honeywell deal. He also opined (Dkt. No. 66-1 at 5) (footnotes omitted):
Dr. Huvard's rate was $350 per hour, increased to $450 per hour for depositions and trial.
During the deposition of Dr. Huvard, the following occurred when questioned by counsel for Raymat (Huvard Dep. 84, Dkt. No. 66-4) (emphasis added):
Raymat then filed a Daubert motion. Raymat's motion is
First, Dr. Huvard should never have refused to answer proper questions posed during his deposition. Raymat was entitled to examine Dr. Huvard on the opinions stated in his rebuttal expert report. Raymat may try to admit at trial the aforementioned testimony for purposes of impeachment.
Second, Dr. Huvard is precluded from testifying about any opinions based on the random document drafted by strangers to this litigation in Japan. Also, he should not get into the definition of "technology transfer" stated in a Canadian document and the internet report of an unrelated Honeywell deal.
Third, as stated at the hearing, A&C Catalysts cannot use Dr. Huvard's deposition testimony taken by opposing counsel in lieu of testimony in person. This would be unfair. If he is tendered as a witness, he must appear in person.
At an expert deposition, counsel in Raymat's position ordinarily would not cross-examine the expert on every point that counsel would bring up on cross-examination at trial. Instead, depositions of experts are more selective and strategic. It is not unusual for counsel to limit the deposition examination to pinning down ambiguation in the Rule 26 report without trying to impeach on the spot. In fact, one purpose of such depositions is to flesh out the story so that after the deposition, counsel can further investigate and be able to impeach the fleshed-out story at trial.
For the proponent of a witness to seek to rest upon the fleshed-out version of the story at deposition and to avoid cross-examination at trial is unfair.
Beyond this, direct testimony at trial is limited to what was timely disclosed in the expert report. Even if examination by opposing counsel went beyond the four corners of the report in deposition, that cannot be received into evidence on direct testimony at trial. This is a long-standing practice stated in the undersigned judge's orders designed, in part, to encourage counsel to make sure their disclosures are forthcoming. Accordingly, expert testimony herein must be in person.
Raymat's motion to exclude the expert report of Dr. David Dodds is
Dr. David Dodds signed an opening expert report. He holds a Ph.D. in organic synthesis with experience in the area of pharmaceutical and chemical manufacturing. In his twelve-page report, he opined based on his "experience in the field and [as one] skilled in the art," that "to reasonable industrial standards," the eleven-page document provided by Raymat did not meet the requirements of documentation "for the purpose of transferring a manufacturing process from one party to another and allowing the continuation of the business of manufacturing Lauroyl Lysine for commercial sale." His rate was $570 per hour.
Raymat moves to exclude Dr. Dodds' report and testimony based on (1) his failure to consider "sufficient facts," including that Raymat did not own the Yantai plant in China, and (2) his "unreliable methodology." That is, Dr. Dodds opined about what a document for a "manufacturing site transfer" would require, whereas in Raymat's view, it had no obligation to transfer all of the manufacturing details that would allow A&C Catalysts to recreate the plant in Yantai.
A&C Catalysts responds that Dr. Dodds was not required to accept Raymat's "version of contested facts" and Dr. Dodds' insight into the "usage of trade and the industry standards for transfer of a chemical manufacturing process" based on his experience will be helpful to the trier of fact (Opp. 1).
Raymat's attack goes to the weight, not admissibility, of Dr. Dodds' opinions. Accordingly, Raymat's motion is
A&C Catalysts' motion to exclude the expert report of Dr. Walter Goldstein is
Dr. Goldstein signed a rebuttal expert report. He holds a Ph.D. in chemical engineering and a MBA. He has over fifty years of experience in "science and engineering," including experience developing and overseeing chemical and biochemical processes. In his nine-page report, he opined that Raymat's eleven-page document was "perfectly acceptable" and that "[t]here isn't any evidence that conveying anything else such as equipment was intended or agreed to by the parties." His rate was $350 per hour, increased to $475 for testimony.
During deposition, Dr. Goldstein was asked who drafted portions of his report. He stated (Goldstein Dep. 57-58, 62-63, Dkt. No. 67-3):
A&C Catalysts moves to exclude Dr. Goldstein's report and testimony because (1) he is not qualified to be an expert in the area of "sale or transfer of a chemical manufacturing process," (2) Raymat's attorney was the ghostwriter of the report, (3) Dr. Goldstein cannot opine about the parties' subjective intentions about the terms of the settlement agreement, and (4) Dr. Huvard found flaws with Dr. Goldstein's analysis.
In opposition, Raymat responds that counsel acted as a "legal secretary — by providing sufficient facts and documents to the expert, by explaining the legal issues of the case, and by providing secretarial support." Nonetheless, Raymat argues that Dr. Goldstein formed his opinions based on the facts provided and his experience in the field.
A&C Catalysts' general attack on Dr. Goldstein's qualifications is rejected, but Dr. Goldstein cannot testify as to the parties' subjective intent for the settlement agreement. He lacks personal knowledge of that intent. That Raymat's counsel may have served as a ghostwriter for portions of the report will not alone disqualify Dr. Goldstein, but this may be used to impeach Dr. Goldstein at trial. Moreover, the following statements are hereby
Dr. Goldstein will be able to testify as to relevant opinions based on his experience and knowledge of customs in the field. For example, he can opine that "[i]n the world of manufacture [sic], it is inappropriate for one to use the phrase `manufacturing process' to cover both the process and the equipment" and that a "chemical engineer assigned the task of specifying equipment to make the LL product would use [Raymat's eleven-page document] as the basis to carry out his or her engineering analysis and specify equipment and layout in consultation with vendors and in a manner that fits (and is germane) to his company's facility, utilities, resources, etc." (Goldstein Rep. 3, 5, Dkt. No. 69-1).
In sum, the experts may testify as to customs and usage in practice based on their experience in the relevant field and as ones skilled in the art, as disclosed in their expert reports. They cannot, however, speculate as to the intent of the parties and cannot testify on matters for which they lack personal knowledge.
For the reasons stated at the hearing, Raymat's motion in limine number 1 is